

# DARTMOUTH COLLEGE

## DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT

### Government 85.12

#### Military Statecraft in International Relations

Monday 3-4:50; Thurs 4:00-5:50; x-hour Mon 5:00-5:50

Office Hours: Friday 11:15 – 1:00

Spring 2015

Prof. Daryl Press

Silsby 219

#### Course Description:

The course has two main goals. First, it will acquaint students with the missions and capabilities of the conventional forces that make up the bulk of the U.S. military. Second, it will teach students how to estimate the likely outcomes of military operations, and to use this information to shed light on important foreign policy questions.

This course will use theoretical works and historical cases to familiarize students with the missions and capabilities of conventional military forces and prepare them to conduct a detailed military analysis that bears on an important foreign policy question. No prior familiarity with military forces is needed to excel in this class. In fact, students with no knowledge about military forces prior to the class have done very well in this class in the past.

Most of our sessions will be divided into two parts. In the first part I will give a 40-60 minute presentation. These presentations serve two functions. Some are designed to help each of you build a baseline of understanding about the basics of conventional military forces. Others are focused on helping you with the mechanics of writing a long, complicated research paper. These presentations will not cover the same territory as the readings. The remainder of each class will be devoted to discussion of the readings.

#### Course Requirements:

Your grade will be based on regular reading quizzes, a major research paper, and class participation.

**There will be very frequent reading quizzes.**

- |                                                  |                                             |
|--------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| • Research paper: <b>due June 1<sup>st</sup></b> | 60% of course grade.                        |
| • Reading quizzes:                               | 30% of course grade (lowest score dropped). |
| • Participation:                                 | 10% of course grade.                        |

Seminar participation is important. If a student's final grade falls between two possible grades (this happens **frequently**), I will use seminar participation to decide whether or not to "bump up" the student's grade to the higher alternative.

The research paper assigned in this class is an analysis of a current conventional military forces problem. The paper is a **substantial** project that requires weeks of research and careful analysis, and weeks of careful writing and editing. Students are required to begin working on the paper at the beginning of the quarter. There are four deadlines that students must meet along the path to complete their papers: 1) Paper topics are due in class on **April 6**; 2) a preliminary outline is due on **April 20**; 3) a well-developed, detailed outline is due on **May 4**. 4) Final papers are due on **June 1**. Some eligible topics for the research paper are listed at the end of this syllabus; I recommend that you choose one from this list. If you would rather work on a different topic you need to talk with me about your idea **by April 2**.

Students with disabilities:

I strongly encourage students with disabilities, including chronic diseases, learning disabilities, and psychiatric disabilities, to discuss with me after class or during my office hours appropriate accommodations that might be helpful to them. Students with disabilities should meet with me no later than the end of the second week of the term so we can arrange appropriate accommodations.

Religious Observances:

Some students may wish to take part in religious observances that occur during the academic term. If you have a religious observance which conflicts with your participation in this course, please meet with me before the end of the second week of the term to discuss appropriate accommodations.

Reading Materials:

There are no required books. The two books below, however, will be very helpful to you, and – in my opinion – you’d be better off buying them. You can do so from any online book seller.

MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets: The Story of the Battle of the Bulge (New York: Quill Press, 1985).  
Dunnigan, How to Make War: A Comprehensive Guide to Modern Warfare in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, 4<sup>th</sup> edition  
(New York: Harper, 2003).

The required readings for the course are available on the class Canvas site.

## CLASS 1

### Introduction to Course

No reading for this class

## GROUND FORCES AND GROUND COMBAT

4/2

### Ground Combat and the Tools of Force Analysis, part I

#### Reading:

Dunnigan, "The Poor Bloody Infantry," (pp. 15-41) and "Tanks: The Arm of Decision," (pp. 63-82), in *How to Make War*.

Biddle, "The Modern System," from *Military Power*, 24 pp.

Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe," (36 pp).

#### Notes on reading:

- The Dunnigan reading is supposed to give you a feel for what ground forces are like, roughly how big different types of units are, and generally what they do. There is no need to memorize exact numbers or specific details – in fact you should be deeply suspicious of these.
- The Biddle reading is intended to give you a sense for the tactical problems faced by ground forces on the modern battlefield.
- The Mearsheimer article and the Posen article (you will read the Posen article for the next class) were written in the late 1980s and assessed the military balance in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. They both came up with roughly the same answer. But your main goal in reading these papers should be to see how they approach their questions, i.e., how they modeled the ground balance. Focus on their methods. Several of you may model your papers on these. For these reasons, these papers are two of the most important articles you will read in this class.

#### In class presentation:

- Introduction to ground forces, pt. 1 – How they're organized, what they look like.
- U.S. force structure

#### Handouts:

"What are ground forces? How are they organized?"

