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Policy Research Shop

Methodologies for Tracking Refugees Longitudinally

Nationwide Analysis and Policy Options

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Prepared by:

David Lumbert
Brandon DeBot
Roanna Wang
Nina Brekelmans
Eric Yang

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Contact

Nelson A. Rockefeller Center, 6082 Rockefeller Hall, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH 03755
<http://rockefeller.dartmouth.edu/shop/> • Email: Ronald.G.Shaiko@Dartmouth.edu



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report analyzes available models and best practices for longitudinally tracking refugees in the United States. New Hampshire currently tracks refugees at the minimum level required by federal programs, and seeks to explore alternatives that would better evaluate the effectiveness of refugee integration programs. To accomplish this goal we performed a literature review of refugee and immigrant studies and surveyed state level refugee offices about their methods and techniques for tracking refugees enrolled in public programs. We incorporate a categorization of the degree of refugee tracking programs, a nationwide overview, and case studies of various states with effective programs, including an analysis of New Hampshire's current tracking mechanisms and refugee demographics. Although the analysis was prepared for the state of New Hampshire, the information and conclusions drawn here are applicable to other states. While most states have limited tracking methods, there is an opportunity for further development of such processes. We conclude with a set of options that could improve the effectiveness of refugee tracking programs and the quality of life for refugees in the United States.

1. INTRODUCTION

The United States has a tradition of being a safe haven for those who are oppressed and persecuted in their homelands.¹ This legacy dates back to the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, which provided for the admission of 400,000 new refugees after World War II. Currently, tens of thousands of new refugees are admitted to the U.S. annually, and New Hampshire typically admits several hundred refugees from various nation-states. The struggle for refugees often continues once they leave their war-torn homelands and relocate to the United States. In addition to the general difficulties of integrating into new communities, refugees face numerous challenges to success, including language barriers and lack of employment skills. Finding employment is the primary key to a family's ability to become self-sufficient and integrate into the community, but gaining employment is particularly difficult for refugees without English language skills. Moreover, these issues have been exacerbated by the current economic downturn.

The federal government provides funding for states to assist with integration programs and assure that refugees are receiving the services necessary to help their transition into American society. With these funds, states are required to track refugee participants for up to eight months. However, numerous studies have shown that full integration takes many years, especially for refugees facing substantial obstacles. Federal cash assistance and medical assistance funding is only granted for the first eight months of resettlement.² Other specialized programs receive funding for up to five years, but these are usually granted to a small percentage of refugees.³ The goal of our analysis is to identify best practices for states interested in longitudinally tracking refugee integration outcomes in order to improve programs and service delivery. Operational effectiveness, cost, and efficiency must also be considered as important factors for such programs, as state budgets are limited and the eight-month federal limit is unlikely to change soon.

1.1 Refugee Tracking at the Federal Level

The federal government depends on individual states for the implementation of refugee assistance. This system has distinct advantages and disadvantages, as local communities are best prepared to assess the individual needs of refugees, but the federal government has greater resources to apply toward these issues. The Refugee Act authorizes the Office of Refugee Resettlement to disperse funds to state offices that administer refugee programs.⁴ Community-based groups play a crucial role in this process, as they are responsible for the implementation and success of refugee policies. The federal framework disperses authority between policymakers and local officials who execute the programs.

The Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) appropriates funds on an annual basis to assist with resettlement programs. The majority of the funds are used as part of a general fund that provides social services to refugees who are in the first sixty months of their residence in the United States.⁵ A substantial portion of the remaining appropriations is used to provide refugees with cash and medical assistance, social services, and other targeted assistance for areas with large concentrations of refugees and entrants.⁶ Some funding is provided for other programs addressing specific groups of refugees, including Cuban and Haitian groups, survivors of torture, unaccompanied alien children, and various alternative projects.⁷ A common characteristic between all these appropriations is that the ORR awards funding to individual states and nonprofit resettlement agencies which then distribute the money to individuals in their communities. Many states add an additional tier to this process by giving funds to specific agencies and community offices that then disburse the funds to refugees. This process ensures that those most familiar with the refugees are responsible for the disbursement of funds, but also removes some control from the federal government.

Another important disconnection between federal policy and refugee resettlement occurs between academic researchers and policymakers. The impact of research findings on federal policy toward refugee policy is often minimal.⁸ For example, academics have generally acknowledged the importance of information-sharing, reflection, and documentation of refugee programs, yet there is little evidence that this has made its way into practice.⁹ The difficulty of raising awareness and passing federal policy that reflects such evidence means that best practices may not be considered or implemented at the programmatic level.

Together, these concerns demonstrate the importance of understanding the local issues with this national program. Policies affecting newcomers generally exist at the federal level, but states also make decisions about how to appropriate the funding they receive. In addition, local offices must find the most efficient and effective ways to distribute these funds. Each of these tiers of refugee resettlement policy must be considered and addressed to develop more successful integration programs.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

While many studies address refugee relocation from a numerical standpoint, few analyses look at the issues related to refugee resettlement over time, and how these issues can be

mitigated through improved monitoring and tracking techniques. Although the literature is relatively thin on these topics, numerous practices and issues are discussed repeatedly as central to the process of integration. As noted in the Government Accountability Office's (GAO) report on Refugee Assistance, employment is the most important factor in successful refugee resettlement.¹⁰ Federal programs typically allocate funds for employment placement assistance within their first eight months in the United States. Most refugee studies address this policy by researching more effective methods for assisting refugees in the employment search and with their transition to new communities and work environments.

