The Class of 1964 Policy Research Shop

ANALYSIS OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN UKRAINE

Prepared for the United States Agency for International Development/Kyiv Mission

PRS Policy Brief 1617-01
January 23, 2017

Prepared By:

Apoorva Dixit
Jordan Einhorn
Jessica Fedin
Sarah Han
Michelle Li
Regan Plekenpol
Priya Ramaiah
Rebecca Rodriguez
Alexa Sonnenfeld
Clara Wang
Andrew Weckstein
Kevin Zhang

Contact:
Professor Ronald G. Shaiko
Nelson A. Rockefeller Center for Public Policy and the Social Sciences
Dartmouth College
ronald.g.shaiko@dartmouth.edu
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

1. **INTRODUCTION** 6

2. **THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL ENVIRONMENT FOR CSO ACTIVITY AND DEVELOPMENT** 7
   - 2.1 **KEY FINDINGS**
   - 2.2 **RECOMMENDATIONS**
   - 2.3 **ANALYSIS OF UCIPR UKRAINE CIVIL SOCIETY ENABLING ENVIRONMENT (UCSEE) PROGRAMMING** 8
   - 2.4 **THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE AND REFORM PROGRESS: SLOWLY BUT SURELY MAKING IMPROVEMENT** 9
     - 2.4.1 CSO Perspective of Progress on Government Reform
     - 2.4.2 Improved Relations between Government and CSOs
     - 2.4.3 Government Resistance to CSO Activity and Reform Efforts
     - 2.4.4 Public Perception of Reform Progress
     - 2.4.5 Influence of Russian Aggression on the Political Environment
   - 2.5 **THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND JUDICIAL REFORM** 12
     - 2.5.1 The Current State of the Courts
     - 2.5.2 The Progress of Judicial Reforms
     - 2.5.3 Alternative Dispute Resolution and Other Solutions
   - 2.6 **THE ADMINISTRATIVE ENVIRONMENT FOR CSOS: REGISTRATION, TAXATION, AND IMPLEMENTATION** 14
   - 2.7 **LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND CSOS: MISTRUST WITH POTENTIAL** 16
   - 2.8 **CASE STUDY: DOPOMOGA DNIPRA AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS** 17
     - 2.8.1 An Absent Government
     - 2.8.2 Support from the International Community: Effective or Misguided?

3. **CSO SUSTAINABILITY** 19
   - 3.1 **KEY FINDINGS**
   - 3.2 **RECOMMENDATIONS**
   - 3.3 **UNITER CONTEXT**
   - 3.4 **RELIANCE ON INTERNATIONAL FUNDING**
   - 3.5 **DOMESTIC AND COMMUNITY FUNDING**
     - 3.5.1 State and Government Funding
     - 3.5.2 Innovative Funding Methods
   - 3.6 **ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: MANAGEMENT AND LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT**
   - 3.7 **CONSTITUENCY BUILDING**
     - 3.7.1 Constituency Building as a Metric of Sustainability
   - 3.8 **RECOMMENDATIONS**
   - 3.9 **CASE STUDY: NONPROFIT MANAGEMENT M.A. PROGRAM AT UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY (UCU)** 25

4. **CSO MOBILIZATION** 26
   - 4.1 **KEY FINDINGS**
   - 4.2 **RECOMMENDATIONS**
   - 4.3 **EVALUATION OF ISAR-EDNANIA**
   - 4.4 **NATIONAL IDENTITY: BEYOND POST-SOVIET MENTALITIES**
     - 4.4.1 Impetus to Mobilization
     - 4.4.2 Recommendations
   - 4.5 **GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS, COALITIONS, AND INSTITUTIONALIZED CSO MOBILIZATION** 30
     - 4.5.1 Grassroots Organizations
     - 4.5.2 Coalition Groups
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A team of twelve students from the Nelson A. Rockefeller Center at Dartmouth College spent the Fall 2016 term studying the current state of civil society in Ukraine. The students analyzed the relevant documents produced by USAID regarding democracy assessment as well as documents focused specifically on civil society organization (CSO) sustainability and activism. In addition, the students analyzed reports submitted to USAID by its implementing partners focused on civil society and media programming, including: Strengthening Civil Society in Ukraine Project—UNITER, implemented by Pact; Ukraine Civil Society Enabling Environment Project, implemented by UCIPR; Ukraine Civil Society Capacity Building Project, implemented by ISAR-Edannia; and U-Media, implemented by Internews Network. Each of these programs will be discussed in the broader context of four thematic approaches to the analysis: 1) the overarching political and legal environment within which CSO development and activism takes place (team members: Michelle Li, Andrew Weckstein, Kevin Zhang); 2) CSO sustainability (team members: Apoorva Dixit, Priya Ramaiah, Rebecca Rodriguez); 3) CSO mobilization (team members: Jordan Einhorn, Sarah Han, Regan Plekenpol); and 4) the relationship between the media and civil society in general (team members: Jessica Fedin, Alexa Sonnenfeld, Clara Wang).

Following their ten-week analysis of these documents as well as academic research and journalistic accounts of civil society development and activism in Ukraine during the fall term, the students embarked on a field research mission that began in Washington, DC on Monday, November 28 with meetings at the Ukrainian Embassy in the United States, and the US-Ukrainian Foundation. The following day, the students had meetings at USAID/Washington and with Senator Rob Portman, (R-OH), chair of the Senate Ukraine Caucus, as well as with his staff member responsible for Caucus activities. On the evening of Tuesday, November 29, the team flew to Kyiv, arriving on the afternoon of Wednesday, November 30. On the morning of Thursday, December 1, the team met with the Democracy and Governance team at USAID/Kyiv and received a comprehensive overview of Mission programming relating to civil society. From December 1 through December 13, the four teams identified above conducted 61 interviews with 92 CSO leaders, government officials, and media representatives. In addition to conducting interviews in Kyiv, the teams traveled to Dnipro, Lviv, and Odesa to conduct interviews with similar leaders and officials.

The mixed methods approach employed by the students closely mirrors approaches undertaken by democracy assessment teams contracted by USAID/Washington or by USAID Missions around the world. The implementation of this approach, however, is somewhat different from more typical USAID assessments. Rather than focusing solely on the assessment of specific USAID programs, their implementing partners, and grantees, the team has taken a broader approach to analyzing civil society in Ukraine. While the students have interviewed the USAID implementing partners and some of their grantees, the teams have pursued CSOs representative of their four themes. As a result, this report offers both a retrospective look at civil society activities and programs as well as prospective views in the context of the new USAID-funded ENGAGE program that targets local,
grassroots organizations and initiatives. Also, in addition to the thematic analyses, each term has produced a case study that is illustrative of one or more of its finding and/or recommendations.

In order for the four teams to convey their findings from each interview, nightly debriefings were held throughout the thirteen-day period. In addition, all interview notes were posted on a shared Google drive. Each primary interview team was responsible for highlighting comments or thoughts that were relevant to other teams. By the end of the interview period, each team was responsible for reading and incorporating relevant aspects of each of the interviews undertaken into its analysis. Students also had prepared background papers on twelve topics relating to CSOs during the fall term that have served to augment their field research in Ukraine.

Each of the four teams has synthesized its research effort into four major findings as well as four recommendations for future USAID civil society programming. These findings and recommendations will be presented in the following order: political and legal environment, CSO sustainability, CSO mobilization, and media and civil society.

The political and legal environment team focused its attention on interactions between CSOs and governmental entities at all levels of government. The interviews by team members included discussions with elected and appointed governmental officials as well as CSOs seeking structural reforms in the registration process. They also gained insights from various CSO leaders who discussed the problems with government interactions. Their key findings focus on the statutory environment for CSOs, CSO interactions with local governments, the judicial system and judicial reforms, and the evolving political landscape. Regarding the statutory environment, the team finds that while the filing requirements for CSOs have been simplified, effective implementation lags and hinders CSO development. To overcome this problem, the team recommends that USAID facilitate the implementation of online registration processes and assist in the implementation of the new tax registration law to alleviate problems caused by delays in judicial action.

Regarding CSO interactions with local governments, the team finds that cooperation between local governments and CSOs is complicated and ranges from cozy to totally distrustful. At the local level, there appears to be a corrupted relationship between some CSOs and government officials. What little funding the local governments have seems to be directed at less than credible CSOs with ties to certain leaders in local governments. Those organizations not favored by local government officials are disdainful of the process and view local governments as corrupt and working at cross purposes with local CSOs. This distrust is magnified by the relative lack of capacity on both sides. This relationship between local CSOs and local governments deserves serious attention from USAID. The team recommends that USAID focus its attention on building capacity on both the governmental front as well as within and across the CSO sector in an effort to ameliorate the high levels of distrust of government found in the local CSO communities. This finding highlights what the team views as a potentially difficult problem for the ENGAGE program (i.e., the capacity of an implementing partner to assess the credibility of local CSOs—weeding out the fake organizations from the real ones).
The third finding of the team is focused on the judicial system and judicial reforms. Clearly, the current judicial system is very problematic; while judicial reforms are taking place, they are longer term in nature and face significant obstacles in implementation. The team recommends that USAID redirect its focus on judicial reform toward methodologies of alternative dispute resolution at the local and at the local levels of government, thereby bypassing the paralyzed court system and offering citizens some degree of timely resolution of day-to-day problems. Finally, the political and legal environment team focused on the overall political landscape for CSOs and government in the post-Maidan period. While government-CSO relations have improved somewhat in this period and government has become more receptive to reforms, the general public is still extremely frustrated with the reform process due to the lack of tangible results. The team recommends that USAID assist both government and civil society in their efforts to publicize the positive steps that have been made in a more effective manner by linking tangible progress at the local level to national reform efforts and to educate the public on the long-term nature of reform efforts. To highlight the relationships between governmental entities, CSOs, and the international donor community, the team presents a case study of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) with a specific focus on Dopomoga Dnipra.

The CSO sustainability team focused its attention on the degree to which CSOs are on the developmental path toward sustainability. The team finds that most civil society organizations rely heavily, if not entirely, on funding from international organizations or governments, particularly those of Western European nations. In terms of sustainability, this model of funding is not sustainable and organizations acknowledge that they would be unable to continue their work should this international funding cease or decrease substantially. It also produces scattered objectives for CSOs who are trying to cater to different donors with different visions. Second, the team finds that significant sources of credible domestic funding are lacking. Because local funding for collective action organizations is so scarce, what is available is stigmatized and assumed to be corrupt. CSO leaders are averse to receiving funding from the government and domestic businesses due to the perception that such a relationship would create a conflict of interest. This problem is exacerbated by an overall lack of a culture of donation to causes that are not solely humanitarian by Ukrainians. Innovative CSOs are turning to more unique ways to raise funds, such as online crowdfunding and social impact businesses.

The third finding of the team relates to the organizational capacities of CSOs across Ukraine. The team finds that the vast majority of CSO leaders at the more successful and larger organizations had either international academic study experience or management experience at an international NGO. These skills and experiences far surpass the organizational capacity workshops promoted by many international organizations. CSOs with high degrees of both specialization and professionalization enjoy higher levels of interaction with government and media; they are also much more effective in fundraising. The team recommends that the CSO skill-building efforts at the local level be structured to focus on longer term, more in-depth curricula that promote cultural emphasis on ideation, collaboration, and problem-solving. The team also recommends that USAID take the lead in developing more effective impact assessment tools for the CSO sector. Finally, the team focuses on reform efforts linked to sustainability. The team finds that CSO reform efforts
have been disproportionally focused on government. As a result, little attention is given to the inability of CSOs to develop significant constituencies of support. The team recommends that USAID incorporate a strategy that includes longer-term funding linked to mission-driven partnerships, not one-time, project-specific funding. This longer-term funding would be linked to achievement of interim targets for development of sustainable organizational practices. The team also recommends greater donor coordination regarding the multiple development strategies being imposed upon CSOs in Ukraine. Finally, the team recommends that USAID support more in-depth training programs for CSO leadership. At present, CSO leadership is viewed as an avocation. A mature CSO sector will be populated by leaders who view CSO leadership and governance as a sustainable vocation. To that end, the team offers a case study of the M.A. in nonprofit management at Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv.

The CSO mobilization team sought to provide insights into the mobilization problems inherent in civil society across Ukraine. The team finds that the older generation suffers from the post-Soviet mindset while the younger generations are losing the state-focused mentality. However, the widespread lack of trust in any formal institution in Ukraine hampers the abilities of CSO leaders to mobilize citizens. The team recommends that USAID develop more systematic communication channels within government to promote transparency and understanding of the governing process. Such efforts may help battle the disaffection felt by citizens and increase public trust. Ednannia Marketplace is an example of an effective platform, but there is a risk of tapping into the same sets of CSOs and not mobilizing a more diverse collection of organizations. The team also finds that while continued USAID efforts in building coalitions is important, this area of programming should not crowd out for targeted efforts to reach out to rural grassroots organizations. The team recommends that USAID incorporate the research of CEDOS on their analysis of CSO networks in five cities—Kyiv, Lviv, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Odesa—and their surrounding communities that include more than 1,000 CSOs into their ENGAGE program implementation. The CEDOS report is due to be published in late January or early February of 2017.

The mobilization team also finds that while numerous local CSOs have emerged in the post-Maidan era, the effectiveness of this movement toward decentralized organization is hard to discern given higher community engagement in event-driven activities and comparative low engagement in longer-term mobilization efforts. The team recommends that USAID and its implementing partners focus attention on collective action efforts that instill credible models of democratic self-governance at the grassroots level. The team has heard from several CSO representatives in Kyiv as well as in Dnipro and Odesa that local housing associations are beginning to build momentum by engaging all of the units in buildings to work together to repair common areas and to purchase windows in bulk. There are now associations of building owners (e.g., OSR and OSBB) that serve as models. Some of the more entrepreneurial associations have pulled resources to add another floor on their buildings and to share in the profits of the sales of apartments. The team feels that the housing association approach to grassroots mobilization offers fertile ground for USAID programming.
The team also finds that there is a growing pattern of local, grassroots organizations that receive local government grants being less than transparent in their activities. The team heard from several local CSO leaders that there is significant corruption in the local CSO sector as corrupt governmental officials funnel local government funding to fake CSOs linked to these officials. The team recommends that USAID be vigilant in discerning the most credible local CSOs to support. When asked to approximate the number of local CSOs that are fake, virtually all of the CSO representatives said “the majority” or “most” were fake. A CSO leader of IRF in Odesa went so far as to say that 75 percent of the more than 10,000 CSOs registered in Odesa are fake. He had $200,000 to allocate to CSOs across the Odessa region and could find only 15 organizations that met IRF standards. This should give USAID pause in implementing ENGAGE across the country. The team recommends that the ENGAGE implementing partners establish rigorous standards and clear metrics for evaluating the credibility of local CSOs. The team recommends that regional evaluation teams be established that include both funders of local CSO activities as well as representatives from the clearly established and demonstrably credible local CSOs in each region. Including local governmental representatives may assist the evaluation effort by judging the feasibility of projects and identifying redundancies, but this addition may be introducing potentially corrupt elements into the process. The CSO incubator model found in cities around the country can also be replicated. Finally, the team recommends that USAID continue to search for better metrics to assess impacts of local CSO activities. The mobilization team analysis concludes with a case study of Patients of Ukraine.

The last section of the report focuses on the role of the media in civil society. The media team analyzed the composition of the media as well as its impact on civil society. The team finds a media system dominated by oligarchs but also overwhelmed by a proliferation of local and regional media outlets that are not driven by economic success. These media outlets function more as public relations companies rather than as sources of credible news. The team finds that the regional media outlets do not produce unique news programming but rather repackaged other news/propaganda/jeansa content. Conversely, while independent stations attempt to compete with such media outlets, these stations fail to distinguish themselves from other similar stations. Regarding new media, the team finds that digital platforms present opportunities to penetrate the existing media marketplace, but these same outlets complicate fact-based reporting. Regarding the training of journalists in Ukraine, the team finds that the wide variety of academic training opportunities as well as CSO-supported training programs can be redundant and uncoordinated. In addition, the team finds that media literacy efforts thus far have failed to reach the general public in any meaningful way.

The media team recommends that future USAID media programming focus on developing more autonomous regional media outlets. Regarding capacity building among news organizations, the team recommends that USAID implementing partners provide tools and training that will allow organizations to target and access niche markets more effectively. Also, the team recommends training and the provision of tools necessary to develop outreach methodologies beyond social media as well as platforms that aggregate quality media content. Further, the team recommends
that USAID partners work with media CSOs to publicize media metrics regarding viewership and credible content. Finally, the team recommends that USAID encourage greater coordination of media training programs and to institutionalize media education. The media team presents a case study of efforts to combat Russian media propaganda/misinformation campaigns.

1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this analysis is three-fold; first, the team will analyze current and recently completed USAID programs—Strengthening Civil Society in Ukraine Project: UNITER (Oct. 2008 - Sept. 2016); Ukraine Civil Society Enabling Environment: Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research (UCIPR) (July 2014 - July 2019); Media Development (UMedia—Internews Network) October 2011 - September 2016); and Ukraine Civil Society Capacity Building Project (ISAR-Ednannia) (July 2014 - July 2019) to highlight the impacts of these USAID civil society programs in Ukraine and, based on information gleaned, to provide recommendations to USAID-Kyiv for possible future programming in this sector. In addition to these programmatic foci, the team will also analyze broader civil society programming on the following thematic dimensions—the political and legal environment within which CSO development takes place, CSO sustainability, CSO mobilization, and the integration of various media sources into CSO activism. The analyses of these CSO themes will also generate recommendations for future USAID civil society programming, with particular focus on the ENGAGE program. Finally, it will expose Dartmouth undergraduate students to USAID civil society programming and programmatic implementation as well as to the evaluation methodologies employed by USAID assessment teams in the evaluation of USAID programs.

The USAID Ukraine country development cooperation strategy for the period 2012-2016 put forward three development objectives to reach the mission goal of a “more stable, democratic, and prosperous Ukraine.” The first development objective (DO 1) is a “more participatory, transparent, and accountable government process,” and is supported by three Intermediate Results (IRs); “Improving the legislative and policy environment in line with European standards (IR 1.1), improving citizen oversight and engagement in governance processes (IR 1.2), and making the government more accountable to its citizens and adherent to its rule of law (IR 1.3).” USAID hopes that the pursuit of this DO and the supporting IRs will increase public participation and oversight, leading to a more stable and accountable democratic polity in Ukraine.

IR 1.1 aims to support the engagement of CSOs, independent media, and citizen involvement in reform related to the standardization of government processes, increasing transparency of government decision making, and reducing corruption within the political environment of Ukraine. Technical assistance will also be provided to CSOs to ensure that the developed policies are in line with international best practices. IR 1.2 focuses on developing citizen and civil society organizational capacity to monitor and impact policy at the national level. In order to do this, civil society needs access to quality information, as well as the adequate technical capacity to function within the Ukrainian political system. Overall, IR 1.2 aims to support CSO initiatives to promote greater accountability from their representatives and from the electoral process. IR 1.3 focuses
mainly on reform of Ukraine’s legal framework, with emphasis on increasing citizens’ knowledge of basic rights and freedoms in order to protect citizens’ and civil society’s rights above government interests while increasing the accountability of the Ukrainian judiciary. Working towards this DO and the supporting IRs will also contribute to the other two development objectives by building civil society capacity to more effectively participate in reform related to both the delivery of health services (DO 3) and economic policy and management issues (DO 2).