4/6

## **Ground Combat and the Tools of Force Analysis, part II**

### **Paper topics due in class.**

#### Reading:

Posen, "Measuring the European Conventional Balance," (41 pp).

Cohen, "Towards a Better Net Assessment," (39 pp).

Mearsheimer, Posen, and Cohen, "Correspondence," (50 pp).

Dunnigan, "Artillery," pp. 101-117, in How to Make War.

#### In-class presentation:

- Introduction to ground forces, pt. 2 – How they fight
- What is a Gov 85.12 Paper?

4/9

## **Ground Combat (pt. 3), and How to get started on your papers.**

#### Reading

Homer-Dixon, "A Common Misapplication of the Lanchester Square Law," (5pp)

Lepingwell, "The Laws of Combat? Lanchester Reexamined," (38pp)

Discussion: "How to do a preliminary outline?"

#### Assignment:

Military analysis simulation: "A Quick Oil Grab"

4/13

**In-Class: Military analysis simulation: You report on "A Quick Oil Grab" simulation**

4/16

**Case Study of Ground Combat: Battle of the Bulge Pt. 1 (70pp)**

Reading:

Keegan, "The Rhine and the Ardennes," and Map in The Second World War, 439-447. (8pp)

MacDonald, A Time For Trumpets, Chapters 6, 10, 11, (62 pp).

Notes on Reading:

- The purpose of the reading on the Battle of the Bulge (this session and the next one) is a) to help you increase your understanding of the principles of land combat that we have been covering in the past few sessions, and b) to give you a better sense for such concepts as defensive advantage, fog and friction in war, the role of both predictable and unpredictable events in battles, and to help you understand why movement in combat is so slow.
- As you read about the Battle of the Bulge, refer to the maps to keep a sense of what's going on in the broader battle. You don't need to keep track of small units, but as you read a section on some unit's engagements, try to keep a sense for where this fits into the overall battle. This is hard, but with the maps it's possible. And it'll keep the reading interesting.

**Equitoria-Burnia Wrap-up / An Example of a Gov 85.12 Paper**

4/20

**Case Study of Ground Combat: Battle of the Bulge Pt. II (77pp)**

Reading:

MacDonald, A Time For Trumpets, Chapters 12, 13, 14. (48pp)

Manteuffel, "The Battle of the Ardennes 1944-5," (27pp).

Table from Citizen Soldiers

**Discussion:**

**Battle of the Bulge. Two key questions: (1) Why in the world did Prof. Press assign all that? (2) What were we supposed to learn?**

**\*\*\*\* Preliminary outlines due / bring them to meetings**

4/22-4/24: One on one meetings about your papers

**MODERN AIR COMBAT**

**4/27 – LIKELY USE OF X-HOUR**

**Air Superiority and Interdiction of Ground Forces**

Reading:

Lambeth, Transformation of American Air Power, pp. 12-102, 121-24.

Posen, re-read pp. 70-73 in "Measuring the European Conventional Balance,"

In class presentation:

What are air power assets? What are their roles? What do they look like?

4/28: One on one meetings about your papers

5/4

### **Airpower and Coercion**

Reading:

Schaffer, Wings of Judgement (80-148).

Sebald, "A Natural History of Destruction."

Pape, "The Limits of Precision-Guided Air Power." (20pp).

In class presentation:

What are air power assets, pt. 2 – How do they fight in air-air combat? In air-ground attacks?

### **5/6-5/8 – All day one-on-one meetings**

### **Naval Power – At Sea and Across the Shore**

5/7

### **Principles of Naval Warfare and Power Projection**

Reading:

Dunnigan, How to Make War, pp. 219-238, 255-278.

Lautenschlager, "Technology and the Evolution of Naval Warfare."

McDevitt, "The PLA Navy's Anti-access Role in a Taiwan Contingency,"

In class presentation:

Principles of Naval Warfare

Projecting power ashore

Anti-access / area denial

Handouts:

"Naval Assets for Combat and Lift"

**\*\*\*\* Detailed outlines due / bring them to meetings**

5/11

### **Naval Combat: Regaining Access**

Reading:

Krepinevich, "Why AirSea Battle," (37pp)

Cropsey, "Keeping the Pacific Pacific." *Foreign Affairs*. (3 pages)

Rovner, "AirSea Battle and Escalation Risks,"

5/14

### **Conventional Operations and Nuclear Escalation**

No Reading – **Work on Papers.**

## RECENT EXAMPLES OF MODERN AIR- AND GROUND- WARFARE

5/18

### **Operation Desert Storm / Operation Iraqi Freedom**

#### Reading:

Cohen and Keaney, "What Did the Air Campaign Accomplish?" (64pp)  
Press, "The Myth of Airpower in the Gulf War and the Future of Warfare," (40pp)  
Biddle, "Victory Misunderstood."  
Press, "Lessons from Ground Combat in the Gulf," (10pp).