2.1 The History and Development of Refugee Studies

The field of refugee studies has expanded dramatically in the past half-century.¹¹ In particular, the past fifteen to twenty years have seen a broadening and augmentation of the discipline.¹² The development of refugee studies has lent legitimacy to the broader issues faced by refugees and the challenges of developing effective resettlement policy.¹³

According to Dona and Voutira, the study of refugee resettlement is characterized by three main attributes: "multi- and inter-disciplinarity, bottom-up approaches, and the relationship between advocacy and scholarship."¹⁴ Refugee studies are frequently interdisciplinary because the issues associated with refugee relocation tend to affect a broad spectrum of social science analysis and allow researchers in various disciplines to contribute to and refine refugee programs.¹⁵ Researchers typically employ a bottom-up approach to refugee studies because this allows them to analyze the refugee experience by focusing on individuals, rather than broad categorizations.¹⁶ This perspective shows the impact of policies in practice at the state and local level, rather than their theoretical implications.¹⁷ Furthermore, the relationship between scholarship and advocacy is important because there has been consistent tension and incompatibility between research and policy, an issue that shows the complicated nature of policymaking and the difficulty of policy implementation.¹⁸

Black's discussion of the relationship between resettlement theory and actual policy supports these characteristics. One of the most daunting challenges for refugee studies is ensuring policy implementation of best practices. Black argues that "Even if there is an emerging consensus on the need for critical reflection within refugee assistance programs and information-sharing and proper documentation of the situation and experience of refugees and asylum-seekers on the part of policy organizations, the question remains as to whether such activity has had any real impact on policy."¹⁹ Numerous studies have shown that nonprofit organizations lack the proper capacity to provide appropriate protection and assistance to refugee groups, yet this evidence has not followed through with policy.²⁰ Additionally, while ORR hopes to facilitate economic self-sufficiency for refugees, it is not necessarily as concerned with full integration, which refugee studies tend to emphasize. While the development of the field of refugee studies has helped drive reform of refugee resettlement policy, there is still considerable distance between scholarship and policy decisions.

2.2 Trends and Findings

2.2.1 Outcome Factors

Several important conclusions can be drawn from a review of the relevant literature on effective refugee resettlement practices and the tracking of integration outcomes. First, finding employment is the single-most important factor in successful resettlement, but administrators are still unsure about which programs most effectively prepare refugees for the workforce. Second, most communities do not track refugees longitudinally, especially those not receiving publicly-funded services, and this convolutes outcome data. Third, even when tracking occurs there are a number of crucial measures, especially qualitative ones that are not considered. This further hampers outcome data and leaves states unaware of the populations they are serving. Fourth, there are a number of innovative tracking programs being experimented with by various states and agencies, but they are not applied on a broad enough scale to affect the greater refugee population and the delivery of services. Along these lines, there exists a significant disconnection between the young field of refugee studies and policy changes. Finding ways to implement evidence-based best practices remains a considerable challenge.

Various studies make recommendations about methods to improve refugee resettlement practices and outcomes tracking. The most consistent finding is that obtaining reliable employment has a strong causal link with successful integration into American communities. However, this process, in most cases, takes longer than eight months. The GAO has found that assisting refugees with finding employment and learning skills that will make them more competitive job applicants should receive a large percentage of the funding allocated for refugee assistance.²¹ While the majority of refugee funds do address these issues, organizations providing assistance are uncertain which practices are most effective at improving refugees' long-term employment prospects.²² However, there are specific trends in academic literature that propose areas that could be strengthened and improved.

Current refugee tracking beyond eight months tends to be limited to refugees who qualify for additional funding beyond the initial settlement period.²³ This has several drawbacks, as those who receive employment often become untraceable, as do those who are unaware of these programs to begin with. Federal cash assistance and medical assistance programs cease after eight months, and most states do not supplement those programs beyond the federal threshold.²⁴ Extending this timeframe would allow refugees to be tracked further, but is generally regarded as a prohibitively expensive solution. Social services and targeted assistance allow tracking for up to sixty months, which keeps refugees in the system for a longer timeframe, but these services are generally only applicable to small subsets of the refugee population, and thus results in very incomplete tracking.²⁵ Food assistance is typically available for longer timeframes, but this program is not for refugees specifically, and thus does not facilitate tracking as much.²⁶ In addition, refugees may not be aware of their eligibility for these services, or may neglect to ask for them; this severely compromises states' ability to track refugees over long periods of time.