It is clear from the interviews conducted that virtually every CSO representative identified civil society in Ukraine as the only sector of the Ukrainian political and social environment that is a positive force for the democratic future of Ukraine. Emanating from the Revolution of Dignity, the leaders of the Maidan movement have become important actors in civil society in the post-Maidan era. While there remain active CSOs that pre-date the Maidan experience, many of the most active groups in Kyiv as well as outside of the capital city have emerged in the past four years. This analysis incorporates these patterns of growth and maturation through four complementary lenses of the political and legal environment within which CSOs are created and maintained, CSO sustainability, CSO mobilization, and the media environment. The report will access each of these thematic approaches in the order outlined above. Each section will offer key findings as well as recommendations for future USAID programming.

2. THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL ENVIRONMENT FOR CSO ACTIVITY AND DEVELOPMENT

CSOs must navigate a complex and evolving political and legal environment to be successful. This section begins with an analysis of USAID implementing partner, UCIPR. Then, we break down this environment into four major components relevant for CSOs: the overall political landscape, the judicial system as a whole, the administrative laws related to day-to-day operations, and the interactions between CSOs and local government. Finally, we end with a case study on a CSO focused on internally-displaced persons, IDPs, in Dnipro.

2.1 Key Findings

- While government-CSO relations have improved since the Euromaidan and government has gotten more receptive to reforms, the general public is still frustrated with the reform process because of a lack of tangible results.
- The current judicial system is very problematic and while judicial reforms are happening, they are long-term and face many obstacles in implementation.
- Legal processes for CSO activity have been simplified on paper, but implementation lags behind and hinders CSO development.
- Cooperation between local governments and CSOs is held back by mutual distrust and lack of organizational capacity in both parties, but the potential for cooperation is huge.
2.2 Recommendations

- Help both the government and civil society better publicize reform progress by:
  (a) Linking tangible progress in local communities to national reform efforts
  (b) Educating the public on the long-term nature of reform efforts
- Set up alternate forms of dispute resolution (outside of the judiciary) in cities where the judicial process is paralyzed. Such pilot programs might focus on civil matters relating to landlord-tenant conflicts or licensing.
- Implement online processes for CSO registration and phase in the new tax registration law to alleviate problems created by the slowdown in the judiciary.
- Focus on building organizational capacity for both local governments and local CSOs to build trust.

2.3 Analysis of UCIPR Ukraine Civil Society Enabling Environment (UCSEE) Programming

USAID has supported UCIPR in its implementation of the UCSEE program since October 2014. This program aims to improve the legislative and policy environment in which civil society organizations operate in accordance with European standards. To achieve this, UCIPR focuses on three objectives: 1) to improve the quality of relevant civil society enabling legislation and policy; 2) to increase capacity of public officials and CSOs to ensure effective implementation of legislation and policy; and, 3) to increase technical and organizational capacity of UCIPR as a leader and driver of civil society legislative efforts.

In our analysis of the UCSEE program, we have identified significant progress towards each of the three project objectives. A UCIPR representative indicated that largest success of UCIPR was the drafting and implementation of a new law on registration. This law simplified and shortened the registration process for CSOs and charities, including CSO-friendly changes in the tax code. These successes, alongside other UCIPR activities which promote reforms, have contributed to the first objective by improving the quality of relevant civil society enabling legislation and policy.

UCIPR has also demonstrated progress towards the second objective by implementing several training programs for both civil society actors and government officials, including a hotline for CSOs and a Civic Society Forum with 226 participants from both government and civil society. Lastly, UCIPR has increased technical capacity and made progress towards objective three by improving their human resources policy and enrolling management employees in several training sessions to improve the overall organizational capacity of UCIPR.

In addition, the UCIPR representative indicated that a lack of financial resources is the largest obstacle to effective implementation of the UCSEE program and to civil society development in general. Many CSOs that UCIPR supports have struggled to attract funding due to the current economic situation in Ukraine. The representative also expressed the need for greater coordination between international funding organizations, as the overlapping time frames for grant applications has previously resulted in duplicative funding for the same project. USAID may want to coordinate
grant application processes among international donors to allow for more effective implementation of the USCEE program. From our in-person interview and analysis of materials and reports provided by UCIPR, we conclude that the USCEE program has improved the legal and political environment to better support civil society activity and reform efforts.

2.4 The Political Landscape and Reform Progress: Slowly but Surely Making Improvements

The political environment in Ukraine has changed dramatically since the Euromaidan in 2014. Civil society organizations can operate more freely and tend to have more positive relations with the government as compared to years prior to 2014. However, changes in the overall political environment since the Euromaidan have not translated into the dramatic government reforms that many Ukrainians envisioned.

2.4.1 CSO Perspective of Progress on Government Reform

Optimism regarding the progress of government reform varies across the different civil society organizations with whom we engaged. Many interview subjects expressed frustration at the progress of reforms, while others seemed optimistic about achievements. Representatives from Reanimation Package of Reforms (RPR), UCIPR, Democratic Initiative Foundation, and other groups with higher organizational capacities and more government influence were more optimistic, citing the police and military reform, the creation of independent anti-corruption bureaus, and political party financing. These organizations understand that reform is a slow process, and that delays in implementation do not necessarily represent a failure in the long-term reform process.

However, many civil society activists from smaller organizations expressed great frustration with the pace of reforms. The inconsistencies in civil society opinion towards progress on reform may be due to the lag between written reforms and actual reform implementation, but also illustrates that Ukrainian civil society is not a monolithic entity; it is rather a diverse, heterogeneous mix of groups and associations. Many organizations claimed that reforms on paper were completed but that implementation was the inhibiting step. Larger organizations directly involved in the drafting of reforms may have a greater sense of accomplishment than smaller CSOs who have yet to experience tangible results due to delayed reform implementation.

2.4.2 Improved Relations between Government and CSOs

Overall, the relationship between government and civil society organizations has greatly improved since the Euromaidan. Prior to the Euromaidan, the government ignored civil society input and would even obstruct some basic civil society activities. Since the Euromaidan, government officials in the Verkhovna Rada and various ministries are more willing to listen to civil society. The political environment is more accepting of reform efforts and civil society involvement, however, full implementation of reforms has been delayed by government resistance in some areas.
CSOs gain government influence and access primarily through personal relationships with members of parliament and other government officials. Organizations with specific contacts in government are able to effectively communicate policy recommendations. CSO relationships with government have improved in part because of the influx of young, activist MPs who are reform-minded and may have previous connections with civil society organizations. Additionally, increased media coverage of CSOs has provided incentives for government officials to allow greater access for civil society actors.

The degree to which government is willing to listen to civil society organizations also depends on the area of reform. Organizations lobbying for anti-corruption reform seemed to meet the most resistance, while those providing recommendations on foreign policy claim that the government often came to them for advice. This suggests that CSOs may be most effective in the current political environment by marketing themselves as experts, rather than activists looking to combat destructive government activities.

2.4.3 Government Resistance to CSO Activity and Reform Efforts

The strongest example of government resistance to reform efforts is through the corrupt judicial system. Several organizations cited examples in which corrupt courts directly targeted civil society groups to prevent reform or otherwise took action to limit civil society influence in government. However, this is viewed as happening much less frequently in recent years. Government resistance to CSOs activities through the judiciary will be outlined further in the judicial system and judicial reform section.

There are still a large number of MPs from the pre-Euromaidan Rada who tend to be more dismissive of reform efforts, and some political parties may not be interested in implementing reform solutions for fear of a negative backlash if implementation is unpopular or unsuccessful. MPs controlled by oligarchs have an incentive to delay or resist the implementation of reforms, as progress away from the status quo harms entrenched interests. An IFES representative indicated that some of these anti-reform government officials may poison reform efforts by appointing politically affiliated individuals to run newly created independent anti-corruption agencies. Although government has resisted many civil society driven reform efforts, the post-Euromaidan political environment has allowed more robust relationships between civil society actors and government officials, and CSOs are able to operate more effectively and freely in the current political and legal environment.

2.4.4 Public Perception of Reform Progress

A recurring theme from our interviews was the failure of civil society reform efforts to bring tangible results to the Ukrainian people. Following the Euromaidan, the public expected large changes, but reform has been a slow and arduous process. Even implemented reforms have not delivered tangible benefits to the average citizen in Ukraine. Almost all of the civil society organizations that we interviewed emphasized the long-term nature of government reform, and
expressed concern that the general public does not understand that major reforms take years to accomplish. The general public is not aware of most of the incremental reform achievements touted by many CSOs and may view overall reform efforts as a failure because they have not seen tangible signs of progress.

Additionally, even when CSO-driven reform has delivered tangible benefits, the general public may not associate improvements in their communities to actual reform efforts. For example, decentralization reform has resulted in increased funding for local governments and initiatives, creating improvements in service provision and social supports in many cities across Ukraine. One local Dnipro official mentioned how decentralization reform has allowed her department to provide more social programming in Dnipro and to increase financial assistance for over 110,000 households. Citizens may not associate these improvements with government reform, thus both civil society and the government must do a better job linking tangible progress at the local level to national reform efforts.

Many civil society activists and government officials whom we met expressed fear that these misconceptions or the overall lack of awareness among the general public could create a populist movement in Ukrainian politics. Government approval ratings are close to all-time lows, particularly in the East and South, and some MPs in the opposition block representing these areas may be inclined to back populists. This could create instability and potentially early elections which would greatly hamper current reform efforts. Some CSOs also expressed concern that government instability would reduce Ukraine’s eligibility for IMF and other international financial supports.

Based on our findings, we recommend that USAID increase programming to support public awareness campaigns from both civil society and the government, focusing on educating the general public on the progress of reforms, the long-term nature and expectations of major reforms, and the links between improvements in local communities and reform progress.

2.4.5 Influence of Russian Aggression on the Political Environment

The political environment in Ukraine is greatly influenced by Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine and Crimea. The war is seen as the top priority for most politicians and is the most important issue for 53 percent of Ukrainians, according to the 2016 International Republican Institute survey. Thus, reform implementation may be a secondary objective for many decision-makers looking to please constituents. The government often blames Russian aggression as the reason for the delayed implementation of reforms, which many civil society activists see as untruthful. Although the conflicts in Donbas may require increased government attention and resources, delayed implementation is more often the result of political resistance unrelated to the war.

Military reform is one of the greatest post-Euromaidan successes, but several interview subjects indicated that this reform was only effective because it was directly motivated by the conflict. In
a similar vein, many civil society organizations have diverted resources and programmatic activities away from reform efforts to address the Russian conflict. Even organizations that are major participants in government reform efforts indicated that some capacity was directed at providing assistance for IDPs and other communities impacted by the war. The conflicts in the Donbas have played a major role in influencing the current political environment in which CSOs operate today.

2.5 The Judicial System and Judicial Reform

A functioning and efficient judicial system is critical to the success of civil society, as activists rely on the courts to both protect their rights and enforce the laws for which they have advocated. The judicial system of Ukraine, however, has been historically ineffective, endangering the rights of both activists and citizens alike. The Euromaidan presented an opportunity to overhaul and fully reform the judicial system, but in the years since, progress has been slow. The adoption of constitutional amendments this summer and their initial implementation, most notably in the area of competitive selection of judges, provides some positive evidence of progress, however.

2.5.1 The Current State of the Courts

Despite these positive steps, we found a broad consensus among both CSO leaders and local government officials that the judicial system in Ukraine is both highly corrupt and inefficient. Polls have shown that Ukrainians trust the courts even less than they trust Russian media, with 97 percent of the population recently citing the judicial system as corrupt and ineffective.

Corruption in the judicial system stems from an overwhelming lack of accountability, autonomy from the government, and professionalism in applying legal standards. Owing to the persistent Soviet mentality of patronage and nepotism, unqualified individuals can still rely on bribes or connections to secure judgeships, and current judges are easily bribed to make subjective rulings. Being a judge is still one of the most lucrative positions in Ukraine, further exacerbating the cycle of bribery and corruption.

CSO leaders that we spoke to pointed to many recent examples of corruption in the judicial system. Monitors of media law and the rights of journalists have reported police in Kharkiv simply closing several cases that journalists tried to bring to court. Other anti-corruption advocacy groups have described the indiscriminate jailing of protestors during the Euromaidan, and although activists have tried to prosecute the judges who made such rulings, many of those judges are still in the system today.

The inefficiency and ineffectiveness in the judicial system is felt across the country. While there are far more judgeships available in Ukraine than are needed, many of these positions are not filled. In addition, the asset declaration requirement is also thinning the judicial ranks. While there is some hope that the new reforms will serve the judicial system positively, there remains deep concern regarding the legitimacy of the judiciary.
Government officials that we spoke with cited a paralysis in many of their local judicial systems. An oblast official described a trend in which judges are filing appeals against their mandated relocations to other cities, and while waiting for the results of their appeal, the judges are not working and still getting paid. As a result, many minor court cases, including theft and family disputes, have been put on hold indefinitely. Another local official also described a number of recent cases that have been repeatedly postponed, because judges are either preoccupied or simply absent.

2.5.2 The Progress of Judicial Reforms

Since the Euromaidan, the Ukrainian government, working in conjunction with CSOs, has enacted a number of critical judicial reforms that work toward eliminating the corruption and inefficiency plaguing the Ukrainian judicial system. The government strategy includes increasing the autonomy of the courts from other government bodies, increasing public accountability, and replacing problematic judges. Following these principles and established European standards, the government has tried to make the process for becoming a judge more transparent, competitive, and direct, to create a more efficient and independent Supreme Court, and to establish a High Council of Justice responsible for the internal discipline of corrupt Ukrainian judges. An expert on judicial reform at the Reanimation Package of Reforms believes that “tremendous progress” has been made in the past three years on judicial reforms, although he predicted that completely fixing the system might take another 20 to 25 years.

Other CSO leaders, however, have been less satisfied with the progress of judicial reforms in the past few years. An expert describes the Ukrainian judicial system as being 90 percent up to European standards on paper only, with true implementation of these laws lagging far behind. A representative from an anti-corruption organization agreed that the implementation of judicial reforms have been largely delayed in the past few years, and a local official reported seeing no tangible improvements in the judicial system in her city.

One expert cites a lack of political will at the highest levels of government as one of the greatest obstacles to implementing judicial reforms. Parliament, for example, has been intentionally stalling reforms by consistently postponing votes on legislation related to judicial reform. And, as a result, judicial reform cannot happen until broader anti-corruption and governance reforms are implemented at the top levels of Ukrainian government. Furthermore, because the justice sector has always been complicated and unorganized, it is difficult for CSOs to target accountable leadership institutions and lobby for reform implementation.

Another obstacle to implementing judicial reforms is the difficulty in finding fair and accountable judges to replace the sheer number of problematic judges that need to be removed. While police reform succeeded in Ukraine due to the near-complete replacement of the police force, judges are more difficult and time-consuming to train. Thus, while judicial reform in Ukraine may be following the right ideas, the significant obstacles to implementation indicate that developing an effective judicial system upholds civil society laws is still a long-term ambition.
2.5.3 Alternative Dispute Resolution and Other Solutions

In accordance with our assessment of the current judicial system in Ukraine and the progress made in judicial reforms, we recommend that USAID work with CSOs and government officials to set up alternate forms of dispute resolution on the local level while longer term judicial reforms are taking place. As discussed above, well-meaning reform efforts in some cities have further paralyzed an already inefficient judicial system, postponing numerous cases and further undermining the faith of the public in meaningful reforms.

Our recommendation would involve the creation of local mediation boards, comprised of local citizens, to be established as a mechanism to solve local civil problems that are festering in the current judicial system such as landlord-tenant disputes or other property disputes regarding real estate transfers. These could be established as pilot programs in a handful of cities. If successful or at least more efficient and effective than the current local judicial system, such boards would provide citizens with an example of effective problem-solving that they seem to be lacking under the current judicial system. Given the necessarily slow pace of judicial reform, these local mechanisms could effectively enforce the basic rights of citizens and organizations, including CSOs in the shorter term. There are numerous entities that have implemented such programs across the globe for USAID as well as other international donors in an effective and timely fashion. In fact, one of the early USAID democracy programs in Ukraine in the late 1990s was an alternative dispute resolution program that funded the Ukraine Mediation Group.

In addition to the ADR approach, Reanimation Package of Reforms has already offered another judicial reform, working toward creating an autonomous anti-corruption court that can prosecute corruption cases while the regular judicial system is being gradually reformed.

2.6 The Administrative Environment for CSOs: Registration, Taxation, and Implementation

The administrative environment that NGOs must navigate has improved, however progress is stymied by a lack of implementation and political will. This section will divide the administrative environment into three categories: registration, taxes, and implementation.

The overall process of registration for CSOs has significantly improved. CSOs noted that before the Euromaidan, the process would require a completely arbitrary amount of time. Proposals would often disappear into the bureaucracy. After the Euromaidan, the situation has improved somewhat. A simplified procedure for registration has shortened the process to a matter of 3-4 weeks. In addition, changes to laws regulating CSOs have made it easier for locally-designated CSOs to conduct programming outside of their specified locality.

That said, the process is not perfect. Documents are rejected and returned without any feedback or corrections. Local administrative centers can also be extremely inefficient, especially when founders must go to them in-person. In short, the process is still bureaucratic and inefficient, averaging three weeks but potentially dragging on for months. CSOs mentioned how Poland had
an online registration system, which could more efficiently process claims without the need to visit local administrative buildings.

Also, a legislative loophole between the definition of a CSO and a think-tank puts Ukrainian think-tanks in strange legal positions. Since the law only recognizes CSOs or charities, think-tanks must register as civic organizations – which can hinder their ability to communicate to the government and the public what they are. In addition, due to financial restrictions, CSOs cannot spend money outside of Ukraine. For example, think-tanks that host talks outside of Ukraine must pay out of pocket for speakers, venues, and catering. Interestingly, one of the largest organizing forces in the CSO sector, the Reanimation Package of Reforms, has not officially/legally registered. They explained that registering would open the group up to legal action and potential litigation.

The complexity of the tax code has hindered CSOs as well. Due to the specialized knowledge needed to apply for and maintain non-profit status, many organizations must hire auditors or accountants. Recent changes in the tax code require all non-profits to re-register. Given the slow and inefficient bureaucratic process that entails, many CSOs risk losing their nonprofit status, which would require them to retroactively pay two years of taxes and scare away potential funders. A phase-in timeline for the new tax registration law could help both CSOs and local courts with limited resources cope with the bureaucratic work involved in re-registering.

The Ukrainian judicial system offers inadequate protection for or attentiveness to CSOs. The larger issues related to judiciary have been discussed, but this section will cover the basics of the CSO-judicial relationship. From the activist perspective, administrative courts are overloaded and corrupt, unable to act as partners in advancing a policy agenda. At a more basic level, protection of CSO rights is also lacking. For example, one major national-wide CSO organizer noted how local officials in a far-flung region managed to restrict citizens’ freedom of assembly. Local activists petitioned the local court arguing that peaceful assembly was enshrined in the Ukrainian constitution. However, local courts allowed the law to stay on the books. In rare cases, we have heard of the judicial system actively used against CSOs. In one disturbing case, one high-profile CSO faced a court order to seize their offices and audit their books. However, due to their public popularity and the ensuing public outcry, the investigation was halted.