5/21

### **The Military Role in Counter-terrorism**

#### Reading:

Mazarr, "The Rise and Fall of the Failed-State Paradigm," *Foreign Affairs*.  
Hefez, "How Yemen Chewed Itself Dry,"  
Robinson, "The Future of Special Operations: Beyond Kill and Capture,"  
Byman, "Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington's Weapon of Choice,"  
Cronin, "Why Drones Fail: When Tactics Drive Strategy,"

\*\*\* We do not have class on May 25 (Memorial Day) or May 28, but I will make myself all day on May 26 for one-on-one meetings about your papers.

6/1

### **Cyber-espionage, Cyber-war, and Cyber-weapons // and Wrapping Up**

#### Reading

Kim Zetter, "How Digital Detectives Deciphered Stuxnet, the Most Menacing Malware in History," Wired Threat Level Blog (11 July 2011),  
<http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/07/how-digital-detectives-deciphered-stuxnet/all/1>

William J. Lynn III, "Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon's Cyberstrategy," *Foreign Affairs* vol. 89, no. 5 (2010),  
<http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA527707>

Mark Clayton, "The New Cyber Arms Race," *Christian Science Monitor* (7March 2011),  
<http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2011/0307/The-new-cyber-arms-race>

Evgeny Morozov, "Cyber-Scare: The Exaggerated Fears over Digital Warfare," *Boston Review* (July/August 2009),  
<http://bostonreview.net/BR34.4/morozov.php>

\*\*\*\*\* **Paper Due** \*\*\*\*\*

### Sample Paper Topics:

- 1) Sixty years after the end of the Korean War, North Korean forces are still poised to invade the South. If North Korea invaded South Korea again, would it have a reasonable prospect for success? Is it likely that the North could reunify the Korean Peninsula under its control? If not, is it likely that the North could at least seize Seoul? How would this analysis change if the United States removed its military forces from South Korea?
- 2) In 1993 there was both a war and a genocide in Rwanda. At the time, some people advocated U.S. military intervention. That intervention did not occur. Since 1993, Former President Clinton promised that this kind of thing would never be allowed to happen again. Assess U.S. military capabilities to prevent or stop a campaign of genocide in Central Africa. What type of force might the U.S. need to deploy to stop the killing? How long would it take to deploy this force? What are the risks and likely costs of this mission? Evaluate the chances for success.
- 3) For many years, the conventional wisdom among American defense experts has been that China does not have sufficient military capability to conquer Taiwan. But China's military capabilities are growing. Does China currently have the capability to win a war in the Taiwan Strait and if not is it likely to have that capability in the near future? More broadly, do China's growing conventional military capabilities pose substantial hurdles to U.S. power projection into East Asia, i.e., substantial enough to prevent the U.S. from conducting effective military operations in the region?
- 4) Could the U.S. and its allies conduct an effective disarming strike against North Korea's nuclear forces? Alternatively, could the United States (or Israel) eliminate or significantly delay Iran's apparent nuclear weapons program?
- 5) Does Iran have the capability to close – or significantly impede – the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz? How might Iran seek to do this – using submarines, ground based missiles, surface ships, and/or aircraft? How much could they impede oil flow? How might the United States try to keep oil shipments moving, and how quickly could the suppress Iranian efforts and reestablish adequate “throughput” through the Strait?
- 6) In a conflict with China, the United States might decide to block China's energy imports and take other steps to reduce China's access to petroleum products. How vulnerable is China to a military campaign designed to block its access to energy imports? How vulnerable is China's sea-based trade? How vulnerable are the current, or planned, pipelines? Can the U.S. discriminately restrict China's energy imports without interdicting imports headed to neutral countries and particularly U.S. allies? Can the U.S. reduce China's energy consumption enough to coerce the Chinese government to concede on important foreign policy goals (e.g., cease military operations in a war over Taiwan)?
- 7) Suppose that the North Korean government collapsed tomorrow. A country with millions of deeply impoverished civilians – and a few nuclear weapons -- would suddenly be in some state of anarchy. Assess the requirements of the military operations required to stabilize North Korea in the wake of collapse.
- 8) If the Syrian government collapses there might be an extended period of anarchy and disorder in Syria, triggering escalating human rights abuses and mass emigration. If such an eventuality came to pass, the United States and other world powers would consider a major military intervention. What might this mission look like? What size force would be required? What are the prospects for a successful stability operation? Alternatively, if the Syrian civil war continues along its present course, the United States and other major powers may consider a limited intervention to protect civilians from the violence. How might that operation be conducted? What size force? What prospects for success?