Several factors are tracked as outcome measures for these refugee assistance programs. Publicly administered and public-private partnerships measure employment status, wages at employment, health benefits, and job retention.²⁷ Matching grant programs track similar attributes, including employment status, wages at employment, health benefits, and “economic self-sufficiency.”²⁸ The literature suggests that, while these factors are helpful for tracking refugees, other factors would enable broader understanding of refugee integration. These include socio-demographic characteristics, such as education, and post-migration stress factors, such as underemployment and discrimination.²⁹ Mental health issues, such as depression, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, alcohol abuse, and general well-being, can also play a crucial role in whether refugees have a successful transition to American society, yet these issues are not typically tracked as refugees receive assistance.³⁰ Finally, pre-migration stress, including trauma and conditions in refugee camps, and personal resources, such as time perspective and language fluency, should also be assessed.³¹ Together, these factors create a holistic approach to refugee studies that focus on mental health, self-awareness, and well-being.³² Assessing these factors on a larger scale over long periods of time would provide better, more complete information about how resettlement affects refugee health, and how these conditions ultimately lead to economic self-sufficiency.

As noted in the GAO report “Little is Known about the Effectiveness of Different Approaches for Improving Refugees’ Employment Outcomes,” refugee success in finding employment often depends on other, more qualitative factors, such as readiness to work.³³ These factors can be difficult to measure, but assessing refugees on these and other aspects of employment skills would help determine why they are or are not finding employment.³⁴ Targeting funding toward programs that improve skills crucial to the workplace would likely have a very positive impact on the eventual success of refugee resettlement and integration.³⁵ States have some leniency with how they allocate federal funds, and directing more toward assessing important qualitative traits could improve resettlement practices.³⁶

The recent economic downturn exemplifies key issues associated with finding employment for refugees and the importance of effective training and tracking practices. Significantly fewer refugees found jobs in 2009 than in 2007, especially among those who had entered the U.S. very recently.³⁷ Refugees struggled to find and keep full-time jobs, especially since 2008.³⁸ This is likely because non-refugees with more experience and training now typically fill jobs once obtained by refugees.³⁹ Such economic conditions redouble the importance of providing refugees with employment training and language skills. While ORR’s programs have helped refugees achieve positive outcomes in some cases, it is crucial to note that no individual program has consistently outperformed other job placement programs over the long-term.⁴⁰

2.2.2 Creative Solutions

One potential solution for many of these issues is demonstrated with the Wilson-Fish Alternative Program.⁴¹ The Wilson-Fish Program, an ORR initiative, provides additional funding for innovative programs in resettlement tracking in specific states.⁴² States apply for this funding to implement different techniques for tracking refugees. Some examples include “front-loaded” service systems that provide intensive services to refugees to help

them find early employment, integration of various programs under one agency specifically equipped to work with refugees, and bonuses for refugees that achieve employment goals.⁴³ These funds help create solutions to refugee resettlement issues, and their implementation on a broader scale could potentially help improve refugee resettlement nationwide.

ORR allocates approximately \$768 million to refugee resettlement on an annual basis.⁴⁴ Almost half of this funding falls under the category of “Transitional and Medical Services,” which provide the foundation for refugee services.⁴⁵ ORR also funds several other discretionary programs for states and agencies each year. These include ethnic community self-help programs, supplemental services for recently arrived refugees, assistance for refugees with agricultural backgrounds, technical assistance grants, microenterprise development funding, and targeted assistance for specific communities.⁴⁶ About \$48 million is allocated annually to these programs, which provide additional funding in areas that may be otherwise underfunded or unaddressed.⁴⁷ However, the need for such discretionary support underscores the lack of funding for refugee programs on a broad scale. The focus on these specialized grants rather than broad-based programs creates a shortage of services in many disadvantaged communities. Furthermore, the use of smaller, specialized programs makes it more difficult to track refugees longitudinally, as it decentralizes the authority of refugee offices and increases coordination problems.

Refugee health—especially mental health—has long been cited as a crucial aspect of successful resettlement. Health directly relates to refugees’ ability to maintain employment. Refugees must be physically able to perform their work, especially in labor-intensive jobs. Additionally, mental health is often impacted by trauma experienced in refugees’ homelands and can carry over in one’s resettlement. Emotionally scarred refugees may not be prepared to enter the workforce or be able to assimilate to a new culture. ORR addresses this acute need through several initiatives, including preventative health programs, technical assistance for refugee health, and maintaining an ORR Refugee Health Team.⁴⁸ While these services are crucial to the refugees receiving them, they disadvantage groups residing in areas that are not granted funding for such programs. For example, only 35 states receive funding for preventative health programs.⁴⁹ While it is helpful that these aspects of refugee health are recognized as important to resettlement, it is disconcerting that such services are only provided to some refugee populations.

The LEP Pathway Program, funded by and implemented in Washington State, provides a different example of a potential solution.⁵⁰ This innovative program examined various barriers to refugees entering the state and attempted to address those issues. The LEP Pathway Program serves refugees who traditionally receive inadequate services through federal programs, including those receiving TANF, State Family Assistance (SFA), single adults receiving Refugee Cash Assistance (RCA), and refugees who do not receive cash assistance within 60 months of arriving in the United States.⁵¹ The program provides these refugees with crucial training, focusing on employment services such as job search workshops, skills training, experience-building service projects, job placement assistance, job retention assistance for at least 90 days, and additional English language classes.⁵² Despite the high barriers to refugee success, such programs help alleviate the issues associated with resettlement, and also make it easier to track outcomes for refugees

receiving services. However, they also rely on state and local funding to operate on a large scale, which can limit their diffusion to other communities that would benefit from such initiatives.