Finally, CSOs noted that government support for CSOs was limited, and that many CSOs are afraid of government funding. Aside from fears of agency capture, CSOs also noted harsher and more rigorous tax schemes as reasons that dissuaded them from accepting government funds.

While legal processes have become far more CSO-friendly since the Euromaidan, implementation of these reforms has hindered progress especially outside of major cities. Both new and established CSOs continue to lack the organizational capacity to respond to convoluted legal environment and often must write-off the judicial system’s protection.
2.7 Local Governments and CSOs: Mistrust with Potential

Local governments and CSOs show promise in collaborating and delivering effective solutions to citizens. Especially with the push for decentralization, local administrations are much more capable and responsible. That said, deep mistrust persists between CSOs and their local governments. From the local government perspective, many CSOs are not credible and disappear. The smaller and newer these organizations are, the more suspicious local government officials often become.

On the other hand, local CSOs view local officials as leftover vestiges of a corrupt regime that the Euromaidan should have washed away. Even more disturbing, many CSOs view local governments as inept, incompetent, and utterly incapable of providing and maintaining support. In fact, many of these CSOs were established due to a lack of public support or attention in a specific sphere, from IDPs to HIV/AIDS patients to veterans groups.

The core of this issue lies in trust. A lack of trust between local governments and CSOs prevents some of the most innovative policy solutions from coming to fruition. For example, the Polish-Ukrainian Cooperation Institute noted how participatory budgets, in which citizens vote on potential public projects funded by public money, arose from civic engagement and activism. Leaders at International Republican Institute mentioned how a project on facilitating constructive discussion between various CSOs and local governments was scrapped since local citizens were already trying to mobilize and communicate; the class was redundant.

Lack of organizational capacity on both sides of the relationship remains a core problem. Local city officials cited organizations that would disappear after Day 1, fall apart after one event, or simply fizzle out. Most CSO workers, especially at the local level, are not professionals; rather, local activists are working part-time for no pay on a very episodic basis. Worsening economic conditions mean that many of these organizations are simply unable to continue operating. Organizational capacity is an issue for local governments as well. Even with the increased resources from the recent decentralization push, local governments are often overwhelmed with the sheer scale of economic and security issues facing them. For example, the local government in Dnipro was dealing with IDPs, economic stress/poverty, and caring for the elderly, orphans, veterans from Afghanistan and the Donbas. In short, the increase in resources is not enough to meet the drastic increase in needs and responsibilities.

As a result, financial support is rare and policy advocacy can be difficult. Local organizations have had trouble communicating with policymakers and find the policy responses to be half-hearted or insufficient. Instead of advocating for policy, local CSOs often focus on directly addressing issues. These CSOs are often faster and more effective than the government, generating significant resentment between the CSO sector and local officials.

Building trust between local governments and CSOs will take time and must begin with strengthening the organizational capacity of both. For CSOs, the attitude that the local government
is the enemy halts constructive conversation and advocacy. For local governments, giving CSOs an opportunity to voice their concerns leads to better local governance. In Lviv, a city widely cited for its good governance and lack of corruption, local officials directly cited the role of CSOs in producing a better government for citizens.

2.8 Case Study: Dopomoga Dnipra and Internally Displaced Persons

To date, almost two million IDPs have fled conflict zones in the Donbas regions, seeking refuge in safer areas across Ukraine. As the armed conflict continues, the number of IDPs also continues to increase, with Ukraine now ranking fourth in the world in terms of the number of IDPs. Not only is the crisis severe, it is also unfamiliar. Internal displacement is a relatively new phenomenon in Ukraine, with previous episodes of forced migration being limited to much smaller numbers.

The dramatic humanitarian crisis quickly prompted Ukrainian civil society to take action. Many established CSOs set aside their regular activities to focus on providing immediate aid to Ukrainians afflicted by the conflict, and a number of new CSOs have also been established across the country to contribute to the aid effort. Dopomoga Dnipra is one such organization, established in the summer of 2014 by activists who participated in the Euromaidan. The organization is based in Dnipro, and it has served more than 100,000 IDPs since its founding.

CSOs such as Dopomoga Dnipra have been assisting IDPs in a number of ways. The most common form of aid provision is meeting the urgent material needs of IDPs, which include finding temporary accommodations and providing clothing, food, household items, medical attention, and information on registration. CSOs have also assisted IDPs in meeting their more long-term needs, including psychological support, employment assistance, social services, and legal services.

2.8.1 An Absent Government

A major driver for the mobilization of civil society in response to the IDP crisis was the failure of the state to fulfill its responsibilities. According to international standards, because IDPs do not qualify as international refugees, it is the home state’s responsibility to provide protection and aid to the IDP population. While the Ukrainian government has attempted to address the IDP crisis, however, it has conspicuously failed to produce adequate solutions. The Ukrainian government does not have the resources or the experience to respond to the needs of the IDP population, and in addition, humanitarian aid is simply not a priority on the national government’s agenda.

One of the co-founders of Dopomoga Dnipra emphasized the latter obstacle to government support. She believes that, because IDPs are not a very salient political issue and thus win few votes in major elections, government officials lack the political will to devote much energy to the IDP crisis. As a result, there is still no coherent, central policy in Kiev for addressing the crisis. The co-founder also reported that local levels of government are slightly more willing to offer support, but even for local city officials, the IDP problem falls just outside of the usual agenda.
The leader further elaborated on the minimal support that Dopomoga Dnipra receives from the government, even at the local level. The organization originally hoped for local government funding when it was founded in 2014, but all that the city provided was a run-down, unfurnished building to serve as the group center. All of the early work of Dopomoga Dnipra was supported by donations from citizens and businesses within Dnipro. Even today, local citizens continue to bring food and supplies to Dopomoga Dnipra. A Dnipro city official confirmed that Dopomoga Dnipra is not unique. While the city has provided some assistance to IDPs on its own, including housing and community events, it has cooperated very little with local CSOs on the IDP crisis. The local official expressed a sincere desire to work more closely with CSOs such as Dopomoga Dnipra, admitting that such cooperation would likely be a productive step.

2.8.2 Support from the International Community: Effective or Misguided?

Like many other CSOs in Ukraine, those providing aid to IDPs have attracted the attention of international donors. In the case of Dopomoga Dnipra, the Salvation Army was the first international organization to become involved with the organization, providing a number of essential supplies in August of 2014. USAID stepped in soon after, furnishing and equipping two extra floors of the center and upgrading its electrical capacity. With the upgrades, Dopomoga Dnipra doubled its capacity to house IDPs, providing shelter for 400 individuals throughout the winter of 2014.

In 2014, USAID also supported a roundtable discussion for around 30 local government officials and civil society leaders to discuss ideas for improving the condition of IDPs. The roundtable was the first such discussion in the region since the IDP crisis began, and the positive publicity that it attracted generated $1.8 million in grants for Dopomoga Dnipra from international donors as a result. However, the discussion was not successful in every aspect: while the participants jointly developed an IDP Response Roadmap to encourage cooperation between CSOs and local government, such cooperation has clearly faltered in the two years since.

In fact, the co-founder indicated that international support for the organization, and for IDP aid groups in general, has often been misguided. There has been a largely ineffective coordination of resources by the international community for IDP aid, and that the problem stems from a misunderstanding of IDP needs. She cited a recent example of a Swedish aid group that tried to teach IDPs at Dopomoga Dnipra extremely basic skills, such as washing their hands and carrying buckets of water on their heads. While this is likely an extreme example, it reflects a broader problem, in which certain international donors might fundamentally misunderstand the needs of IDPs fleeing eastern Ukraine. Many IDPs were actually quite wealthy in their previous communities, and they are now simply in need of new homes and jobs.

Finally, the co-founder indicated that certain international donors, including USAID, might be too focused on the conflict zone itself while neglecting the needs of the surrounding areas. She questioned the utility of rebuilding a home in the Donbas region, for example, when it may just be destroyed in the very next day of fighting. Ukraine’s IDP population is concentrated not only
within the conflict zone but also in the neighboring regions of Kharkiv, Zaporozhia, and Dnipro, and the co-founder expressed hope that international donors could maintain a full and informed perspective on the reality of the IDP crisis in Ukraine.

3. CSO SUSTAINABILITY

Sustainability is defined as the ability of CSOs to pursue their missions and strategic plans in the long term more effectively, regardless of international donor funding. While Ukraine enjoys having an active and passionate civil society, a variety of challenges inhibit the growth of a sustainable sector. The section begins with an analysis of UNITER, which funded many of the CSOs the sustainability team interviewed. The team analyzed Ukrainian CSOs by investigating factors such as the conflicting incentives produced by international donors, creative domestic fundraising methods, organizational capacity development, and constituency building as a metric of sustainability. The team analyzes the Nonprofit Management M.A. Program at Ukrainian Catholic University as an example of domestic training that encourages sustainable skill-building.

3.1 Key Findings

- Reliance on international funding produces scattered objectives for CSOs and disincentivizes local outreach.
- The scarcity of domestic funding necessitates encouraging the practice of local giving.
- Organizational capacity-building workshops and programs are increasingly prevalent, but are often too short-term to be meaningful.
- CSO efforts have been disproportionately focused on government reform and have failed to prioritize constituency building.

3.2 Recommendations

- CSO skill-building efforts at the local level should be structured to focus on longer term, more in-depth curricula that promote cultural emphasis on ideation, collaboration, and problem-solving. USAID should also support in-depth training programs for CSO leadership.
- USAID should take the lead in developing more effective and innovative impact assessment tools for the CSO sector that include using lean (social performance) data, encouraging alternative domestic funding sources and assessing constituency growth rate.
- USAID should incorporate a strategy that includes longer-term funding linked to mission-driven partnerships, not one-time, project-specific funding. This longer-term funding would be linked to achievement of interim targets for development of sustainable organizational practices.
• With several countries and international groups imposing differing visions of
development on Ukraine concurrently, the team recommends strategic donor
coordination that encourages local organizations to critically evaluate their own
needs and challenges.

3.3 UNITER Context

Funded by the United States Agency for International Development and implemented by
international NGO Pact, the Ukraine National Initiatives to Enhance Reforms was founded in 2008
to address the systemic challenges faced by civil society in addition to supporting local NGO
advocacy activity through grants and training. Pact focuses the program by working with local
organizations to increase their capacity growth. Over 11,000 citizens took part in Pact-supported
initiatives in Ukraine. The Center of United Action was one of the first civil organizations
supported by Pact, having been launched by Ukrainian activist-turned-parliament-member
Svitlana Zalishchuk. Agency sponsorship of the program expired at the end of September 2016. A
2014 audit of the program found that the primary project goals of UNITER were not realistic given
the political climate of Ukraine. Moving forward, the ENGAGE program might benefit from
explicit use of experts who have been in the CSO sector for longer periods and could provide
contextual insight into assessment of goals and organizations.

3.4 Reliance on International Funding

Most civil society organizations rely heavily, if not entirely, on funding from international
organizations or foreign governments. The International Renaissance Foundation, the European
Council, German aid organizations, and the Swedish government are some of the most active
donors to Ukrainian civil society organizations. Additionally, the Canadian and US Embassies are
both very active in terms of donor coordination, co-chairing the bi-monthly donor coordination
meetings. Funding is provided primarily in the form of grants for which the organizations apply
on a project-by-project basis. This financial dependence on foreign aid creates several problems
for these organizations in their sustainability and long-term project planning.

Many CSO leaders acknowledge that they would be unable to continue their activities should this
international funding cease or decrease substantially. For this reason, it can be difficult for
organization leaders to conceptualize, let alone develop, any long-term strategic vision or plans.
Given that funding is often received in the form of project-based grants, grantees are discouraged
from undertaking innovative initiatives for fear of losing their financial stability. Many CSOs leaders
don't have concrete plans for the next few years given this lack of financial sustainability and the rapidly-
shifting context of Ukrainian society and its institutions. Similarly, given the diversity of donors,
oranizations are also challenged with aligning themselves with multiple visions of development
and being “politically correct.” Leaders understand that they must fill certain criteria in order to
qualify for a grant. For this reason, projects that will not be funded cannot be undertaken. Due to
a lack of local sources for funding, and given the knowledge that full financial stability is possible
with international sources, local fundraising and outreach is unlikely and even discouraged. Most
leaders feel that given the lack of a donation culture it is useless to attempt to fund any projects even partly through local donations. This results in continued dependence on outside sources of funding.

3.5 Domestic and Community Funding

Many CSOs interviews described some attempts at collecting community or domestic donations, but a lack of faith in this system as a sustainable method of funding. This is due not only to lack of donation culture, but also because citizens do not trust that their donations are being effectively used—especially when they cannot see tangible results. Because local funding for collective action organizations is so scarce, what is available is stigmatized and even assumed to be corrupt. CSO leaders are averse to receiving funding from the government and domestic businesses due to the perception that such a relationship would create a conflict of interest or quid pro quo expectations. Innovative CSOs are turning to more unique ways to raise funds, such as online crowdfunding, social impact businesses, and providing services such as training, workshops, or research.

The lingering after-effects of Soviet culture and mindset have yet to encourage individual citizens to donate to local groups. Many CSOs communicated that they were trying to combat citizen passivity and embed in citizens the belief that they could contribute to change. However, without tangible, visible, and short-term results, it is difficult for donors to believe money was not misused. Because corruption is pervasive, the assumption is often that donating is simply a scam. Beyond lacking a culture of giving, but the current economic situation in the country makes donating for the average citizens incredibly difficult.

3.5.1 State and Government Funding

Though improving, trust in the government and in NGOs is low, and even more so between CSOs and the government. When asked if the state should invest in funding civic society, a senior administrator at Ukrainian Catholic University said that the state is corrupt and receiving funding from the state would make the NGO corrupt as well, a sentiment echoed through several interviews. CSO leaders are also reluctant to take funding from the government and domestic businesses due to the perception that such a relationship would create a conflict of interest. It is not only the CSO leaders that expressed this sentiment, but also politicians. When the Mayor of Lviv was asked about state funding, he replied that the moment a NGO receives state funding it becomes part of the state. However, his reasoning was that he would rather CSOs continue their function as a watchdog, and they cannot be a watchdog if they are being funded by the state itself.

However, one method of receiving state funding without the associated conflict of interest is through participatory budgets. This is a Polish method that has been applied in city councils throughout Ukraine where a certain percentage of the state budget is dedicated to civic society. The decision on how that money is to be spent is made by a public vote, so the people are empowered to fund their top projects. This is currently functioning in Lviv where one percent of
the city budget goes to fund civic projects. This method builds trust between all three stakeholders—the citizens, the CSOs, and the local government.

3.5.2 Innovative Funding Methods

Innovative CSOs are turning to more unique ways to raise funds domestically. Below, the team explores online crowdfunding and social impact businesses as these approaches represent two of the more innovative ways in which local CSOs are funding themselves without the assistance of the international donor community.

Currently, a CSO called Garage Gang Kollektiv has created an online crowdfunding platform called BigggIdea for various projects to raise money. In this model, people can simply go online and choose a project to donate to. Citizens can trust these projects are legitimate as Garage Gang Kollektiv screens them prior to posting. Garage Gang also provides a physical space and forums to facilitate their online presence. These practices help increase trust in the BigggIdea platform itself, which is still developing. Currently, the most successful project to be funded on BigggIdea was Vox Ukraine, an organization that fact checks political speeches and other media. BigggIdea funds itself by receiving a percentage of any of the earnings from the projects on its platform. This model, however, raises questions about online financial regulation policy.

Another domestic fundraising model that is successfully operating are community-backed restaurants. The first community-backed restaurant opened in Ukraine in June of 2015. Called Urban Space 100, it operates in Ivano-Frankivsk. This restaurant is founded through donations, and majority of its profits are used to fund civic society programs and activities. Kyiv-based CSO, Insha-Osvita, is currently at work bringing this model to the Urban Space in Kyiv. They need 3,000 donors, and they plan to use 70 percent of the profits for civic projects. This idea is also being pursued by a Lviv-based CSO called MyCity, where the leadership team has secured more than 150 “investors” willing to provide $1,000 toward the cost of opening the restaurant.

A program run by Ukrainian Catholic University aims to help female monasteries become sustainable. Partnered with UCU, these monasteries have started a variety of businesses using their available resources, such as growing mushrooms, making tea from their own garden herbs, producing spaghetti, and more.

3.6 Organizational Capacity: Management and Leadership Development

While more sustained, interactive organizational building capacity workshops and exercises are lacking, most civil society activists pointed out that a shift towards ideation, brainstorming, and critical thinking necessitate a fundamental cultural and educational shift from the ‘post-Soviet’ mindset of everyone over 25 years old. The educational system in Ukraine continues to rely heavily on rote memorization learning rather than experimentation or any creative processes. While informal learning options have risen in prominence in response to this gap (e.g., Insha Ostiva, a German-funded operation incorporating dialogue sessions and seminars), democratic processes have yet to be incorporated into foundational levels of personal and educational development.
Student government, for example, remains a foreign concept in Ukrainian schools. Indeed, a senior administrator at Ukrainian Catholic University pointed out the most successful seminars, conferences, and programming events regarding civil activism were those over which students took complete control over the implementation process. Early engagement and agency in the political process has proved effective in the efforts of the Mayor of Lviv to push for youth internships throughout his city council, a program that has drawn hundreds of young adults into government positions by allowing them to experience them for themselves. A robust internship program, with the goal of professional development as opposed to goodwill volunteering, remains to be seen in NGOs or other civil society organizations.

The successful CSO leaders and decision makers that this study interacted with almost universally possessed either international study abroad experience or previous management experience at an international NGO. These skills and experiences run past the organizational capacity workshops promoted by many international organizations, including those of UNITER and other USAID programs. Skill-building at the local level should be both long-term and promote cultural emphasis on ideation, collaboration, and problem solving. While full-length programs such as the graduate degree in nonprofit management at Ukrainian Catholic University are developing, there remain few options for young Ukrainians seeking a meaningful education on social enterprise, particularly with no experience. The Open University of Reform, a three-month program organized by the Center for Democracy and Rule of Law, has enrolled about 40 students each iteration and is now in its fourth offering, but remains selectively limited to young leaders with CSO experience. While most CSO leaders said that civic engagement and NGO jobs have become more popular since Euromaidan, even established organizations such as the International Foundation for Electoral Systems acknowledged difficulty in filling positions above the entry level due to lack of skilled and experienced candidates. Indeed, CSOs with high degrees of both specialization (e.g., designated grant writers, lawyers, or public relations managers) and professionalization enjoyed high levels of connection with government and media and more effective fundraising than less developed counterparts. Even organizations founded by members of parliament or other high-profile officials (e.g., Open Ukraine, Center for Political and Legal Reform) are unable to utilize their access and connections without specific attention on the less glamorous day-to-day mechanics of running an organization. As one NGO leader put it, the excitement of launching a new program is always greater than the excitement of managing it, but how an organization functions during its mundane tasks are more important than ever.