2.3 Immigration Parallels

Though traditional immigration differs from refugee resettlement, individuals from both groups often face similar challenges as they relocate to new communities. As a result, analysis of literature on effective resettlement practices for immigrants at large can yield beneficial findings for refugee populations specifically. As overall immigration has been tracked much longer and more thoroughly than refugee resettlement patterns, there is more information available in this specific discipline. Applying these findings to policy can help expand refugee services and the tracking of integration outcomes in meaningful ways that ease resettlement difficulties and ultimately improve the quality of life for the nation's refugees.

Even though refugees usually face greater initial obstacles to resettlement, their patterns of adjustment often mirror those of other immigrants.⁵³ As Waters and Ueda discuss in *The New Americans: A Guide to Immigration Since 1965*, some refugee groups outperform other immigrants in terms of employment and language skills.⁵⁴ However, these successes may mask the struggles of refugees from other countries, especially severely war torn regions, which deserve additional consideration.⁵⁵ Acknowledging this qualification, insights on effective refugee resettlement and tracking can be extrapolated from studies of immigration.

Portes and Rumbaut address another crucial element of immigration and refugee resettlement specifically in *Immigrant America*. The authors address concerns over below-average employment, education, and income levels for immigrants entering the country, as well as why these problems appear worse for certain immigrant groups than others.⁵⁶ They argue that inherent traits, cultural proclivities, and the United States' immigrant and refugee policies all influence the occupational discrepancies that can be observed.⁵⁷ While this analysis also focuses on immigrants in general, the idea that employment outcomes are based on a combination of inherent factors and governmental policy has important implications for refugee resettlement policies.

Portes and Rumbaut also consider mental health issues associated with relocation to the United States. They assert that there are drastic psychological consequences to immigration, particularly forced immigration, which can devastate communities if they are not properly addressed.⁵⁸ Portes and Rumbaut argue that communities with relatively poor refugee groups have a much higher propensity for psychological distress and disturbances than the general population, as these groups in particular tend to feel alienated and powerless in their new communities.⁵⁹ These findings confirm the previous assertion that resettlement programs, particularly for refugee populations fleeing violent and traumatic homelands, may neglect mental health issues.

In *Becoming a Citizen: Incorporating Immigrants and Refugees in the United States and Canada*, Irene Bloemraad argues that government programs targeted at integration and multiculturalism, such as those emphasized in Canada, more effectively incorporate

immigrants than programs focusing on security and border controls, on which the United States relies disproportionately.⁶⁰ Patterns of integration and “interventionist” policies produce immigrant communities that transition to Western society more successfully.⁶¹ Although Bloemraad studies immigrant populations as a whole and is primarily concerned with political participation and engagement, her findings imply that more aggressive strategies for facilitating resettlement would benefit refugee groups as well. Additionally, Bloemraad’s determination that federal policy has direct influence on the quality of resettlement for immigrants locally is consistent with earlier evidence that federal funding and services are a major factor in the success of refugee resettlement.

Another important and relatable consideration for immigrant populations is the integration of second-generation citizens. Alba and Waters address this aspect of integration in *The Next Generation: Immigrant Youth in a Comparative Perspective*. They argue that the education and assimilation of immigrant youth is a major element of the eventual success of immigrant communities at large.⁶² Although most of their analysis focuses on the integration of immigrants from labor migration, the authors do assert that refugee resettlement and integration is highly variable, depending heavily on the level of trauma experienced, previously attained human capital, and their reception by the host society.⁶³ The final component—reception by the host country—connotes that national policies in the receiving country have a vast influence on the educational attainment and integration of second-generation immigrants, which are crucial aspects of successful resettlement for refugees.

3. HOW NEW HAMPSHIRE CURRENTLY TRACKS REFUGEES

New Hampshire is currently part of the Voluntary Agencies (VOLAGs) Matching Grant Program, which is provided by the federal Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR).⁶⁴ The program provides public cash assistance to help refugees become economically self-sufficient within 120 to 180 days of program eligibility. Funding for the Matching Grant Program is available to voluntary agencies through cooperative agreements, where the ORR awards \$2 for every \$1 raised by the agency. There are three voluntary agencies in New Hampshire that provide services such as reception, orientation, counseling, housing, and basic health services—two located in Manchester, and one in Concord.⁶⁵

In terms of refugee tracking, New Hampshire provides an employment incentive program that refugees follow for eight months. There is also a refugee cash and medical program, and English participation program that refugees participate in for eight months, during which employment is tracked. Beyond that, refugees are not tracked in any formal way. However, the voluntary agencies do track refugees if they are voluntarily in touch with the agency.

3.1 Demographic Profile of New Hampshire Refugees

Since the 1980s, over 6,000 refugees have settled in New Hampshire. From 1997-2009, there were 2,237 refugees from Europe, 1,906 from Africa, 891 from Asia, 377 from the Middle East, and 2 from Cuba.⁶⁶ In 2008 and 2009, around 500 refugees arrive in New Hampshire per year. The refugees are from over 30 different nations, and many settle in

Hillsborough County, as well as in the Concord, Franklin, and Laconia areas.⁶⁷ Between 1997-2007, there was a large influx of refugees from Europe and Africa, most notably Bosnia and Sudan. However, between 2008-2009, the flow of refugees from Europe and Africa slowed considerably, and the number of Asian refugees increased dramatically. Between 1997-2007, there were no refugees from Bhutan, but that number changed to 277 refugees in 2008, and 470 refugees in 2009. From the Middle East, there has been a steady flow of refugees from Iraq in the past two decades.

4. FIFTY STATE ANALYSIS

4.1 Methodology

In order to understand how refugee offices track resettlement outcomes, the Policy Research Shop conducted a survey of all fifty states. A PRS researcher contacted each state refugee office and asked a representative to respond to a series of questions regarding their tracking methods. After follow-up email and telephone correspondence, we received 100 percent participation from state refugee offices. The format and length of responses varied based on respondent, showing a wide range of tracking methods, measures, and lengths.

To analyze refugee tracking practices state-by-state, we developed a standardized system that placed state refugee offices in three categories: zero (0), one (1), two (2), and three (3). The numerical values represent the length and extent of refugee tracking practices in ascending order. Those states assigned the 0 category have no state refugee office and accept very few or no refugees. States in the 1 category perform only the tracking required by the federal Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) through the first eight months of a refugee's resettlement period. The 2 category includes states with moderate tracking mechanisms, generally tracking refugees eight months to one year in the same measures as category 1. In some cases, category 2 states depend on refugees to self-report statistics based on phone and in-person conversations. Other states collect data from social programs past eight months due to special grants or partnerships. States that track refugees past the one-year mark or have innovative tracking procedures at the one-year mark are placed in the 3 category. A complete listing of states, categorizations, and brief notes on their tracking procedures is located in Appendix A.

4.1 Current ORR Requirements

The Office for Refugee Resettlement (ORR) currently reports on progress toward goals and operational efficiency in compliance with the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA). ORR is also required to report annually to Congress on three priority measures: entered employment, wage rate, and 90-day job retention, along with updates on specific grant initiatives, resettlement programs, and refugee demographic data. The most recent report includes data from 2008 and was submitted on April, 20 2011.⁶⁸


States choose from three ORR delivery models when providing services to refugees.⁶⁹ First, the Publicly Administered model is modeled after Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and provides cash assistance to refugees. Second, the Wilson/Fish program either subcontracts resettlement obligations to private agencies or private

organizations receive funding from ORR and operate completely outside state agencies.⁷⁰ Finally, the Public Private Partnership option allows VOLAGs to work with the state and supplement program budgets to provide greater cash assistance to refugees. A fourth model, the Matching Grant program, is partially funded through ORR, but administered through a national network of VOLAGs. Particular social programs offered through these models vary by states, but ORR funding expires after a refugee has lived in the United States for eight months. Table One presents the required reporting measurements from ORR. Map One displays the geographical distribution of refugee assistance programs in 2009.

Table One. Required Performance Outcome Measures for Refugee Assistance Programs⁷¹

Publicly Administered, Public Private Partnership, and Wilson/Fish Programs	Matching Grant Program
1. Entered Employment	1. Entered Employment
2. Average Wage at Employment	2. Average Wage at Employment
3. Employment with Health Benefits	3. Employment with Health Benefits
4. Job Retention for 90 days	4. Self-Sufficient at 120th day
5. Cash Assistance Reductions due to Earnings	5. Economic Self-Sufficiency Retention at the 180th day
6. Cash Assistance Termination due to Earnings	6. Economic Self-Sufficiency Overall

Map One. Geographical Distribution of Refugee Assistance Programs in 2009⁷²



Source: ORR.

*At the time of this report, Wyoming did not provide a Publicly Administered, Wilson/Fish, or Public Private Partnership program.

Table Two, prepared by the Government Accountability Office, presents the funding formulae for ORR’s refugee assistance programs. The table shows that federal funding varies depending on assistance program and the ability of private organizations and state agencies to match federal funds.

Table Two. Characteristics of ORR’s Refugee Assistance Programs⁷³

	Publicly Administered	Wilson/Fish	Public Private Partnership	Matching Grant
Funding	ORR reimburses states for 100% of costs	ORR reimburses states or voluntary agencies for 100% of costs	ORR reimburses states for 100% of costs	ORR provides national voluntary agencies \$2 for every \$1 they privately raise, up to \$2,200 per person
Funding affected by refugees’ employment outcomes	No	No	No	Yes
Dedicated funding for case management services	No	Yes	No	Yes
Duration of cash assistance	Up to 8 months	Up to 8 months	Up to 8 months	4-6 months
Cash assistance amount	Amount based on state’s TANF formula	Depending on the state, amounts may range from an amount based on the state’s TANF formula to an amount set by ORR*	Depending on the state, amounts may range from an amount based on the state’s TANF formula to an amount set by ORR*	A minimum of \$200 a month per adult and \$40 a month per minor in cash plus assistance with housing and transportation costs per adult refugee
Participation limits	All eligible refugees can enroll	All eligible refugees can enroll	All eligible refugees can enroll	The number of refugees that can enroll is limited by available funding. Refugees selected by voluntary agencies may participate
Flexibility to states and voluntary agencies	In accordance with TANF regulations and policies	States and voluntary agencies can partner with each other to provide cash assistance and services and develop early employment incentives	States must partner with voluntary agencies to provide cash assistance and states have flexibility in how they provide other services and may offer early employment incentives	Voluntary agencies have flexibility to design programs based on ORR guidelines. Agencies can offer early employment incentives

4.3 Overview

Chart One displays the distribution of states among the four categories identified in this report. Montana and Wyoming have no state refugee offices and do not process refugee data for any length of time. Refugees may access services in these states and live there, but no state office is dedicated to working with these clients.