3.7 Constituency Building

CSO reform efforts have been disproportionately focused on government-centered reform and constituency building has not been prioritized. This leads to the existence of many small and effective CSOs that have contributed to reformative legislation but lack an identity that would survive in the absence of international support. For this reason constituency building serves as an important function of sustainability: without ties to constituents, or a citizen population directly and continuously engaged with an organization, a CSO would dissolve if funding were to cease.
Without incentives for sustained engagement, it is difficult to foster organizational loyalty and CSOs have failed to create the opportunity for this form of engagement. For many CSOs, a constituency is often defined as a Facebook following, however, while social media platforms are often effective for outreach purposes though they do not foster a true sense of investment in the mission of an organization. The lack of outreach is partly a function of a CSOs ability to remain financially viable through international funding alone. If funding were provided on a long-term basis, it would give CSOs more time and effective means to cultivate constituencies. Further, this would allow stability in goals and time for trust-building in the community.

3.7.1 Constituency Building as a Metric of Sustainability

The average citizen needs to be convinced of the efficacy of and the need of these reforms. Currently corruption is framed as us versus them, where it is assumed anyone new and joining post-Euromaidan has values, is not corrupt, and is fighting the older generation. However, part of the problem remains that tolerance for corruption in society is still high. Constituencies can also serve as barometers of efficacy for donors, with funding applicants encouraged to demonstrate community engagement.

3.8 Recommendations

The team recommends that USAID incorporate a strategy that includes longer-term funding linked to mission-driven partnerships, not one-time, project-specific funding. This longer-term funding approach, similar to the design of UCIPR and ISAR award models, would be linked to achievement of interim targets for development of sustainable organizational practices. The team also recommends greater donor coordination regarding the multiple development strategies being imposed upon CSOs in Ukraine.

Project-specific funding does not allow many organizations flexibility in planning and the ability to be innovative in project design as they can feel pressure to tailor projects for grant approval. Further, given the variety of international donor sources, there are inevitably a number of varying versions of development which are imposed on organization projects or goals in accompaniment with a grant. This complication is exacerbated by the fact that there is a lack of structured donor coordination. However, there are risks associated with giving organizations too much autonomy with funds, as they need to have the organizational capacity and skills to assess the potential for successful and meaningful impact.

In order to mitigate the effects of a disproportionate reliance on international funding, donors should focus on vetting organizations based on their capacity, vision, and overall mission in order to create more long-term partnerships. This will allow CSOs greater flexibility in programming and project-planning. Donors can create a relationship with the organization while monitoring and assessing organizational successes. This can include contingencies on the funding that relate to a continued effort to professionalize, increase organizational capacity, and undertake local fundraising projects.
Since trust building with state and constituents requires a long term cultural shift, shorter term solutions include exploring creative fundraising methods highlighted above. Alternative modes of domestic fundraising should be actively encouraged, if not stipulated in the requirements to receive ENGAGE funding. This will also encourage organizations to develop long-term vision and plans to achieve it, regardless of international donors.

The team also recommends that the CSO skill-building efforts at the local level be structured to focus on longer term, more in-depth curricula that promote cultural emphasis on ideation, collaboration, and problem-solving. Organizational capacity building exercises should therefore incorporate mentoring and more extended interaction with experts.

Such qualities can be incentivized and operationalized through revised forms of impact assessment and proposal requirements, whereby CSOs applying for sub-grants to hold skill-building workshops are required to demonstrate a mentoring, experiential, or similar creative component in order to either be deemed effective or receive funding. A renewed emphasis on demonstrating long term impact would present a two-fold benefit of encouraging organizations to think critically about their own metrics as well as giving funders the certainty of sustained impact over “grant-eating.” The process of applying for, complying with, and following up with international funding processes is both bureaucratic and daunting for any NGO, let alone smaller grassroots movement. The large presence of USAID affords the Agency and others like it the ability to incentivize innovation from an institutional perspective and encourage local CSOs to dabble in the practices they find most effective given their field knowledge. For example, the “lean data” approach to assessing social impact was raised by an organization in this study, but CSOs generally conceded a necessity to conform to standard practices of international donors. As a method written about widely in outlets such as the Stanford Social Innovation Review, the targeted approach of “lean data” encourages allow smaller organizations to be more nimble and efficient, but only to the extent that they are allowed such flexibility. By incentivizing and acknowledging innovative approaches to social impact in Ukraine, where international donors provide nearly all CSO funding, organizations such as USAID have a uniquely powerful potential to shape the landscape of development approaches.

3.9 Case Study: Nonprofit Management M.A. Program at Ukrainian Catholic University (UCU)

The Institute of Leadership and Management within Ukrainian Catholic University provides the formal graduate education program for civil society leaders and representatives in Ukraine. The mission of the institute is to “form civic society by means of teaching and developing leaders of non-profit sector as well as Christian leaders basing on moral principles.” The institute offers a number of programs that emphasize the professionalization and management skills necessary to effectively manage a CSO. The Institute is supported by Caritas Germany, the Henry Nowen Foundation, the Fidel Götz Foundation, and Communicantes, among others. They also partner with Pro-mova and Lviv Business School.
Through the Institute, UCU offers a master’s degree in Non-Profit Management. The program has been around for seven years, with the most recent class size of 28 participants. The 1.5-year program costs a total of 30,000 hryvnias, however, students are only required to pay for half of the tuition. The Institute is able to cover the remainder of the cost through their donor fund and students are also encouraged to apply for scholarships to cover the rest, many of which are distributed through ISAR-Ednannia via UNITER. The purpose of the program is to educate members and leaders of the CSO community on management according to international standards of management and ethics. Introductory courses focus on studying the implications of working within the Ukrainian civil society environment. Other courses include strategic and operational planning, ethics in public organization, and human resource management. The program also has a course on fundraising which encourages create ways to engage local donors such as crowdfunding initiatives and celebrity auctions.

The Institute offers a number of smaller, more focused programs such as a Leadership Summer School. This twelve-day study program aims to create a team of young leaders through seminars, discussions, and group activities. Aside from organizational and communication skills participants are taught the importance of cultivating community values and are able to meet with leaders in the social service field. Similarly, they provide a number of workshops that serve to educate representatives of CSOs on a range of topics, from Good Governance to their MyMedia Program which is a Certificate Educational Program for Management of Media Organizations whose goal is to encourage the development of independent media and the skills of its representatives in Ukraine as well as in Belarus, Azerbaijan and Moldova.

The programs and workshops are open to individuals who are active representatives of civil society organizations. The MA program similarly attract individuals who already have some experience working in and representing CSOs and are at least 35 years of age.

4. CSO MOBILIZATION

Mobilization is imperative for a flourishing civil society in Ukraine. Thus, this team focused on civil society engagement through youth outreach initiatives, advocacy groups, and grassroots organizations, with an emphasis on the ability of CSOs to mobilize a constituency that is not directly affiliated with them. The problem of mobilization in Ukraine is largely framed within the Ukrainian post-Soviet mindset and lack of trust in formal institutions. While establishing trust with large institutions is part of the solution, it is also key to focus on credible models of collective action efforts at the grassroots level to overcome apathy. Moreover, USAID and its implementing partners should be wary of putting too much emphasis on one type of CSO (e.g., coalition or local grassroots), and seek to diversify the players they engage with in terms of size, regions, and focus. Diversification of support recipients would ensure that USAID is mobilizing as large of a constituency as possible, while at the same time being wary of those so-called CSOs that are mere fronts for corrupt enterprises. Civil society flourishes when it includes a wide array of organizations—community groups, non-governmental organizations, labor unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, foundations,
think tanks, and many others. Some groups are service providers; others are advocacy groups that give voice to sectors of society who may not otherwise be heard. Some articulate societal interests of specific constituencies while others aggregate the interests of broader blocks of citizens. The key is to develop social and political mobilization into a “habit of the heart” for Ukrainian citizens.

To the degree that USAID programming highlights this aspect of CSO development in Ukraine, the programs will pay long term dividends.

4.1 Key Findings

- As Ukraine seeks to establish a renewed national identity while shifting away from post-Soviet mindsets, CSOs are struggling to gain public trust.
- The emphasis on coalitions of CSOs should not ignore the importance of grassroots and institutional CSOs play in mobilizing a larger constituency.
- While numerous local CSOs have emerged in response to Maidan, the effectiveness of this decentralization of reform is hard to discern given high community event engagement, but low long-term mobilization.
- There is a growing trend of government funded local organizations not being transparent in their activities.

4.2 Recommendations

- USAID should develop better systematic communication channels to increase transparency between the various players operating with civil society.
- USAID should be wary of focusing too heavily on building coalitions in order to reach rural grassroots organizations.
- USAID and its implementing partners should focus attention on collective action efforts that stimulate successful mobilization of all parties, such as housing associations.
- In order for USAID to monitor and evaluate local actors more effectively, they should adopt an incubator model.

4.3 Evaluation of ISAR-Ednannia

ISAR-Ednannia serves as the implementing partner for the Ukraine Civil Society Capacity Building Project (October 2015 to September 2019). The project focuses on the following three areas of organizational development: advocacy skills, adaptive capacities, and technical capacities of Ukrainian CSOs. The three objectives included: “Organizational development skills of CSOs improved through the NGO Marketplace (mini-grants voucher system, web-portal and regular capacity development forums); NGO Capacity Building Marketplace strengthened as a tool that provides organizational development assistance to civil society; and, Technical and organizational capacity of ISAR Ednannia increased as an Intermediary Support Organization (ISO) and the Marketplace Administrator.” To achieve these objectives, Ednannia launched the online Marketplace website tool; hosted the National Civil Society Development Forum “Change
Yourself to Change the Country” in November 2015 (attended by over 1,000 participants from 850 CSOs); organized three schools of organizational development forums; and, held four community of practice and sixteen webinars on organizational development.

In particular, the first and second objectives of Ednannia were of interest in their mobilization effectiveness. These objectives focused on the Marketplace website tool that was used to disseminate grants mini grants for 187 CSOs with 161 mini-grants totaling $148,676. The amount of applicants exceeded the funds distributed, as 425 applicants applied. The Marketplace is a platform that allows for verified CSOs to be matched with various services and donor funds. While ISAR Ednannia manages the Marketplace (both online and offline), Sida, USAID, and the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation have used the Marketplace to access various CSOs. In addition to the benefit of transparency of activities and ease of access to services, the grants encourage development of the applicants. There are three levels of grants, the basic level voucher (up to $1,000) requires applicants to study and understand their own organizational development through a self-assessment; the advance level grant (up to $7,000) requires organizations to draft a detailed development plan; the group grants (up to $7,000) allow several groups (at least 3) to pool resources.

Its focus and approach to encouraging grassroots organizational development and civil society engagement framed the CSOs the mobilization team researched in Ukraine. In particular, tools such as the Marketplace and transparency are key to allowing CSOs to engage with the public and move forward with effective reforms.

4.4 National Identity: Beyond Post-Soviet Mentalities

Ukraine is currently seeking to establish a national identity that leaves behind post-Soviet mindsets and embraces individual autonomy and engagement in democratic processes. While many interviewees indicated a general mistrust of dysfunctional systems, our team observed that most of those who were exercising agency in civil society fit into a certain set of demographics: youth, humanitarian activists, and veterans. Even within this subset of society, however, it is challenging to encourage citizen agency and prove that individual effort and funds, when pooled together over time, can actually create change, particularly as many feel disillusioned by the lack of notable, concrete reforms post-revolution. Nonetheless, certain cultures and mentalities remain that inhibit greater mobilization and participation including a lack of trust, ambiguous communication, and ubiquitous post-soviet mentalities that do not encourage personal agency or goals that are larger than the individual. Though the general atmosphere of society appears to be cautiously optimistic, albeit fatigued, forming a cohesive, creative, and collaborative national identity continues to be a great struggle for Ukrainian civil society, which currently lacks individual involvement, accountability, and ownership.
4.4.1 Impetus to Mobilization

In the younger generation, mobilization through social media campaigns, with the development of crowd-funding efforts for local reforms, is becoming a viable mean of engaging people on a large scale. Further, the current war in the East and the crisis of integrating IDPs across society has aided in the formation of a national identity and spurred a notable surge in civic engagement. Veterans, with a fervent intolerance towards corruption, also join the ranks. However, these humanitarian responses are reactionary and do not indicate an ability to institutionalize this kind of activity. Many interviewees have noted that prominent events, such as a revolution or war, cause spikes in activity, but that these often lack stability and longevity. One of the most pervasive trends our team has identified is society’s fatigue and unwillingness to commit to engaging with CSOs for the long-term beyond attractive, tangible, and finite projects.

4.4.2 Recommendations

USAID should continue to communicate achievements and projects in a transparent manner, allocate funds towards the education of civic actors on the importance and value of democratic participation, and standardize the ways by which CSOs gain equal access to government officials. People need to see results and be reminded that forward progress may not always be visible. For this reason, many effective organizations have linked their loftier, ideological aims with tangible, short-term projects to increase participation and ease of securing funding. In particular, civil society needs to be reassured that interactions between CSOs and government are free of special favors or unfair advantages. The necessity of personal, leveraged connections between established CSO leaders and members of parliament is a barrier to entry and success for the grassroots level on a financial and moral level. Furthermore, when the general public is aware of this system they suspect foul play and lose momentum to mobilize.

Ukrainian civil society would be well-served by a general increase in trust and transparency between the various players operating with civil society; this is directly linked to mobilization and greater institutional accountability. The Ednannia Marketplace tool is an example of such an effective platform. There is, however, a risk that supply side partners will be lacking in quantity and diversity, given that a US-based agency is controlling the program. Ideally, this type of communication, coordination, and funding platform will expand its scope to other international and local actors in order to avoid tapping into the same sets of CSOs and donors. The Marketplace could also provide a means of leveling the playing field by facilitating the interactions between CSOs. For example, if one organization is meeting with a member of the Rada on a matter that affects a wide variety of interests, could that be an opportunity for the Marketplace to facilitate the inclusion of another (smaller, less engaged) CSO at that meeting. This might lead to a mentoring relationship developing between organization leaders. Regional disparity in the Marketplace was evident, with Kyiv, Lviv and Vinnytsya being awarded the most grants. In addition, most of the grants were focused on “strategic planning and communication strategies development; fundraising strategies development; advocacy and policy dialogue trainings, policies and procedures development.” As CSOs develop, the Marketplace may want to consider honing in on
specific areas within the broad goal of organizational development such as policies and procedures development to ensure the rollout of effective reforms. Nevertheless, this model holds promise in communication efforts to help battle the disaffection felt by citizens and increase public trust.

4.5 Grassroots Organizations, Coalitions, and Institutionalized CSO Mobilization

Ukrainian CSOs can be broadly categorized into three organizational types: grassroots, coalition, and institutional. Grassroots level organizations are typically local independent organizations; they may receive funding from larger coalitions of which they are either direct members or nonmembers. They are typically able to engage with community members through planning public events and advertising on social media. Coalition organizations are larger umbrella organizations composed of a variety of smaller organizations, which benefit from the coalition’s funding mechanisms. Coalition organizations have large regional presences and emphasize policy reform. Institutionalized organizations are typically larger, well-established, self-contained organizations that are well recognized by and likely funded by the international donor community. They may take the form of research-driven think tanks or they may be full-service advocacy organizations as well as social service providers. There is a need for greater coordination and communication among CSOs at the grassroots level, coalition, and institutional level; however, this should not translate towards consolidation of CSOs so they only exist at the coalition level. While the strength of coalitions lies in effective policy reform, grassroots organizations are able to mobilize individuals, while institutional organizations are able to drive theoretical and analytical discussion.

4.5.1 Grassroots Organizations

The effectiveness of grassroots organizations primarily lies in engagement with non-NGO employees; in example, Open Ukraine is an organization that only has five full time employees, but also has a volunteer Youth Leadership Council of ten people and a Facebook page of 8,000+ followers. Though Open Ukraine was founded by a former prime minister, grassroots organizations are defined by their smaller staff and reliance on volunteers. The organization initially focused on culture projects, but due to recent Ukrainian financial turmoil and an inability to find funding for many projects, the organization shifted to prioritize youth engagement. Being a grassroots organization, Open Ukraine was able to easily shift focus to continue mobilizing a larger demographic, in this case youth; moreover, the status of Open Ukraine as an independent organization allows them to focus on small common problems within civil society without being restricted to the mission of a larger coalition.

4.5.2 Coalition Groups

The effectiveness of coalition organizations lies primarily in the ability to build a larger platform to push through policy reform and attract international donations. While some organizations have indicated that coalitions are frustrating due to the formulas members have to follow and their perceived loss of identity, they also have admitted that it is difficult to achieve anything large-scale without the financial and organizational support of a coalition. Large donors sometimes do not
appreciate the activism focused approach to grassroots, and may prioritize the design of a project which may be delivered by a larger organization. Moreover, given that CSO impact can be hard to assess, coalitions have the ability to help smaller grassroots organizations communicate and share best practices with one another. This also helps to eliminate competition between CSOs, as some organizations previously viewed themselves as fighting for the same grants.

4.5.3 Institutionalized CSOs

The effectiveness of institutionalized, professional organizations is primarily in being able to advocate for specific policy proposals to improve Ukraine. For example, some think tanks operate as independent, nonpartisan, noncommercial organizations that focus on research into different areas of society. There is value in these organizations, yet other such organizations may strongly advocate for specific policy changes.

4.5.4 Recommendations

USAID should be wary of focusing its grassroots organization empowerment efforts simply on coalition building. While coalitions can be valuable in assisting smaller organizations in capacity building, there is potential for too much reliance on coalitions and loss of individual grassroots organization and institutional organization support. CEDOS, an independent, non-partisan, non-commercial NGO founded in 2011, has analyzed over 1,000 initiatives and organizations to map out the interconnectedness of various CSOs, with the strongest connections evident in Kyiv between big organizations and international donors. In order to help empower grassroots organizations USAID should seek out these organizations outside of Kyiv. Specifically, USAID should follow up with the report CEDOS is set to release in February 2017 detailing these data visualization trends of CSOs relationships between one another, donors, and regions.

4.6 Post-EuroMaidan Decentralization of Reforms

EuroMaidan inspired citizens around Ukraine and resulted in an influx of civil society engagement in the country. After living in a time of extremely low political efficacy, citizens were suddenly exposed to the tangible impact of large-scale mobilization. Overall, citizens not only realized the value of civil society and mobilization efforts, but also desired to be a part of the change. While this new energy was an important point echoed throughout interviews, and a first step toward mobilization of citizens, these new organizations face challenges in long-term mobilization and maintaining this spirit.

4.6.1 Post-Maidan Organizational Capacity

New organizations can often only receive small grants for very specific individual projects. These groups end up having to work grant-to-grant, or project-to-project, and often disappear for periods of time between grants. While individual projects may have a large attendance or success rate, this is a very difficult way for groups to operate if they want to have any ability to successfully mobilize
the population around their organization or a specific issue. Other organizations have fallen into the trap of existing only as a Facebook page. They place too much power in the social media platform and do not actually organize or mobilize in any genuine way. Existing capacity issues allow ever permeating collective action problems to hinder progress; organizations still have issues constantly mobilizing groups and finding buy-in from Ukrainians. This problem is anticipated to increase as more time passes from the EuroMaidan.