Approximately three-quarters of states track refugees for eight to twelve months, represented by categories 1 and 2. The federal ORR requires states to track refugees up to eight months and funds programs during that time. As discussed in Section Three, federal grants sometimes extend aid programs and subsequently provide additional tracking data. Twenty-three states have been assigned to category 1 and fifteen states have been categorized as 2.

Chart One. Categorization of States by Length of Refugee Tracking.




Table Three. Categorization of States by Extent of Refugee Tracking.

Category Zero	Category One	Category Two	Category Three
Montana Wyoming	Arkansas California Connecticut Delaware Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Michigan Mississippi Nebraska Nevada New Hampshire New Mexico North Dakota Oklahoma Rhode Island South Carolina Tennessee Texas West Virginia	Alabama Hawaii Idaho Maryland Massachusetts New Jersey New York North Carolina Ohio Oregon Pennsylvania South Dakota Utah Vermont Wisconsin	Alaska Arizona Colorado Florida Georgia Illinois Minnesota Missouri Virginia Washington

Ten states surveyed have formalized procedures for tracking refugees past the initial year of resettlement. Many states continue to input tracking data if the client voluntarily provides information, but this rarely occurs, especially because a person’s immigration status tends to change after one year. Unless specific grants are available, refugees no

longer receive special benefits and must meet the qualifications of the general population. Section Five presents case studies on five states with extensive tracking processes and procedures.

4.3 Trends and Analysis of State Practices

As the overview of refugee resettlement programs shows, there is substantial variance between states with regard to the types of refugee programs utilized. Analyzing the raw data, a few distinct patterns appear beyond the broad categorizations. States with the most developed refugee tracking systems tended to be located in the Midwest and Western states. Larger states, in general, had moderately extensive refugee tracking programs, with some states falling on both ends of the spectrum. States with greater refugee populations tended to have more substantial tracking programs, while states with moderate to small numbers of refugees had less extensive tracking procedures. While these trends are not predictive, they do provide evidence about some factors that may influence the extent to which refugee integration is monitored over time.

4.4.1 State Size

States with greater size, in both geography and population, tend to have more extensive tracking measures for refugees. Each of the ten states falling into the ‘most extensive’ category has a geographic territory of over 40,000 square miles, which is close to the national average for geographic size. Similarly, these states tend to be well populated with at least a couple major urban cities, including Florida, Illinois, and Virginia. The notable exception to this pattern is Alaska, which has the greatest territory but one of the smallest populations in the United States. Alaska uses one of the most extensive refugee tracking programs, which may be necessitated by its dispersed population.

There is less of a correlation between small states and the extent of refugee tracking. The less extensive and moderately extensive categories appear to be filled with states from a wide cross-section of physical size, typically a few large states and many small to moderately sized states. With the exception of Alaska, each of the 10 smallest states by population had minimally to moderately extensive tracking programs, with most only upholding the federal standards or not tracking refugees at all.

4.4.2 Refugee Populations

With a few exceptions, states with greater numbers of refugees relocated each year tended to have more extensive tracking programs. Besides California and Texas, all states that received over 50,000 refugees in 2008 had moderately to very extensive tracking programs. Most of these states fell into the most extensive category. Meanwhile, states with the smallest refugee populations typically had less extensive tracking programs, or lacked any tracking mechanisms at all. As states with smaller populations tend to have smaller refugee populations, this determination may be related to how states with smaller populations overall had less extensive tracking mechanisms. There are exceptions, however, as Alaska, Alabama, and Hawaii all received less than 5,000 refugees in 2008, yet each had moderate to very extensive tracking programs. States with more moderately sized refugee populations had the greatest variation in the extent of their tracking

programs. While refugee population does not relate directly to the quality of tracking programs, states with larger refugee populations do generally appear to have more extensive programs.

4.4.3 Region

Refugee tracking mechanisms appear to vary somewhat with location in the country. One distinct pattern that arose was the limited tracking of refugees in the Northeast. Of the ten states determined to have very extensive tracking programs, only three—Florida, Georgia, and Virginia—are on the East coast, and none of these are considered to be in the Northeast. All other Eastern states have minimal or moderately extensive tracking programs. Similarly, most New England states only track refugees for the minimum federally mandated time, with only Vermont and Massachusetts tracking refugees for longer periods of time with additional mechanisms.

Conversely, Western and Midwestern states, such as Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, and Washington, track refugees for longer periods of time and with more metrics. While there are states from both regions in each category, they are skewed more heavily toward extensive tracking programs. Two exceptions are the small, Western states Montana and Wyoming, which are the only two states without any mechanisms for tracking refugees whatsoever. However, these states admit very few refugees each year. In general, a higher percentage of states on the West coast track refugees extensively.