4.6.2 Recommendations

Housing Associations are a new phenomenon developing in Ukraine that can be looked at as a best practice for dealing with collective action problems. Many buildings around Ukraine suffer from poor maintenance of common spaces including elevators, hallway maintenance, and more. Unfortunately, the responsibility for these common areas in buildings does not fall on the individual residents but on management companies. These companies and the building managers that they employ are often corrupt: even though citizens are paying fees to have all of the common spaces maintained, they do not see the results. This is a very tangible issue for residents due to its visible impact on their daily lives; therefore, it is relatively easy to mobilize residents to make a statement against the current system. The Center for Reform Support, among other organizations, was able to go into these apartment buildings and set up meetings with residents. There they would outline for the citizens how to form their own cooperative organization where the citizens were together responsible for the maintenance of the building, in a fair, non-corrupt system.

These housing associations (e.g., OSR, communities of one building or sets of buildings, and OSBB, communities of co-owners of apartment owners) did not only have success on a small scale, they grew in size and capabilities. Some of the housing associations realized that their buildings had room to build an extra floor on top. They built extra units and used that revenue for maintenance fees or for their own profit. Housing organizations are found around the country including in the Donetsk, Rivne, and Poltava regions. Furthermore, housing associations have started to form networks with each other where they are able to coordinate. For example, in Varash they created an interactive map so that housing associations can see what other organizations exist in the city, and where they are developing. Finally, the Law on Peculiarities of Ownership in Multi-Apartment Buildings was passed this summer and gave citizens the option to decide by July 1 who was responsible for managing their building, otherwise the local government would pick someone. This gave residents an incentive for their own mobilization efforts.

Housing associations are an example of how collective action efforts can be effective tools to mobilize citizens around tangible issues. Citizens are able to mobilize when their best interest is at stake; they often just lack the tools (e.g., forums to organize) and motivation (e.g., deadlines). When working with grassroots organizations through ENGAGE, it is important to note the importance of framing an issue in terms that citizens can relate to in order to engage all parties involved.
4.7 Local CSO Lack of Transparency

Local government officials are reluctant to work with smaller, local NGOs because their small nature is often synonymous with a lack of organization, which makes it easier for them to take grants and disappear. This lack of organization also means that they can pose as whatever type of organization they see fit, even if they have no intention of ever following through on their mission. Furthermore, in some places, funders cannot find enough organizations that meet their minimum standards for operation. For example, the IRF outpost in Odessa had $200,000 to allocate in subgrants, but could only find 15 organizations that met IRF standards for operation. In other areas, some CSOs have far more direct access to, and influence on, the government and therefore are able to pursue their objectives far easier than other organizations. This is a form of corruption in itself and is disheartening for other groups trying to mobilize and make an impact.

**4.7.1 Recommendations**

ENGAGE is moving in the right direction with its emphasis on monitoring grants, both in terms of clear records of where funding is going, but also more information on the goals and impacts of these grants. However, ENGAGE cannot fully monitor local efforts without any local USAID representation. While implementing ENGAGE, USAID should also develop an incubator model for monitoring purposes. While this does not have to be a full incubator model, where organizations would operate under complete USAID purview in local areas, USAID implementing partners must have a presence in local areas where they are supporting organizations, particularly areas outside of Kyiv. This will not only allow CSOs to seek assistance to develop their organizational capacity with important resources, but also provides a direct window into everyday operations. USAID implementing partners will be able to observe interactions with the government, implementation of projects, and maintain a more nuanced understanding of the landscape in which the project is operating. Effective monitoring is particularly important for organizations that are focused on mobilization efforts because citizens can be easily disillusioned, particularly by any type of corruption within an organization.

An important part of this incubator model is for USAID to develop a standardized impact assessment rubric. This is a long term solution for evaluation of projects as once CSOs are following a set of guidelines for reporting the results of their operations, it will be much harder for corruption to permeate and CSOs to serve as a front for another organization. USAID must not only develop expectations for an impact assessment, but also teach CSO leaders how to evaluate their organization based on these standards.

4.8 Case Study: Mobilization Efforts of Patients of Ukraine

Patients of Ukraine (POU) is a large national organization with a two-fold purpose: providing health services for underserved patients and lobbying for the healthcare-related rights of citizens. They were born out of an HIV advocacy organization when the founders recognized that less-common diseases needed equal assistance in Ukraine but lacked a platform. As such, POU is a
coalition of over 120 organizations and 60,000 people across the country backed with international funding. Since their founding in 2012, they have been very successful in mobilizing citizens, and subsequently pressing the government for decisive action, particularly through social media and large-scale protests. This case study will explore why the organization has been such a successful mobilizer and extrapolate some recommendations and trends that can be applied more broadly to Ukrainian civil society.

### 4.8.1 Transparent Actions

POU has persuaded the government to simplify the regulation of foreign drugs in order to increase competition and quantity in the market and decrease price. This is part of their belief that quality care is a human right and should be accessible to every citizen. They have also been successful in anti-corruption reforms and raising the state budget for treatment.

In addition, POU is working on a comprehensive database of available medications, and the hospital pharmacies that have them in stock, which can be accessed online. This will reduce under-the-table payments, false information, and, most importantly, allow citizens to quickly access the resources they need. This website (liky.odessa.ua and liky.in.ua) has launched successfully in Odessa and is spreading rapidly. This puts the information (and power) in the hands of citizens and allows them to hold the government accountable. POU is acutely aware of the issues that Ukrainian civil society actors face in transparency and civilian trust and are actively combating the bribery and secrecy that comes with government networks and personal favors.

They attribute their success to the attractiveness of the health advocacy field as a cause people are willing to rally behind, as well as their own internal motivations: they are working for patients, not for their donors or for their salary. They are not politically correct and they are willing to do whatever it takes to support Ukrainian citizens, focusing on the result over the process, even when it does not necessarily appease the government through their donors. The coalition has the ability to mobilize patients across the country to question the system and fight for their rights through their transparency initiatives.

### 4.8.2 Gaining Government Attention

The main goal of POU is to keep the government accountable for all citizens in Ukraine, especially those who are ill, using media and everyday citizens as watchdogs. They believe that the government is not fulfilling its duty to those who are suffering from illness and being denied access to necessary treatment, particularly in medications that should be readily available. Their answer is to mobilize people and the media in keeping the government honest, particularly as the “government is afraid of the pervasive impact of mass-scale media.”

A leader of POU commented that the organization comes across as “a little controversial” to some international donors. However, they attribute a lot of their success to the “shock factor” of some of their more disturbing campaigns, particularly before the EuroMaidan Revolution.
POU worked hard to forge personal relationships with relevant government and media actors simply because they feel that within the Ukrainian system that is the only way to get the attention necessary to pass reforms. These ‘insider networks’ between CSO leaders, journalists, and politicians represent a very real channel for quid-pro-quo expectations and unfair disadvantages for those smaller grassroots organizations that have passion and worthy ideals, but do not yet have the necessary level of political sway. POU is able to have real influence on the government through their connections; however, it is also somewhat problematic that POU has direct access to the Minister of Health through Viber, while many other laudable activists do not have the same privilege.

**4.8.3 Ties between Grassroots Organizations and Coalitions**

With the knowledge that they can be supported by a larger coalition, individuals have the capacity to mobilize, to start their own organization, and fight for causes that hit close to home. In this manner, POU unites patients with different diseases (TB, cancer, “orphan diseases”, HIV/AIDS), activists fighting to protect those patients, and the average citizen to achieve mass scale health reform. POU now has more than 30 representatives of different disease areas, operating as an umbrella that teaches and trains those beneath them. A coalition-style format is also incredibly helpful for activists who focus on particularly rare diseases (called “orphan diseases”) as they otherwise would likely not have the capacity or funding to accomplish their goals and support the people whose lives rely on them. POU acts as a platform for smaller or newer organizations. These types of coalition models can be valuable temporary solutions to help mobilize the grassroots and level the playing field.

**4.8.4 Clear Outputs Inspire More Inputs**

Another theme that has emerged in our interviews is that people are much more willing to give time and money to projects that produce tangible outputs. Being results-oriented is important in a climate of fatigue because people like to see that change is happening and donors like to see clear metrics of their success. With this in mind, POU is careful to link their ideological ambitions to concrete projects in order to continue to produce clear impact assessments and incite greater mobilization of civic actors, as people rally around concrete programs and undertakings. The organization is run like a business and has a result-oriented structure, putting forth clear goals and communicating when they are reached. They believe that many people like the idea of raising funds for “kids with cancer,” but are less inclined to raise money individually for vague “advocacy” campaigns.

In many ways, POU has benefited from the revolution with greater and direct access to receptive and active ministers in the government. However, this increased efficiency has decreased their public visibility somewhat, as they no longer need to protest in the streets. It is difficult to communicate to the disillusioned public that, though they may no longer see the reforms in action, they are still slowly moving in a direction of progress.
5. MEDIA AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Media in Ukraine represents a critical leverage point to foster the growth of democratic values and engage citizens in local and national affairs. While the dominant and entrenched presence of oligarchs in the media sphere complicates the growth of a free and fair press, in the past decade, an independent media presence has begun to develop. Indeed, the democratic momentum following the EuroMaidan Revolution, combined with the ground-leveling force of digital media have dramatically increased the number of individuals and organizations engaging in objective reporting. The support of international aid organizations and capacity-building CSOs contributed significant support to this development. While this trend seems promising, many challenges persist in establishing distinct, interesting, and verifiable coverage, and in equipping journalists to meet the demands on a dynamic, tech-centered world. Additionally, public media literacy remains low. As media vibrancy requires both a flourishing press and an engaged public, much work therefore remains relating to media development in Ukraine.

5.1 Key Findings

- Regional media does not produce distinct coverage from national media.
- Digital media presents opportunity to penetrate media but complicates fact-based reporting.
- Competition between independent media outlets high but differentiation is limited.
- Journalist trainings can be ineffective and media literacy development fails to penetrate public in any meaningful way.

5.2 Recommendations

- Focus on the autonomy of regional media.
- Provide tools and trainings that diversify the reach of digital media and highlight quality coverage.
- Provide tools and trainings that allow independent media to develop distinct brands and target niche markets.
- Encourage coordinated, effective trainings and institutionalize media education.

5.3 U-Media Evaluation

The U-Media program, with Internews as the implementing partner, has achieved notable progress within the last five years towards its goals of (1) supporting media independence and freedom of speech and (2) increasing the variety and quality of news sources. Internews has particularly focused on developing numerous sources of high-quality content in an effort to attract audiences away from biased media, as well as programming for journalist training, media literacy education, and media monitoring. A notable example of U-Media’s work has been its progress on developing a public broadcasting channel, though concerns remain as to whether “the demand and request for PSB is solely from a small group of activists who do not even watch television.”
Overall, this research supports the conclusions and recommendations of the February 2016 Performance Evaluation of the Ukraine Media Project. To contribute to this evaluation, this research found evidence that Internews has started working on the recommendation that it facilitate greater collaboration among its partners. Internews has begun organizing autonomous, local press clubs in Lviv, Kharkiv, Chernobyl, and other regions of Ukraine in order to improve cooperation amongst local organizations, as well as outreach into their respective regions. Even given these efforts, regional development is lacking. The continuation of U-Media programming will prove crucial in meeting this and other existing needs in the media sphere.

Additionally, this research builds on the 2016 evaluation’s findings by focusing on:

1. Recommendation 6.1: Internews should concentrate funding efforts around strategically important media activities that are well-coordinated and outcome-based.
2. Recommendation 6.4: Whenever possible, U-Media needs to find effective ways to encourage institution and core partners to collaborate by supporting joint projects in critical areas.
3. Recommendation 6.8: To the extent possible, whenever possible, the project should support production and distribution of publicly available data on ratings, monitoring, readership, and other market-driven characteristics of independent media rather than top oligarch media.

This report finds that greater coordination among actors in the media sector can help eliminate redundancies and inefficiencies that only exacerbate the issues of a highly-saturated media environment. Furthermore, a greater focus on attracting audiences to high-quality content should be a key focus of future U-Media programming. Now that higher-quality content exists, organizations should place more attention on the media market and public outreach.

5.4 Regional vs. National Media

The Ukrainian media sector is distinctly divided at the national and regional levels, and the sector has developed unevenly across regions. However, there are two notable commonalities across all regions and all levels of the media industry in Ukraine: (1) there is a lack of viable funding options and (2) all media outlets face a competitive environment.

At the national level, a select number of large, media conglomerates such as 1+1 Media Group, GDF Media Limited (Inter), and StarLightMedia (STB) dominate the industry. These media outlets are largely funded and owned by oligarchs, whose interests are reflected in the organization's content. Media outlets at the regional level face the same issue, as many are financially backed by local oligarchs who view media outlets as luxury items. As a leader of a media think tank noted: “Having a media network is like showing off a fancy watch for oligarchs.”

The funding provided by oligarchs is important to the success of many Ukrainian media outlets, as a stagnant advertising market has translated to lower profits for media organizations who usually
generate funds from working with advertisers. Hence, few media organizations see viable opportunities to separate themselves from oligarch interests, as doing so would require employees to take a significant pay cut or no pay at all. This issue has been less troublesome for larger, popular TV stations such as 1+1 and Inter, as their market dominance has allowed them to operate off a larger profit margin than most other outlets. However, 1+1 has still been concerned with the weak advertising market and has started looking to other business ventures to generate revenue, such as product placement in their TV programming.

These financial challenges and imbalances have resulted in wide variation in the level of technical resources and human capital available to national and regional media outlets. Top journalism students prefer to work for large, national media conglomerates who offer the highest salaries and benefits. For example, 1+1 offers their journalists opportunities to study and train abroad, and their offices boast state-of-the-art equipment. However, the built-in training programs at 1+1 and other large conglomerates do not seem to emphasize the same journalistic standards as CSOs.

Since regional and local news outlets cannot offer attractive salaries or benefits, they struggle to attract and retain top talent. Few journalists from city schools want to return to the more rural regions of Ukraine to work for local news outlets. Thus, some of the journalists working at local news organizations do not come from typical journalist education backgrounds, as they hold degrees in fields such as linguistics or teaching. Hromadske Odesa highlighted human resources as one of the main challenges to their success, as they are unable to properly film, edit, and produce high quality digital content because they struggle to find journalists with these skills who are willing to work for a lower salary. Local outlets are also unable to afford the equipment necessary to produce high quality content, particularly TV content, and many of our interview subjects noted the disparity in aesthetic quality between national and local channels.

5.4.1 National Media Conglomerates: Market Share and Audiences

The large, national media conglomerates tend to target the same audience—women ages 30-35—as they are the demographic known to have the largest consumption habits. Thus, advertisers prefer to work with media outlets that attract this demographic group in Ukraine. However, these large media outlets have larger aims than just this demographic. In order to attract all demographic groups in Ukraine, they produce a diverse array of programming ranging from reality shows to children’s shows. This strategy seems to be quite successful for attracting a large audience to their news channels, as the most recent Internews survey reveals that approximately 62 percent of Ukrainians watch 1+1 for news, while only four percent watch First National.

At the regional level, news outlets seem to be fighting for the same audiences as national media conglomerates, as they publish similar content to national media outlets and to one another. In many regions – particularly Odessa – the market is saturated by a multitude of different media outlets with similar content, and there are few dominant outlets in each region that can capture a majority of the market. National media outlets still capture the largest audiences.
5.4.2 National Media Outlets: Diverse Content and Differentiation

At the national level, the most dominant players have diverse content to appeal to a broad audience. Their focus appears to be on providing entertaining content, rather than high-quality news information, in order to attract a wide swathe of Ukrainians with varying socio-economic and educational backgrounds. 1+1 noted that they modeled their studio off flashy, palace-like studios in the Middle East to create a spectacle, and they structure their news pieces as mini narratives to make them seem less like a statement of facts and more like “storytelling.”

Regional and local outlets tend to simply copy the content produced by national news organizations. There is a lack of quality content at the regional level, which stems from both a lack of resources and talent, and the organizational structure of local news outlets. Many of these smaller, local outlets have few journalists. Thus, they face greater pressure to produce a greater amount of content per reporter, which leads to a drop in quality. Furthermore, some regions are still plagued by the old “Soviet” mentality where local media outlets are seen as insignificant extensions of government mouthpieces.

According to a recent Internews survey, national TV and Internet news outlets enjoy a greater level of trust than regional outlets on average. However, this differs by region and there does not seem to be a clear explanation for this variation. Some of our interview subjects were unsure of why this trend was occurring, but others noted that it may be the legacy of a Soviet era mindset where people mainly received news information from national media, and local media was insignificant.

5.4.3 Working Conditions and Safety Concerns near Conflict Areas

The working conditions of journalists vary greatly across regions. News organizations operating in the Eastern and Southern parts of the country are more concerned with the safety of their journalists, but even journalists working at 1+1 Media in Kiev have been threatened for reporting on corruption in the government.

A growing concern for journalists is the crackdown on pro-Russia content. One prominent media organization alleges that approximately 350 people have been jailed for posting pro-Russia comments on social media, and the Ministry of Information has taken a stronger stance against content and information that is perceived to be pro-Russian. However, other organizations did not confirm these claims.

5.4.4 Recommendations

As Ukraine seeks to decentralize its government as part of its reforms, the media sector should also start developing more autonomous regional and local media outlets. Since the media market is generally oversaturated and highly competitive, local media outlets should seek to create unique content to attract more niche, local audiences, rather than attempting to compete with national media outlets by echoing their content. Targeting specific demographics through specialized
content for the area, such as specific reporting on IDPs in conflict regions, could allow regional media outlets to grow and develop a designated audience, as focusing on specific topics would allow them to be more credible, authoritative sources for this information. Narrowing their scope will also allow journalists at regional outlets to focus their attention and time on fewer topics. Local media outlets should also focus on the technical development of their journalists so they can produce higher quality online content, as the Internet is a low cost, more accessible option for news organizations that operate on a smaller budget.

By distinguishing themselves through their content, local and regional media outlets can more successfully attract and retain audiences, rather than fighting over the same audience with hundreds of other competitors who have greater resources. Capturing a dedicated, local audience may also allow local media organizations to stabilize or improve their financial situations, as they can develop a steady stream of income and then focus on expanding their reach. Nevertheless, support and professional development at the regional level is severely lacking, and focusing efforts on developing local media may result in the greatest improvements in media content outside of Kyiv.

5.5 Digital Media

Digital media represents, as one journalism professor put it, “how to be a media organization and not die in the future.” For civic-minded organizations in Ukraine, digital media holds particular promise as a means to advance a free and fair press. Insofar as digital media provides the opportunity for fresh, audacious voices to penetrate the news landscape, it can also amplify oligarch influence, create siloed “echo-chambers” of information, and perpetuate false news. Ukraine must leverage the opportunities of digital media while mitigating its inherent challenges.

5.5.1 Digital Media Reduces Barriers to Entry

Digital platforms have been lauded as an effective means of gaining access to entrenched markets. This holds particularly true in spheres with a few dominant players and high barriers of entry, such as Media. In Ukraine specifically, the predominance of oligarch-owned news outlets complicates market entry. Digital media, however, provides an avenue to compete against Big Media by substantially minimizing operation and production costs. Crucially, digital media diminishes overhead and equipment costs. Whereas traditional TV outlets require expensive sets, equipment and many personnel, a few motivated individuals with a minimal budget and a few key pieces of equipment can launch a digital media outlet. By reducing the barriers to entry, in Ukraine, as elsewhere, digital media outlets have proliferated and provide an alternative to Big Media.