4.4.4 Conclusions from Analysis

We cannot determine direct causal linkages that can predict the type of refugee resettlement program an individual state will offer. The decisions about what tracking methods to employ are ultimately made by individual state legislatures, executives, and autonomous agencies, and are subject to a variety of influences.⁷⁴ Nevertheless, a few trends can be detected from the data available. Eastern states tended to have less extensive tracking programs, while Western and Midwestern states typically had more extensive programs. Smaller states, and states with smaller refugee populations, frequently had less extensive tracking mechanisms, while larger states often had more extensive programs. While each trend has exceptions, these overarching patterns provide valuable information about different factors influencing refugee tracking.

From this perspective, New Hampshire appears better aligned with its counterparts. While states with similarly sized refugee populations did tend to employ somewhat more extensive tracking programs, most New England states had comparable levels of tracking systems. Similarly small states—both geographically and by population—also tended to have less extensive resettlement tracking.

4.5 Case Studies

Examples of other states are a promising source for developing new mechanisms for refugee tracking. Numerous states have implemented practices for tracking refugee resettlement over time that could be useful to other states facing similar issues. Alaska, Georgia, Illinois, Missouri, and Minnesota each share demographic characteristics with

New Hampshire in terms of their refugee profile. In addition, these states feature robust or innovative refugee tracking programs that could guide New Hampshire's refugee program. The following case studies detail specific practices from each of these states.

4.5.1 Alaska

Alaska's refugee program warrants elaboration because of its concentrated social services and similar refugee demographics to New Hampshire. In FY2011, Alaska accepted 86 refugees, with the top source countries being Somalia (35 percent), Burma (30 percent), and Bhutan (24 percent).⁷⁵

Alaska's refugee resettlement program is unique in two ways. First, all refugees are resettled in Anchorage and due to the geography of the state, rarely move away from that city in their first year of resettlement. Second, all services are provided by the Refugee Assistance & Immigration Services (RAIS) branch of Catholic Social Services.⁷⁶ Refugees are tracked consistently in one office without the need for cross-organization sharing. The state funds this program directly with no state coordinator or multiple resettlement organizations. RAIS uses a Refugee Progress Assessment form to rank refugees in categories related to education, familiarity with city, and self-sufficiency (See Appendix). The office holds a quarterly "All Refugee Meeting," where they invite all refugees who have received services from them to attend a get-together. Within the first year of resettlement, approximately 80 percent of refugees attend the meeting. After the first year, that number drops to 10 percent and after two years, generally one refugee attends.⁷⁷

4.5.2 Georgia

Georgia's refugee tracking system shares demographic and economic data on refugee clients among agencies, setting a standard for inter-agency interaction. In FY2011, Georgia received 2,635 refugees, with the top source countries being Bhutan (38 percent), Burma (35 percent), and Somalia (six percent).⁷⁸ While Georgia accepts nearly five times as many refugees as New Hampshire, its technological advancements may be options for New Hampshire to follow as refugees are demographically similar.

Through funding from the Office of Refugee Resettlement, Georgia has developed an extensive database for maintaining records on refugee demographics and statistics called "DHS Refugee Services Tracking System." First developed in 1998, it now operates on a Microsoft Access platform and has two components: State Refugee Database and Agency Database. The State Refugee Database collects demographic and biographical data on refugees, operating as a record for every refugee who has received services since 2000. As of FY2011, the database included 29,260 refugees from 125 nations. Similarly, the database tabulates the number of services provided via contracted organizations. This number totaled 23,141 in FY2011 and since 2000 is 143,072. These services are divided into ten categories and allow for assessment of need and prevalence based on usage.

The Agency Database allows contracted service providers to enter, edit, and share information on refugees as they obtain services. Contracts to service providers are also managed through this program to ensure that programs are implemented as planned.

Caseworkers input client meetings and services provided to produce an invoice, which is then sent to the state. Since the refugee information is linked to multiple agencies, ORR reports can easily be generated and the system can be adapted to fit future requirements.⁷⁹

In addition to the Agency Database, four data sources provide information on services accessed by refugees outside of those organizations directly contracted by the Georgia State Refugee Office. SUCCESS provides data on Refugee Cash Assistance, Refugee Medical Assistance, and Secondary Migration data on refugees moving to Georgia from another state. The Georgia Refugee Health Program adds data on first, second, and third trimester medical screenings, while Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System (WRAPS) provides updates on monthly refugee and Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) arrivals. Finally, the Multi-County Refugee Resettlement Unit provides annual Refugee Status Data to the office by classifying clients as SIVs, asylees, and parolees. Frequent information is posted on a blog, maintained by the Georgia Coalition of Refugee Stakeholders.⁸⁰

4.5.3 Illinois

Since 1975, more than 145,000 refugees from more than 60 countries have resettled in Illinois. In the fiscal year 2011, nearly 2,000 refugees arrived in Illinois, with 26 percent coming from Bhutan, 29 percent from Burma, and 31 percent from Iraq.⁸¹ In comparison, in 2011 New Hampshire had 84 percent from Bhutan, eight percent from Burma, and two percent from Iraq.⁸² Illinois' Bureau of Refugee and Immigrant Services (BRIS), run by the Department of Human Services, provides funding and manages contracts with local agencies designed to help newly arriving refugees achieve self-sufficiency in the United States. BRIS also includes the Refugee and Immigrant Citizenship Initiative (RICI), the first state-funded program of its kind. Since 1995, thirty-five agencies have provided English as a Second Language, civics, U.S. History instruction, and application services to more than 180,000 immigrants throughout Illinois.