As with other regions of the world, digital media has begun to reshape the media landscape in Ukraine. The notoriety of media outlets and media NGOs such as Hromadske, Ukrainskaya Pravda, and Detektor Media (previously Telekritika) highlights this trend. Even beyond these well-known players, digital media allows up-start citizens to plant a stake in the ground. Said the CEO of one small, digital news organization modeling itself off the likes of VICE and Vox Media, “I was tired
of always seeing the same content. So I registered my own [media group].” Admittedly, digital media also introduces the potential for nefarious actors to enter the fray, including those that amplify oligarch influence, stir-up pro-Russia propaganda, and produce “fake news.” Given that oligarch media previously boxed start-ups out of the market all together, however, the proliferation of new players in the game represents a trend towards a vibrant press.

5.5.2 Digital Media Facilitates Market Segmentation and Targeting

Particularly for those new to the media market, though for more established players as well, digital media allows organizations to segment, monitor, and target audiences. Indeed, for digital media start-ups, one expert notes, finding a niche and offering unique content represents the key to success. With the limited resources of most digital media start-ups, it is not possible to produce content on the same scale as Big Media. A 1+1 Media representative remarked that “it’s hard to imagine what kind of new content [a new media organization] could bring.” However, media start-ups that identify unmet audience demands-- coverage that Big Media overlooks-- can provide crucial value-added. One media startup, for example, seeks to make short, easy-to-consume videos that explain a critical topic in an entertaining fashion. In one case, the startup produced a video series about the rise of a crooked Mayor that also included soundbites of ridiculous comments the Mayor had been recorded saying. This organization knows that this content does not hold mass appeal, but hopes it will appeal to the one-to-three percent of the population of a given city that seeks high-quality coverage. Ukrainskaya Pravda has similarly identified and targeted a niche market, developing robust reporting on IT to garner a following in the Ukrainian tech sector. As digital tools allow organizations to easily track audience metrics, as well as elicit feedback from their viewers, media start-ups can understand the composition of their viewership and more precisely deliver tailored content.

5.5.4 Creating Sustainable Revenue Streams Remains a Challenge

While individuals may be able to operate media start-ups with substantially smaller budgets than traditional media groups, maintaining revenue streams remains a challenge. Four primary factors complicate revenue sustainability. First, the ability of oligarch-backed organizations to operate without financial pressure tilts the playing field in their favor, as they are able to offer subscription-free and ad-free content. Second, Ukrainians are not accustomed to paying subscription fees, and for many the expense of a newspaper subscription seems wanton. Third, ad revenue margins are extremely narrow. Though media-based ad revenue is declining across the globe, the margins in Ukraine are particularly low; the revenue-per-click ratio on YouTube, for example, is less than ten cents, compared to 30 cents elsewhere. In such an environment, the temptation of jeansa persists, jeopardizing objective reporting. Indeed, one media organization commented that “yellow journalism” may be more prevalent online because “short and stupid leads” can generate “lots of clicks.” Fourth, the saturation of the media market means that many organizations are fighting for the same audiences and, correspondingly, the same (limited) revenue streams. Thus, digital media organizations, like their print-based compatriots, are left with few viable options to sustain themselves economically.
Given the slim profit margins and steep competition in the media market, international aid proves vital for media start-ups continued viability. The Telekritika case highlights threat posed to independent, digital media outlets when international aid diminishes. Seizing on the momentum leading up to the Orange Revolution, Telekritika developed quality, objective reporting and substantial public trust. After the Revolution, however, international funding decreased as the perception seemed to be that “democracy won” and that a free and fair could therefore develop independently. Unfortunately, Telekritika was unable to harness sustainable revenue streams and was bought up by a media holding group that later sold the brand to Kolomoisky. Detector Media, the offshoot of Telekritika that developed in the wake of this takeover, acknowledges the need to diversify their funding methods to avoid a similar trajectory in the future, but remains concerned about their ability to do so. Some organizations expressed interest in developing consulting arms or for-profit production services, however, others felt that operating as a business would compromise the “good will of their projects” and decrease public trust. Thus, while digital media provides an opportunity to enter the media market, staying afloat and true to an organization’s founding values as well as remaining financially sustainable, particularly without international aid, remains a challenge.

5.5.5 Connecting to Diverse Audiences and Combatting Misinformation: Challenges

The ability of digital media to reach diverse audiences presents an additional challenge. Social media continues to represent the primary method of news dissemination, particularly for new media groups. Though this allows organizations to spread their findings cheaply and quickly, it transmits stories to a limited, homogenous demographic: namely, young, well-educated, already active individuals. Many organizations report that developing a Facebook following and having “friends” re-post their articles diversifies their audience. Given that these “friends” tend to be similarly minded, though, this diversification remains marginal. Reliance on social media as a form of distribution therefore introduces the problem of “e-news echo-chambers.” In other words, the civically-minded cyber community isolates itself and fails to reach a broader public audience. Though this phenomenon is hardly unique to Ukraine, the notable split amongst internet users in Ukraine between the young and old amplifies this problem. To access wider audiences, it is crucial for digital media organizations to recognize this issue, consider alternative methods of news distribution, and breakdown the insulating “Facebook Wall.”

Perhaps most problematically, digital media can be manipulated to promulgate misinformation. Again, this problem is not unique to Ukraine; however, given limited levels of “critical media literacy,” the creation of “false news” can be especially damaging. A number of organizations provided anecdotes of individuals, particularly older individuals, reading and accepting false-news online. There seems to be a pervasive issue that the internet itself is considered a reliable source, therefore if someone “reads something online, they believe it.” Moreover, verifying credible news reports from misleading ones requires time, resources, and a desire to do so; many individuals, even those that recognize misinformation as a problem, lack at least one of these pre-requisites. Finally, the social media crutch again exacerbates this problem, as false news with “clickbait-y titles” can spread quickly, and more shares can be seen as corresponding with an article’s reliability.
The issue of internet echo-chambers therefore intersects with the promulgation of misinformation, as when an issue takes off in certain “chambers” it can be inculcated from alternative narratives and “infect” a subset of the population. Though several organizations, namely StopFake and Bellingcat, actively flag false news stories, the breadth of false news and the limited audiences of these organizations limit their impact. For those desiring to push biased or false information, digital media presents a dangerous tool, particularly in Ukraine where media and digital literacy remain minimal.

Digital media represents the future of news in Ukraine and must be adapted to accordingly. By reducing barriers to entry, introducing new players to the field, and facilitating micro-targeting, digital media offers a significant opportunity to shake-up the stratified Ukrainian media sphere. Creating sustainable revenue streams, connecting with diverse audiences, and combatting misinformation, however, present new challenges that must be addressed to continue advancing towards a free and fair press. The following recommendations assist in these efforts.

### 5.5.6 Recommendations

To capitalize fully on the potential offered by digital media, organizations must diversify their audience and develop avenues for scaling-up quality reporting. Trainings in public outreach can help organizations to identify means of disseminating coverage beyond social media. Particularly promising may be sites that aggregate reporting from independent news outlets and provide a centralized platform of quality content. Moreover, media metrics, published by some CSOs already, can be more widely broadcast to signify quality digital media outlets from fraudulent ones. Further, algorithms that track, flag, and identify false news, such as those developed by Slate in the United States, represent a tool that may mitigate the influence of misinformation. Ensuring that organizations understand how to adopt these tools provides another means to increase the coverage of quality outlets. Similarly, ensuring that organizations understand how to optimize their websites to increase the likelihood of being found in internet searches assists in this task further. In short, building the capacity of organizations to break into new markets and scale-up objective reporting, while minimizing the influence of pseudo-news, would help to realize the potential of digital media.

### 5.6 Current State of Independent Media

Since EuroMaidan, Ukraine has witnessed an uptick in independent media outlets leveraging digital media to sidle into the market. This development injects critical objective reporting into the country; however, the reach of this reporting remains limited. Indeed, independent media outlets largely fight over the same audience—the highly educated, civically-engaged elite—complicating the task of sustaining themselves independently. Moreover, these organizations are poorly differentiated from each other—all claim to provide independent coverage, but few provide independent coverage with a distinct angle. For long-term sustainability, independent media outlets would be well served to differentiate themselves to provide unique value-added to the market.
5.6.1 Lack of Differentiation

Particularly amongst the most prominent independent media outlets—Hromadske, Ukrainskaya Pravda, and Detektor Media—there are few clear points of differentiation. One media CEO commented that they all provide the same, predictable coverage and these groups themselves do not make their differences from each other distinct. Increasing independent coverage represents an irrefutable mark towards a free and fair press, however, in-fighting between these organizations over viewership minimizes the potential reach of the independent media. Adopting unique angles and targeting niche markets presents an avenue for organizations committed to journalistic standards to continue to proliferate and expand the number of individuals viewing independent media, rather than eating away at the same slice of the market pie. While limited and nascent, some differentiation appears to have begun to develop. Detector Media, for example, services multiple digital platforms focused on different topics that may appeal to different sectors of the market. As more independent start-ups enter the market, it will be increasingly necessary for independent media to follow suit. Equipping independent organizations to develop distinct brands and deliver unique content will be critical to the future success of independent media.

5.6.2 Recommendations

Equipping organizations that enter the independent media market to deliver unique value represents a crucial need for the long-term viability of the sector. Digital tools, such as those offered by Google Analytics and many social network sites, allow organizations to zero-in on their viewership and identify gaps, trends, and market opportunities. These analytical tools can therefore accelerate the adoption of differentiated content. Ensuring that media groups fully understand how to use these tools will further facilitate this process. These services may be particularly important for new market entries actively seeking an identity. Moreover, trainings in branding and marketing will allow organizations to better signify their unique value-added. Given the promising long-term trend towards independent media, investing in tools and trainings that allow organizations to independently develop within the sector, thus expanding the sector as a whole, increases the viability of a free and fair press in the future.

5.7 Media Education

For independent media to thrive in Ukraine, journalism education and media literacy must be improved. Currently, many journalism university programs lack resources and effective training. Similarly, the journalism trainings offered by media civil society organizations fail to deliver the hard skills demanded by journalists. In addition, a lack of government involvement in media literacy programming within the formal education sector hampers the development of a media-literate public. A continued need therefore exists for investment in media education at both the higher- and lower-levels of education.
5.7.1 University Journalism Education Gaps

Journalism education varies in quality—on the whole, higher education programs in Ukraine lack the ability to train objective, professional, and media literate journalists. Journalism classes lack the resources and equipment to provide students with experiential journalism programming, such as running a multimedia newsroom studio. Most journalism departments focus on classes related to linguistics training and journalism history rather than on practicums relating to high-demand skills like data journalism. Higher education curricula additionally tend to lack an introduction to national- and local-level politics and economics. Most professors are academics rather than experienced journalists, perhaps explaining the limited practical training opportunities. Critical needs for budding journalists are thus not delivered in most higher education programs in Ukraine. It is of particular importance to improve this education given the challenges of developing professional excellence through field-training in the oligarch-dominated media landscape.

Kyiv-Mohyla and Ukrainian Catholic University represent bright spots in the higher-education sector, but are exceptions to the rule. Indeed, these are the two most elite and most successful journalism schools in Ukraine—Kyiv-Mohyla typically only accepts 25 percent of applicants. Moreover, these universities maintain high standards by only granting degrees to students they feel are capable professionals. A professor at Kyiv-Mohyla reported that several years ago, approximately half the graduating class did not receive diplomas because they failed to meet these rigorous standards. Most universities in Ukraine, however, handout journalism degrees to students regardless of their preparedness. This tendency dilutes the value of a degree in journalism. Indeed, a surfeit number of individuals with journalism degrees turns diplomas into meaningless indicators.

The success of Kyiv-Mohyla provides some insight into how to improve the gaps in higher education. Kyiv-Mohyla distinguish themselves as proactive actors in the changing journalism landscape. It was the first to start a digital journalism school and have recently started a fact-checking school using texts produced by the UAP. Kyiv-Mohyla incorporates media fact-checking organizations such as StopFake and Bellingcat into their curriculums and teach students to critically analyze media bias and subjective reporting. Kyiv-Mohyla additionally instructs students on misinformation identification and fact-checking best practices. In order to encourage students to pursue careers as objective, professional journalists, students speak with successful journalists and alumni who relied on honest reporting to advance their careers. Disseminating and encouraging the practices of Kyiv-Mohyla University may improve the higher-education environment in Ukraine.

5.7.2 Skills-based Journalism Training

As a result of poor journalism education, media organizations find it difficult to attract talented and objective reporters, who are “diamonds in the rough.” Therefore, many media civil society organizations try to fill education gaps through trainings and education initiatives. The IMI and the AUP, for example, hold two-to-three day training sessions for journalists focused on media literacy, safety in war reporting, and journalistic standards.
Many journalists express skepticism about the effectiveness of trainings. Indeed, many journalists are reluctant to take these trainings seriously because they believe that after several years of fieldwork, they have little to learn. These training sessions therefore need to communicate their value to journalists more strongly, as they can augment journalists’ skillsets. A centralized platform where different trainings can be promoted to journalists may help with training session promotion. While U-Media has advocated for an increase in training programs, the core problem remains appealing to all types of journalists and effectively delivering unique value to participants. Some media organizations mentioned that while they are aware of the numerous trainings available, there is no time and a lack of human resources to attend many of them, especially at the local level where they are needed most. Students who lack strong formal journalism training, however, often remark that they learn more in three days at a training experience than they have throughout their years in university. Thus, training programs can be effective tools if properly developed.

Trainings can also provide value by educating journalists in response to specific political developments. The war on the Eastern front, for example, created a need for training journalists on war reporting. IMI developed training sessions relating to war reporting to address this need, including CPR and safety mechanism information. Moreover, upon identifying further needs amongst participants, namely relating to journalistic standards, IMI again adapted their programming to meet this need. Other best practices from journalist trainings can be in the AUP trainings, which requires an application and vetting process. AUP additionally monitors their success by using entry-exit surveys and tracking the content produced by journalists who underwent the organization’s trainings. Monitoring impact improves organizational accountability relating to the quality of trainings. By responding to the needs of journalists and monitoring internal effectiveness, training programs serve to develop best practices in the field of journalism.

### 5.7.3 Institutionalization of Media Literacy

Media literacy is gaining traction as a tool that can be incorporated into all levels of education. The AUP media literacy curriculum has reached 2,000 out of 21,000 schools in Ukraine, but there remain many challenges to institutionalizing media education within the school system. The Ukrainian Ministry of Education is a difficult partner to work with and does not financially support any initiatives to provide media literacy education to schools. Detector Media has created an electronic media literacy “game” curriculum, with tests and information presented in a visually appealing way. However, the electronic resource is bypassing the government due to the difficulties with working with government and bureaucracy to change curriculums.

It is critical to introduce media literacy as early as possible within the formal education system in order to reframe the role of media in society away from the Soviet model of media as a biased public relations machine and to help citizens think critically about sources of information. Many people are incapable or reluctant to fact-check and analyze sources. In addition, many individuals put blind faith in content discovered on the internet, failing to recognize potential problems in online sources. Many citizens are also unaware of how they may be manipulated by emotional
articles and visual imagery. A standard curriculum starting from elementary school will ensure that people know how to verify sources, fact-check, and analyze media content.

5.7.4 Recommendations

In order to help make journalism trainings more effective, they need to reach a broader sector of the journalism community and focus on skills journalists require for content production. Core among these skills are hard, technology-based ones, such as video editing, data journalism, and aesthetic design. While U-Media has successfully encouraged the development of serious investigative content, many other practical skills have yet to be delivered. Many journalists express the need to improve their digital competence and data-driven skills, not just their investigative skills. It is important for journalists to understand how to employ multimedia tools such as film and podcasts. In addition, monitoring impact can improve journalist trainings. Journalism trainings are a tool proven effective, but can modified to reach wider audiences and tailored to meet in-demand skills.

To improve media education more broadly, media literacy needs to be institutionalized within school and university curriculums throughout Ukraine. In order to most effectively generate responsible methods of interpreting the media and news, media literacy should be introduced at an early age. Continuing to invest in the work of CSOs targeting institutionalized media literacy, therefore represents a critical need for the long-term development of a critical and engaged public.

5.8 Case Study: Misinformation and the Conflict with Russia

The current conflict between Russia and Ukraine has been characterized as a “hybrid war” due to Russia’s strategy of pairing traditional warfare with a robust propaganda campaign. Although Russian propaganda has been present in Ukraine for several years, the recent conflict has highlighted the influence of Russia’s misinformation tactics. Most Ukrainians agree that by appealing to emotion, Russian propaganda has successfully manipulated public opinion against the national government in Kyiv. A leading media scholar notes that “Russian propaganda has a message for everyone,” including disinterested parties and patriots, and it “uses your emotions; when you have strong feelings, you can’t use your brain to understand and analyze nuance.”

Two main features distinguish Russia’s propaganda strategy: (1) information that is partly true or outright false, which is (2) disseminated through a variety of channels in large volumes. Russian propaganda has framed the Ukrainian government as a fascist regime that has killed its own people, and they propagate this information through TV the Internet, social media, and the radio.

5.8.1 Current Strategies to Counter Russian Propaganda

Russian propaganda has drawn the attention of the Ukrainian central government, and to curb its influence the Verkhovna Rada passed legislation banning Russian TV channels from broadcasting in Ukraine in 2014. More recently, Russian films, books, and cultural figures have also been
blacklisted from entering Ukraine. Additionally, according to the AUP, Ukraine’s Ministry of Information has also worked to silence pro-Russian voices by sentencing approximately 350 individuals to 3-4 years in prison for posting pro-Russian comments on social media. However, IMI stated that the Ministry of Information was ineffective and had not implemented any successful policies. A media expert from 1+1 Media concurred, noting that although the Ministry wanted to exert influence, it had none. She remarked: “I wouldn’t say [the Ministry of Information are] control freaks, but they want to control everything.”

The CSO sector has implemented several initiatives to address Russian propaganda efforts as well. First, a few organizations such as AUP and IMI have focused part of their media literacy education on identifying fake news and parsing out reliable news sources. Additionally, organizations such as Detector Media monitor both Ukrainian and Russian media to evaluate the quality and bias of their content. New CSOs have also developed in response to Russian misinformation, such as StopFake, which has recently joined First Draft—a network of international NGOs, companies, and news organizations working to combat misinformation.

Some news organizations have responded to Russian propaganda by producing “patriotic” journalism, biased towards pro-government construction of narratives. For example, news organizations backed by oligarchs with anti-Russian views, such as 1+1 Media, only employ people and report information that align with their “values.”

Efforts to educate the public about Russian propaganda and misinformation seem to have been effective, as a recent Internews survey showed a dramatic decline in trust in Russian media outlets across all regions of Ukraine. This public awareness about Russian misinformation stems from high-profile fact-checking efforts. For example, a story about Ukrainian soldiers killing a woman and crucifying her baby drew substantial public attention and outcry, but when it was later found to be false it garnered even greater publicity.

Nevertheless, the conflict has also brought forth a number of significant challenges. First, the media sector in Ukraine has varying opinions on how to deal with Russian misinformation in their reporting standards. Organizations such as AUP condone the existence of the Ministry of Information and their alleged actions against pro-Russian supporters. Conversely, IMI and the Media Law Institute note that during this time of conflict, it is better to allow for some restrictions on freedom of speech such as the blacklisting of Russian media. Additionally, IMI notes that since some Russian media reports cannot be verified, they do not consider leaving out the Russian perspective as unbalanced reporting. Since some CSOs differ in their opinions on whether these actions constitute restrictions on freedom of speech or violations of journalistic standards, they have also disagreed over the wording of proposed legislation and the methodology for monitoring media organizations.

Fact-checking is also not a surefire way of combatting misinformation. To fact-check an article requires significant effort from journalists to find the relevant information to disprove a lie, but false news is created at a much faster rate, as it requires zero research or evidence. Thus, it is
impossible for fact-checkers to keep up with the pace at which false news is propagated, so pseudo-news articles are often able to provide the first word on an issue or topic.

The prevalence of Russian media also varies across regions, making it difficult to address the entire issue at the national, institutional level. For example, the banning of Russian media has had minimal impact in the Eastern areas of Ukraine such as the Donbass region, which only gets TV signal from Russian channels.

Russian propaganda and the counter efforts also have varying influence on different demographics in society. Ukrainians who still want to access Russian TV channels can do so online, which means that individuals who support Russia can still find manipulative information that supports anti-Ukrainian views. Furthermore, older Ukrainians are more likely to watch TV, while younger Ukrainians are more apt to access information online and through social media platforms. Thus, depending on what region of the country an individual resides in and how they access media information, they may be more subject to pro-Ukrainian information or pro-Russian information. Therefore, online efforts at combatting misinformation such as the StopFake website may only reach younger audiences, while older audiences who are less likely to use the internet may not benefit from StopFake’s resources.

The possibility of Russian influence across Europe and in the recent U.S. presidential election has raised the public profile of Russian propaganda. When we spoke with the Ukrainian Embassy in the U.S., they highlighted the uniqueness of the war as an opportunity for Western countries to learn how to fight against hybrid combat methods, and members of the American Federal government have started to look to the example of fact-checking efforts from organizations like StopFake. Since key players in government have started focusing on the issue of Russian propaganda, combating misinformation has become a larger priority for government officials, technology companies, and CSOs alike across the world.

5.8.2 Future Considerations

Although internet penetration in Ukraine is still relatively low at 60 percent, a growing number of Ukrainians are turning to the Internet and social media platforms to access news information. Social media sites such as Facebook and news aggregators such as ukr.net are now some of the most popular sources of news. The wealth of information available online makes it difficult to monitor information channels or fact-check articles, and it also increases the pace at which information is propagated because of the low cost-barriers to producing online news. Thus, it is important for the Ukrainian government and citizens to consider the growing risks of trending towards online media.

The speed at which false information can be spread online is also alarming, as research shows that information is more effective and convincing when it can form the initial frame of an individual impression of a topic and when it comes from numerous sources. Furthermore, multiple Ukrainians have noted that the aesthetic quality of Russian media is substantially better than Ukrainian media,
which may contribute to its efficacy in shaping public opinion against the Ukrainian government. Since independent media outlets in Ukraine are still struggling to develop high quality content, particularly on digital platforms, this may be a growing area of concern for the media sector.

6. CONCLUSION

Civil society in Ukraine is fragile, but motivated and full of passionate people. The Revolution of Dignity catalyzed civil society development, but the hard work of building sustainable, robust, and effective CSOs remains. Our recommendations fall within three areas of focus: funding, communication channels, and organizational capacity. In terms of funding, it is important for USAID to support long-term, sustainable goals with close monitoring to ensure CSOs follow through. USAID should also aim to better coordinate bureaucratic funding processes between international actors to prevent overlap, and switch to mission-based funding instead of project-based. Second, numerous teams found a need for increased communication channels between the government, CSOs, donors, and the public. This is of the utmost importance in order to increase awareness of reforms and trust in the reform process, as well as overall trust for the government. To our third area, the majority of our recommendations focused on the development of organizational capacity. In the media sector, USAID should focus on improving both the quantity and quality of independent, credible media sources. This includes trainings on branding, journalistic ethics, outreach, and institutional support. In the political and legal environment, USAID should continue supporting the organizational capacities of both local CSOs and local governments, and advocate for implementation of CSO-friendly reforms such as a speedier registration process. In addition, USAID should focus on the evaluation of past efforts that successfully overcame collective-action problems, particularly the new housing associations found throughout Ukraine. Also, while coalitions can be an attractive partner, it is important to recognize the benefits of grassroots organizations and not rely too heavily on coalitions. As USAID evaluates grants given to local organizations through ENGAGE, the sponsored organization should pursue an incubator model, where there are USAID employees deployed with deep knowledge of the localities. Finally, in order to maintain the sustainability of these organizations it is important to conduct trainings with a focus on the long-term, particularly with an emphasis on leadership skills. We remain cautiously optimistic about the development of civil society in Ukraine, particularly as the ENGAGE program begins, and hope that these findings and recommendations contribute to forming the civil society that the Ukrainian people deserve.

We end this report with a note of thanks for the cooperation and support of the USAID/Washington and USAID/Kyiv leaders and staff. Without the approval of Tom Melia, Assistant Administrator for Europe and Eurasia, and Susan Kosinski Fritz, USAID/Kyiv Mission Director, for this experiential learning opportunity, this report would not have been produced. Special thanks to Dan Ryan, Deputy Director for Democracy and Governance at USAID/Kyiv, for his attentiveness to our project and his logistical support throughout our research endeavor.
APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW LIST: Interview Subjects and Organizational Affiliations

1) Ukrainian Embassy in the United States
   a) Oxsana Shulyar, Political Consular
   b) Vitalii Tarasiuk, First Secretary
   c) Volodymyr Muzylov, Economic Head
2) USAID, Washington DC, Europe and Eurasia Bureau
   a) Stephen Kelley, Ukraine Desk Officer
3) US-Ukraine Foundation
   a) Nadia McConnell, President
4) Office of Senator Rob Portman (R-OH) Chair, Ukraine Caucus
   a) Senator Rob Portman
   b) Tyler Brace, Legislative Assistant
5) USAID/Kyiv
   a) Susan Fritz, Mission Director
   b) Tom White, Office Director of Democracy and Governance
   c) Garth Willis, Democracy Officer (Anti-Corruption)
   d) Marat Kyurchevsky, Project Management Specialist
   e) Tatiana Sira, Project Management Specialist
   f) Anna Novak, Administrative Assistant
   g) Dan Ryan, Deputy Director

Political and Legal Team

6) International Republican Institute (IRI)
   a) Stephanie Shackelford, Resident Program Officer
   b) Michael Druckman, Resident Program Officer
   c) Dmytro Orekhov, Program Assistant
7) Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research (UCIPR)
   a) Mariya Heletiy, Deputy Project Director, USAID Project “Citizens in Action”
8) Foundations for Freedom
   a) Oleksa Stasevych, Program Manager
9) Anti-Corruption Action Center
   a) Tetiana Shevchuk, Lawyer, Program Manager
10) Kherson City Official
    a) Oksana Huz, Dnipropetrovsk District Committee based in Kherson
11) Dnipro City Council, Ministry of Social Policy
    a) Lilia Kovaliova, Chief of Ministry
12) Dnipro-1
a) Katerina Chizhnik  
b) Olek Grebenyuk  
c) Pavlo Zakiphiy, Public Affairs  
d) Katerina Leonova  

13) Institute for World Policy  
a) Sergiy Solodkyy, First Deputy Director  
b) Olga Lymar, Project Manager  

14) Kantar TNS  
a) Svitlana Vynoslavska, Deputy Managing Director  

15) Dopomoga Dnipro  
a) Iryna Bulyshova, Co-founder  
b) Andpiy Marchuk, Staff Member/Army recruit  
c) Svetlana Bystvitskaia, Staff Member/former IDP  

16) Democratic Initiatives Foundation  
a) Ruslan Kermach, Political Analyst  
b) Oleksii Sydorchuk, Political Analyst  
c) Maria Zolkind, Political Analyst  

17) Chemonics: USAID Rule of Law  
a) David Vaughn Esq., Chief of Party  
b) Nataliya Petrova, Deputy Director  
c) Tomas Verteletskyy, Monitoring, Evaluation, and Court Performance Specialist  

18) Razumkov Center  
a) Arsen Stetskiv, Political and Legal Programmes Expert  
b) Katerynnaa Markevych, Economic Programmes Expert  

19) Polish-Ukrainian Cooperation Foundation  
a) Kostiantyn Ploskyi PhD, Deputy Director  

20) Office of the Mayor of Lviv  
a) Andriy Sandovyy, Mayor of Lviv  

21) Center for Reform Support  
a) Alex Boycool, Chief of Economic Infrastructure  

Media Team  

22) Mkylov Center for Investigative Reporting  
a) Oleg Oginov, Director  
b) Yaroslov Chepernoi, Editor/Journalist  

23) MediaHub  
a) Valeria Moiceva, Administrative Lead  

24) CentreUA  
a) Oleh Rybachuk, Director  

25) Media Law Institute, at RPR
a) Maksym Dvorovyi, Media Law Expert  
b) Igor Rozkladaj, Media Law Expert  
26) Institute of Mass Information  
a) Irina Chulivska, Chief of Campaigns and Logistics  
27) Odessa National University  
a) Natalia Steblyna, Professor of Communications  
28) Hrodmadske Odesa  
a) Sergei Nazarov, CEO  
29) Academy of Ukrainian Press  
a) Valeriy Ivanov, President  
b) Andrei Kovalenko, Executive Director  
30) 1+1 Media  
a) Olga Slisarenko, Creative Producer  
b) Katerina Romanova, Administrative Assistant  
31) StopFake.org  
a) Oxana Pinsker, Editor  
32) Kyiv-Mohyla School of Journalism  
a) Ruslan Deynychenko, Professor; co-founder StopFake.org  
33) Internews  
a) Wayne Sharpe, Chief of Party, U-Media  
b) Iryna Savchenko, Program Coordinator, U-Media  
34) Detektor Media  
a) Diana Dutskyk, Executive Director, Prof. Kyiv-Mohyla University of Journalism  
35) International Renaissance Foundation, Odessa  
a) Yevchen Popov, Regional Director  
36) Institute for War & Peace Reporting  
a) Kateryna Lana, Ukraine Project Manager  
37) Regional Press Development Institute  
a) Katya Igonov, Director  
38) Lviv Press Club  
a) Olga Shostak, Regional Coordinator  

Mobilization/Sustainability Teams  
39) Patients of Ukraine  
a) Olga Stefanystyna, Executive Director  
40) MyCity  
a) Liubov Zhdan, Project Manager  
41) GoOn!  
a) Anastasia Burdiuzha, Founder  
42) Eidos Center for Political Study  
a) Viktor Taran, Chairman  
43) Center for Policy and Legal Reform  
a) Ihor Koliushko, Head of the Board of CPLR  
44) Skovoroda Institute
a) Iryna Shostak, Co-founder

45) National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy”
   a) Oksana Kohut, Law Student, UKR member

46) Institute of Leadership and Management, Ukrainian Catholic University
   a) Olena Tverda, PR Manager, Institute of Leadership and Management
   b) Sofia-Julia Sydorenko, Coordinator of Management Development Programs,

47) International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)
   a) Yulia Shypilova, Project Manager
   b) Denise Kovryzhenko, International Foundation for Electoral Systems

48) BigggIdea/Garage Gang Kollektiv
   a) Iryna Solovey, President

49) International Renaissance Foundation
   a) Stanislav Linchinskiy, Program Initiative Director, IRF-Kyiv

50) Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union
   a) Olga Chuyeva, Deputy Project Director,

51) Reanimation Package of Reforms (RPR)
   a) Mykhailo Zhernakov, Leading expert on judiciary and Board Member
   b) Artem Myrgorodskyi, Head of Secretariat

52) Committee of Voters of Ukraine
   a) Anatoliy Boyko, Head of Organization

53) Chesno
   a) Andriy Kruglashov, Political Coordinator

54) Transparency International
   a) Tetiana Shevchuk, Coordinator of Educational Programs

55) Centre for Democracy and Rule of Law (CEDEM)
   a) Solomiya Borshosh, Program Director

56) CEDOS (formerly Centre for Society Research)
   a) Varvara Podnos, Urban Policy Analyst

57) Institute of Economic Research and Political Consulting
   a) Igor Burakovsky, the Head of the Institute

58) Congress of Cultural Activists
   a) Olena Pravlov - Chairwoman Head of the Congress of Cultural Activists;
   b) Ludmyla Researcher/Coordinator of Projects

59) Open Ukraine - Arseniy Yatsenyuk Foundation
   a) Taras Mykhalniuk, Director

60) Ukrainian Catholic University
   a) Myroslav Myranovych, Vice-Rector

61) International Renaissance Foundation, Lviv Regional Office
   a) Oksana Dashchakivska, Head of IRF-Western Ukraine Office
APPENDIX B

SCOPE OF WORK

Analysis of Civil Society in Ukraine

A. Purpose of the Analysis

The purpose of this analysis is three-fold; first, the team will analyze current and recently completed USAID programs—Strengthening Civil Society in Ukraine Project: UNITER (Oct. 2008 - Sept. 2016); Ukraine Civil Society Enabling Environment: Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research (UCIPR) (July 2014 - July 2019); Media Development (U-Media—Internews Network) October 2011 - September 2016); and Ukraine Civil Society Capacity Building Project (ISAR-Ednannia) (July 2014 - July 2019) to highlight the impacts of these USAID civil society programs in Ukraine and, based on information gleaned, to provide recommendations to USAID-Kyiv for possible future programming in this sector. In addition to these programmatic foci, the team will also analyze broader civil society programming on the following thematic dimensions—CSO sustainability, CSO mobilization, the political and legal environment within which CSO development takes place, and the integration of various media sources into CSO activism. The analyses of these CSO themes will also generate recommendations for future USAID civil society programming. Finally, it will expose Dartmouth undergraduate students to USAID civil society programming and programmatic implementation as well as to the evaluation methodologies employed by USAID assessment teams in the evaluation of USAID programs.

B. Background

The USAID Ukraine country development cooperation strategy for the period 2012-2016 put forward three development objectives to reach the mission goal of a “more stable, democratic, and prosperous Ukraine.” The first development objective (DO 1) is a “more participatory, transparent, and accountable government process,” and is supported by three Intermediate Results (IRs); “Improving the legislative and policy environment in line with European standards (IR 1.1), improving citizen oversight and engagement in governance processes (IR 1.2), and making the government more accountable to its citizens and adherent to its rule of law (IR 1.3).” USAID hopes that the pursuit of this DO and the supporting IRs will increase public participation and oversight, leading to a more stable and accountable democratic polity in Ukraine.

IR 1.1 aims to support the engagement of CSOs, independent media, and citizen involvement in reform related to the standardization of government processes, increasing transparency of government decision making, and reducing corruption within the political environment of Ukraine. Technical assistance will also be provided to CSOs to ensure that the developed policies are in line with international best practices. IR 1.2 focuses on developing citizen and civil society organizational capacity to monitor and impact policy at the national level. In order to do this, civil
society needs access to quality information, as well as the adequate technical capacity to function within the Ukrainian political system. Overall, IR 1.2 aims to support CSO initiatives to promote greater accountability from their representatives and from the electoral process. IR 1.3 focuses mainly on reform of Ukraine’s legal framework, with emphasis on increasing citizens’ knowledge of basic rights and freedoms in order to protect citizens’ and civil society’s rights above government interests while increasing the accountability of the Ukrainian judiciary.

Working towards this DO and the supporting IR’s will also contribute to the other two development objectives by building civil society capacity to more effectively participate in reform related to both the delivery of health services (DO 3) and economic policy and management issues (DO 2).

C. USAID Civil Society Programming and Thematic Approaches

USAID Civil Society Programming in Ukraine

The team will focus its attention on four ongoing or recently completed USAID civil society programs in Ukraine: Strengthening Civil Society in Ukraine Project—UNITER, implemented by Pact; Ukraine Civil Society Enabling Environment, implemented by UCIPR; U-Media, implemented by Internews Network, and Ukraine Civil Society Capacity Building Project, implemented by ISAR-Endnannia.


The purpose of the SCSU project, also known as UNITER - Ukraine National Initiatives to Enhance Reforms is to increase citizen support for and participation in specific civil society activities by: (1) implementing effective, broad-based monitoring and advocacy campaigns; (2) expanding CSOs' constituencies; (3) improving CSOs media engagement and ICT usage; and (4) developing a sustainability roadmap. UNITER promotes and supports a number of broad-based civic coalitions across communities and regions, and connects local and national organizations to increase citizen engagement in issues of interest. These coalitions are comprised of civil society, media, businesses associations and other organizations and activists that work towards a common purpose. The campaigns supported by UNITER coalition partners represent citizen interests on issues such as EU integration, anti-corruption, elections, civic responsibility and participation, youth engagement, human rights and inclusiveness. The UNITER program also supports anti-corruption and constitutional reform-oriented organizations, coalitions and campaigns that seek to build constituencies, mobilize public support, and engage in effective dialogue between citizens, civil society, government, the private sector and other key stakeholders in the reform process.

Implemented by Pact, the Ukraine National Initiatives to Enhance Reforms was founded in 2008 to address the systemic challenges faced by civil society in addition to supporting local NGO advocacy activity through grants and training. Pact focuses the program by working with local organizations to increase their capacity growth. Over 11,000 citizens participated in Pact-
supported initiatives in Ukraine. The agency’s sponsorship of the program expired at the end of September 2016. The UNITER project has three main initiatives and one special initiative with “the goal to increase citizen support for and participation in specific civil society activities.” The first objective is the implementation of effective broad-based monitoring and advocacy campaigns. This objective is divided into two themes. Theme 1 addresses the promotion European principles and values of human liberty, dignity, equality, democracy, and respect of human rights including the rights of minorities and individuals with disabilities. The CSOs that fall under this theme work with issues of European integration, LGBT rights, transparency and accountability in government institutions, and disability rights. For example, the Institute of World Policy works to fill the awareness gap of Ukrainians on advantages to integrating with Europe and of Europeans on changes Ukraine has undergone by hosting public debates, measuring public opinion, etc. Similarly, the Reanimation Package for Reforms, the national horizontal network coalition partner, has proved the most successful organization in advocating for European reform through its Roadmap of Reforms.

Theme 2 addresses governmental accountability and anti-corruption by encouraging citizens to engage in these issues on the national, sub-national and local government levels. Organizations that target Theme 2 organizations focus on anti-corruption, support for constitutional reform, elections, and legal assistance. An example is the Anticorruption Action Centre, an organization that has participated in drafting laws, lobbying regulations, and blocking potential corruption. Another example is the Centre for Political Studies and Analysis which works to incorporate anti-corruption acts into the legislation of numerous oblasts. The second objective is focused on expanding CSO advocacy efforts and constituencies. This includes reaching out to citizens, and using CSO’s to represent Ukrainians interests to government authorities. The organizations that target this initiative work on educational programs, strategic polling, public opinion surveys, and technical assistance and mentoring.


The overall purpose of the Ukraine Civil Society Enabling Environment activity is to improve the legislative and policy environment to become more conducive to civil society needs and to reflect European standards. To achieve this, UCIPR focuses on three objectives: 1) to improve the quality of relevant civil society enabling legislation and policy; 2) to increase capacity of public officials and CSOs to ensure effective implementation of legislation and policy; and, 3) to increase technical and organizational capacity of UCIPR as a leader and driver of civil society legislative efforts. UCIPR's unique approach will cover the full cycle of improvement of legislative and administrative environment for civil society development in its key areas. Namely, UCIPR will combine analysis of shortcomings and opportunities, monitoring of emerging challenges, development of proposals for improvement of legal acts and administrative practices, initiating and leading advocacy campaigns as well as offer awareness and training efforts, methodological support and monitoring of adopted legislation for civil society development.
In October 2014, USAID began supporting UCIPR in its implementation of the Ukraine Civil Society Enabling Environment Program. The goal of this five-year program is to improve the legislative and policy environment in Ukraine to become more conducive to the needs of civil society, in accordance with European standards. The Program envisions advancements in governance through improving public oversight and engagement, as well as the strengthening of the political and legal environment for media and civil society in order to help CSOs engage citizens and represent their interests. More specifically, UCIPR is working towards these aims through the “analyzing of shortcomings and opportunities, monitoring of emerging challenges, development of proposals for improvement of legal acts and administrative practices, initiating and leading advocacy campaigns as well as offer awareness campaigns, methodological support and monitoring of adopted legislation for civil society development.”

The UCIPR Ukraine Civil Society Enabling Environment Program has the following three objectives: 1) quality of relevant civil society enabling legislation and policy improved; 2) capacity of public officials and CSOs to ensure effective implementation of legislation and policy increased; and 3) technical and organizational capacity of UCIPR increased to serve as a leader and driver of civil society legislative efforts. UCIPR continues advocacy campaigns to improve the tax environment for civil society organizations and to standardize government procedures for the contest-based funding of CSOs. The program also established permanent monitoring of relevant legislative initiatives as a defense against policies restrictive to CSO operation. Additionally, UCIPR assists local stakeholders with the implementation of new favorable legislation to ensure that CSOs could benefit from new tax incentives, legal instruments, and increased access to public information. Progress toward increasing the technical and organizational capacity of UCIPR was made with the help of recommendations from the USAID OFM review and the 2013 UNITER/Pact assessment. UNITER also has a special objective referred to as a Sustainability Roadmap. That is, Pact looks to build capacity of various CSO organizations. Finally, UNITER also works on CSO coordination and accountability.


The five-year Ukraine Media (U-Media) Project promotes the development of a free, vibrant and professional media sector in Ukraine that provides a wide range of useful news and information, serves as a watchdog in the public interest, and defends freedom of speech. The U-Media Project seeks to achieve this goal through four key objectives designed to: (1) Support and promote freedom of speech and media independence; (2) Increase the variety of news sources and improve news quality; (3) Improve the enabling environment for media and freedom of speech; and (4) Improve organizational capacity of Ukrainian media CSOs. The U-Media program has adapted to the changing context in Ukraine by focusing activities on promoting more balanced political coverage across Ukraine through local content production, exchange visits, public discussions, and webcasts with special attention to the South and East. Local media partners monitor and publicize intimidation and attacks on civic activists and journalists and government interference in independent media coverage of Ukrainian politics. Partners provide legal aid and facilitate coordinated action in response to restrictions on press freedoms and violations of civil rights. The
U-Media Project has also made a concerted effort to conduct programming that reaches the conflict areas in Donbas, where events are presenting an increasing challenge for Ukraine's political transition and democratic future. In the lead-up to the presidential and parliamentary elections, the U-Media Project has sought to harness the energy of EuroMaidan and its demands for reform to increase the integrity of the parliamentary elections and help make political processes more responsive and accountable to the people. Specific electoral activities are designed to promote balanced and objective media reporting by increasing local media content and improving journalism skills, including election coverage, as well as Get out the Vote events to help inform citizens about the snap parliamentary elections - the candidates, issues and electoral process.

The Ukraine Media Project (U-Media), implemented by Internews, ran from October 2011 to September 2016. The organization operates internationally with administrative centers in California, Washington D.C., and London. Internews both implements and administers small grants that provide training and support to citizens and media professionals to produce original, high-quality programming. The organization also facilitates access to news and information, which improves the climate of civic engagement. Additionally, they advocate for the adoption and implementation of fair media laws and policies. U-Media built on the previous eight years of the Strengthening Independent Media in Ukraine Project, also known as U-Media and also implemented by Internews. The most recent project had four objectives: 1) support and promote freedom of speech and media independence; 2) increase the variety of news sources and improve news quality; 3) improve the enabling environment for media and freedom of speech; and 4) improve organizational capacity of Ukrainian media CSOs. According to the original Request for Applications, U-Media intended to apply 55 percent (or $14 million) of its budget to fund local Ukrainian media organizations. U-Media provided grants to three types of beneficiaries: institutional partners, core partners, and emerging and short-term partners. In total, U-Media supported 53 local media CSOs and contributed to 12 media-related bills.


The purpose of the Ukraine Civil Society Capacity Building activity is to improve organizational capacity of Ukrainian CSOs to become stronger citizen advocates and government watchdogs. To achieve this purpose, ISAR will focus on three objectives: 1) organizational development skills of CSOs improved through the NGO Marketplace (mini-grants voucher system, web-portal and regular capacity development forums); 2) NGO Capacity Building Marketplace strengthened as a tool that provides organizational development assistance to civil society; and 3) technical and organizational capacity of ISAR Ednannia increased as an Intermediary Support Organization (ISO) and the Marketplace Administrator.

Founded in 1997, Ednannia (Ukrainian for ‘Joining Forces’) works for CSOs, experts, and international organizations such as USAID to conduct trainings, administer grant competitions, link relevant organizations, and otherwise launch projects and initiatives. The Kiev-based group releases an annual report funded by USAID, the 2015 edition of which listed seven civil society development trends for 2016 based on findings by the Civil Society Development Forum jointly
organized by Ednannia. These trends included the formation of a stable community of CSO supporters, highlighting the need for increased professionalization of services in interests of sustainable activity (movement of ad hoc to strategic organizations) as well as the increase of expertise and advocacy presence. This work to increase organizational capacity has been funded from July 2014 to July 2019 by USAID, demonstrating a tendency toward professionalization as a prerequisite for sustainable activity. Ednannia launched the Civil Society Platform Marketplace in 2014, an online platform for mini grants toward organizational development for CSOs.

Thematic Analytical Approaches to Civil Society in Ukraine

In addition to the analysis of USAID civil society programming, the team will pursue four complementary themes in the field study: CSO sustainability, CSO mobilization, the political and legal environment within which CSO development takes place, and the integration of various media sources into CSO activism.

1. CSO Sustainability

Sustainability is defined as the ability of CSOs to effectively pursue their missions and strategic plans in the long term, regardless of international donor funding. The sustainability team will be analyzing the sustainability of Ukrainian CSOs by investigating factors such as their financial viability, the politicization of organization leaders, their degree of professionalization, and their organizational capacity.

i) In order to analyze the sustainability of the organizations, the team will take into consideration the financial viability of CSO programs. It will evaluate CSO viability by looking at the composition of their funding by source, specifically comparing government and international donor funding, their followership, and operational costs. The interview guides will include questions about CSO sources of funding, infrastructure, governance, accountability, purpose, challenges, successes, growth, and coordination.

ii) The second objective is to analyze the impact of politicization of CSO leaders on the long-term operation of the organization. The team will explore this dimension through interviews with CSO leaders who straddle the line between the political and nonprofit world and other relevant stakeholders, to ascertain whether or not such politicization will lead to more advocacy opportunities and partnerships between CSOs and government or to brain drain from civil society to politics.

iii) In the wake of the last decade of political turmoil in Ukraine, several civil society organizations formed on a reactionary basis. These ‘ad hoc’ organizations often lack the organizational capacity and skilled leadership necessary to conduct sustainable long-term activity. Indeed, there are very few graduate education programs in nonprofit organizational management in Ukraine, and many internationally-funded CSOs
(e.g. Ednannia) focus a significant portion of their activity in developing this capacity through training and other programs. Conducting interviews with CSO facilitators about their training and implementation workflow will help the team understand how civil society leaders may develop and maintain professional skills.

2. CSO Mobilization

The mobilization team is interested in exploring the various aspects of civil society engagement, through youth organizations, advocacy groups, and faith-based groups and and other grassroots organizations. The team will be analyzing the degree to which CSOs in Ukraine have the capacity to activate and mobilize members, followers, or ordinary citizens not directly affiliated with any particular CSO. The team has four objectives in their approach to CSO mobilization:

i) Determine degree to which Ukrainians participate in civil society and/or CSOs as opposed to a decade ago. Has this been affected by EuroMaidan? Has this changed as cohorts have aged?

ii) Determine degree to which advocacy is a vital component of CSOs. Are the people who are involved with CSOs diverse and/or well-representative of Ukrainians overall? What is the public/academic perception of CSOs? What type of advocacy roles are CSOs able to acquire and maintain?

iii) Determine level of effectiveness of interest representation among CSO organizations, degree to which sectors of society have representation in the political system.

iv) Determine degree to which CSO organizations play an active role in government reform and institutional accountability.

3. Political and Legal Environment

The current legal framework for the operation of CSOs in Ukraine is governed by the 2013 Ukrainian Law on Public Associations, which set forth relatively progressive regulations governing CSO activities compared to previous legislation. The main provisions of the law determine the procedures for registering CSOs, interacting with state authorities, liability for legal violations, and termination of CSO activities. The grounds for prohibiting CSOs’ actions are clearly defined in the law, as are CSO rights and freedoms. Specific changes over previous legislation governing public associations include simplified regulations for CSOs’ economic activities, a less stringent registration process for CSOs, and a determination of the conditions for CSOs’ liquidation. The 2013 Ukrainian Law on Public Associations also sets definitions for the types of organizations that are legally considered civil society organizations. These include public associations, charitable organizations, organizations of employers, cultural unions, religious organizations, and non-state mass media, as well as a number of others categories.
The Political and Legal Framework Team will pursue five main topics in their analysis: 1) basic freedoms of CSO Activity; 2) obstacles to participation in CSO activity; 3) funding of CSOs in Ukraine (including tax benefits and access to government funding); 4) CSO cooperation with the national, oblast, and local governing bodies; and 5) public councils. Team objectives include:

i) Determine effectiveness and availability of public councils and other vehicles of government interaction.

ii) Gauge difficulty of NGO registration process.

iii) Determine CSO perspectives on funding and taxation legislation.

iv) Determine CSO perspectives on changes in environment following 2013 Law on Public Associations.

v) Analyze the legal/political environment for oligarch-backed foundations.

4. Media and CSO Activism

The media team, also focused on the U-Media program outlined above, will also analyze the broader media-CSO relationships in Ukraine. Newly emerging media enterprises in Ukraine are focused on fostering public broadcasting and independent media as an alternative to state-run and oligarch-owned media. Hromadske, or “public” media was created to provide a media outlet that does not subscribe to the “state-friendly” practices of other media outlets. Independent media in Ukraine also focus on combatting propaganda, corruption, paid-for advertising and direct government interference referred to as “jeansa” or “jeans,” media coverage that is paid for but is not labeled as public relations content.

Many media institutions and CSOs are directly involved in drafting and promoting to the public government reforms related to media. The Media Law Institute (MLI) is the co-initiator of the civic movement “Reanimation Package of Reforms,” a coalition which brings together 48 leading non-governmental organizations and experts from all over Ukraine. MLI provides the movement with institutional support and encouraged the adoption of more liberal social media regulation. It additionally played a role in creating a public broadcast service.

Capacity building efforts fund CSOs and develop more effective media techniques. Qualitative improvements include developing a sense of professionalism among journalists, in addition to training and technical report. Increasing journalists’ professionalism and understanding of concepts like paid journalism and freedom of speech, help uphold an ethical standard to improve the quality of media. Supporting these sorts of initiatives and CSOs committed to similar ethical standards thus aims to improve the media environment. The media team has several objectives:

i) Determine the roles undertaken by U-Media. What were the advantages and disadvantages to working with U-Media for various UMedia stakeholders (U-Media grantees and partners; non-assisted civil society organizations, or CSOs; private-sector organizations; governmental organizations; other donors; etc.) involved in promoting media independence and quality of news in Ukraine? How did Internews tailor its tools and
approaches to satisfy the diverse needs of its partners in a changing environment in Ukraine? Of the tools and approaches that U-Media had at its disposal, which were perceived by U-Media stakeholders to be the most useful for influencing media context under U-Media Objective 1 (identified above) and media content, such as news and other information, under Objective 2 and why? Of the practices and behaviors that U-Media promoted, which were adopted and actively used by its partner organizations to influence media context and/or media content in Ukraine?

ii) Gauge the degree to which major changes in the media environment occurred under Objective 1 and in media content under Objective 2 in Ukraine. Do CSOs and other U-Media stakeholders perceive to that the result, in whole or in part, is attributable the work of U-Media and its partner organizations?

iii) Determine the degree to which journalists experience general concerns/fears/threats while they are working? What are some examples of the kinds of threats or incidents they fear, if so?

iv) Analyze general public opinion regarding Ukrainian media? Do citizens trust media outlets? Do they think highly of journalists and the media? How have the perceptions of media and the laws related to media changed over time? Analyze the degree to which propaganda efforts by Russia are infiltrating the media.

v) Analyze the roles played by journalists. Are they disinterested third parties or advocates of a certain position? Are the media viewed as a part of civil society?

D. Analytical Methodology

The Dartmouth team will employ a mixed methods methodology in the analysis of civil society programming. The team has spent the past ten weeks analyzing USAID documents regarding civil society programming in Ukraine as well as more general civil society documentation and documents relating to democracy and governance assessment frameworks. This work has prepared the team for travel to Ukraine to conduct key informant interviews with a wide variety of civil society stakeholders, including USAID staff in Washington, DC and at the USAID mission in Kyiv, CSO leaders, journalists, government officials at all levels of government, academics, and other relevant individuals. The team will be based in Kyiv and will travel to Lviv, Odesa, and Dnipropetrovsk. In addition to the analysis of USAID programming, the team will produce four case studies that pursue the thematic approaches outlined above in Section B.

Document Review

The team has reviewed the following documents in preparation for the field work in Ukraine:

Civil Society in Democracy's Third Wave: Implications for Civic Education (Primer on Civil Society) http://www.socialstudies.org/system/files/publications/se/6007/600707.html


USAID Documents


The 2015 CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia https://www.usaid.gov/europe-eurasia-civil-society


USAID/Serbia and Montenegro: Scope of Work (SOW) Democracy and Governance Assessment (June 2004).


UKRAINE POLITICAL PARTY ASSESSMENT  (May 2000).  (Draft: Author’s copy.)

ASSESSMENT OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY SECTOR IN MACEDONIA  (U.S. Agency for International Development/Macedonia) Contract No. AEP-I-00-00-00023-00, Task Order No. 837 (June 2003).

CIVIL SOCIETY PROGRAMMING SEMI-ANNUAL REPORTS PRODUCED BY USAID IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS IN UKRAINE.  (2008–present).


Interviews

The team has currently compiled a list of more than 100 key informant interview subjects. The team leaders are in the process of securing interview times and dates.

E. Evaluation Team Composition

Unlike traditional three-person assessment teams often employed to conduct democracy and governance assessments, the core of the Dartmouth team will be composed of twelve Dartmouth undergraduates, eleven of which are seniors and one is a junior. All of the students are minoring in public policy. This capstone seminar, PBPL 85: Global Policy Leadership, serves as their culminating experience in public policy. The student team members are: Apoorva Dixit, Jordan Einhorn, Jessica Fedin, Sarah Han, Michelle Li, Regan Plekenpol, Priya Ramaiah, Rebecca Rodriguez, Alexa Sonnenfeld, Clara Wang, Andrew Weckstein, and Kevin Zhang. In addition to the classroom work completed in anticipation of the Ukraine field work, the students have undertaken two training modules offered by the Tuck School of Business on project management and cultural awareness (utilizing Culture Wizard). The team leader is Professor Ronald G. Shaiko, Senior Fellow and Associate Director of the Nelson A. Rockefeller Center for Public Policy and the Social Sciences at Dartmouth College. Professor Shaiko meets all of the requirements for inclusion on USAID assessment teams:

- Experience in international development, especially with civil society programming in post-communist, post-conflict and transitional settings;

- Previous experience performing USAID program evaluations; and

- Recent experience in and background knowledge of the region.

Professor Shaiko has conducted USAID assessments in Ukraine (political parties), West Bank/Gaza (political parties); Serbia and Montenegro (civil society). He has traveled on several occasions to Ukraine while working at USAID and with USAID contractors. Most recently, he traveled to Ukraine in July of 2106. Shaiko worked at the Center for Democracy and Governance at USAID/Washington in the late 1990s. During his time at USAID he drafted USAID Political Party Development Assistance (1999) and edited Managing Assistance in Support of Political and
Electoral Processes (2000). Professor Shaiko will be joined in leading the team by Professor Derek Epp, a post-doctoral fellow at the Nelson A. Rockefeller Center at Dartmouth College.

F. Schedule and Logistics

The team will begin its field work in Washington, DC on Monday, November 28. The team will travel to the USAID E & E Bureau in the afternoon to meet with USAID staff, including Stephen Kelley, Ukraine Desk Officer. The team will then receive a briefing from Senator Rob Portman, Chair of the Ukraine Caucus (and a Dartmouth graduate) in the late afternoon. On Tuesday, November 29, the team hopes to meet with representatives at the Ukrainian Embassy. In the early evening, the team will travel to Kyiv via Paris, France and arrive in Kyiv at 2:00pm on November 30. On the morning of December 1, the team will travel to the US Embassy/USAID Mission to meet with mission staff, including Dan Ryan and Jeffrey Meyers. The team will be in Ukraine from November 30 to December 16, 2016. In addition to substantial interviewing in Kyiv, sub-teams will travel to Lviv, Odesa, and Dnipro. The team leaders are finalizing agreements for transportation services in Ukraine and for interpreters in Kyiv and in the cities identified. The team will be based at the Premier Hotel Rus, Hospitalna St, 4, Kyiv, Ukraine, 02000; Telephone: +380 44 256 4000.

G. Deliverables

1. A work plan within two days of arrival in Kyiv.
2. Meeting with USAID on the first day of arrival in Kyiv.
3. Briefings with USAID prior to departure from Ukraine to provide initial findings.
4. A draft report prior to departure from Kyiv.
5. A final report within two weeks of receipt of comments from USAID. The team shall submit an electronic version of the report (in PDF format) as well as bound copies to USAID/Kyiv and USAID/Washington.

The final report will include the following:
- Executive Summary (no more than 5 pages)
- Body of the Report (no more than 45 pages)
- Appendices (including a list of interview subjects and organizations interviewed).