In addition to BRIS, the Immigrant Assistance Program, which is run by the office of the Attorney General, was established to ensure that the state government is aware of the needs of Illinois' immigrant population, and the barriers that might prevent immigrants from seeking and obtaining government services. The program involves the coordination of the provision of services and of referrals to other government agencies as appropriate.⁸³

Illinois tracks refugees through two different state agencies: the Illinois Department of Public Health (IDPH) tracks refugee health screenings, and the Illinois Department of Human Services (IDHS) has different tracking mechanisms that may go beyond the one-year that the IDPH tracks them. Data mandated by the U.S. Refugee Program captures individuals served in employment programs, English as a Second Language instruction, and mental health services (where they exist).

If comprehensive tracking is done in the first year, it is data captured by the local volunteer resettlement agencies for those they resettle.⁸⁴ They do not have data on secondary migrants in or out of the state, unless they also provide ORR funded services

that the migrants accessed. In the Illinois system, aggregate data is collected by the Jewish Federation of Metropolitan Chicago, which coordinates the Refugee Social Service Consortium. The data system has a Client Profile and Client Monthly Service Report. Illinois does track services and outcomes for those who access service. The database includes refugees accessing service beyond year one; however, as resources have declined, the post 12 month caseload has decreased, thus the database is small.

One obstacle Illinois has encountered in trying to track refugees is the Right to Privacy. To establish tracking, the two identifiers available are the SSN and the I-94 Alien Number. Refugee permission is needed to utilize those numbers. Even with permission, the fact that refugees move residences with some frequency can disrupt communications. A second set of obstacles arises from the diversity of cultural, linguistic, educational, and socio-economic characteristics within the refugee caseload.

Refugee success and integration have been major concerns in Illinois. The state has had a long-term commitment to developing Refugee Mutual Assistance Associations (MAAs) since the 1980s, which are largely funded through local donations.⁸⁵ The intent is to establish a bridge between the refugee and mainstream communities. The MAAs in Illinois have a coalition which seeks joint funding projects and presents a unified voice in approaching city, state, and federal government. The MAAs also provide an important dimension of intergroup cultural and social support, which sustains the cohesion of the communities. However, they may lack the skills and experience necessary to raise funds, extend services to community members or the administrative skills to meet funder's requests for documentation and/or outcomes. As such, limited funding is available for capacity building at these organizations.

According to Jenny Aguirre, an Illinois Refugee Health Program administrator, and supported in the literature on immigrant integration, refugee resettlement is a process that unfolds over a number of years. Typically, the five-year point is when the refugee family has achieved some stability. It is at the ten year point when, on average, that life has stabilized, that refugees fully accept their new environment, and, as an anchor, the children have become integrated."⁸⁶

4.5.4 Missouri

Missouri also presents an interesting comparison to New Hampshire because both states draw a high percentage of their refugees from Bhutan and Iraq. Missouri received 941 refugees in fiscal year 2011, drawing 20 percent from Bhutan and 14 percent from Iraq.⁸⁷ New Hampshire received the vast majority of its refugees from Iraq and Bhutan in 2011.⁸⁸

Missouri struggles with similar issues to most states with regard to the difficulty of tracking refugees throughout the state. Missouri does not track refugees as a state, but individual agencies do track refugees as long as they are still receiving services. Refugees apply for individual programs, including targeted assistance, services for older refugees, and targeted discretionary funding. Refugees are no longer tracked once they stop receiving services.

One aspect that makes Missouri unique is a new computer program that is being utilized by one of its larger agencies that provides refugee services. The International Institute of St. Louis, a group that provides services to refugees, invested in an automated tracking program called “Penelope.” This program allows the Institute to track refugees over time, and they are beginning to build a substantial database. While refugees are still not tracked once they leave the system, this database gathers information about refugees in various programs, which could potentially provide the basis for longitudinal studies. Penelope allows the refugee coordinators to add in a wide variety of questions and information to be analyzed, an aspect that most other refugee systems lack. Unfortunately, such software is expensive and would fall outside federal program funding, but agencies aiming to gather additional information about refugees could look to implement such a system.⁸⁹

4.5.5 Minnesota

Minnesota has some similarities to New Hampshire in terms of refugee demographics, as both receive considerable refugees from Bhutan and Iraq. Minnesota received 1,840 refugees in FY 2011, drawing eight percent from Bhutan and five percent from Iraq.⁹⁰

Like most states, Minnesota does not track refugees beyond their participation in programs and services provided by the state. However, unlike most states, Minnesota employs an innovative tracking system for refugees who are still receiving services. Refugee information and outcome achievement are reported real-time through a web-based management system that stores data on refugees who have participated in refugee programs. This system tracks a number of dimensions of refugee health, but also adds six outcome domains relating to resettlement issues. These factors include housing status, income and employment, issues with immigration adjustment, use of public programs, safety of living environment, and family functionality. These outcomes are measured as long as refugees are participating in programs, and aim to address issues that directly affect the ease of resettlement and integration. The various measures are not generally tracked beyond five years, as after that refugees are usually no longer eligible for most programs. These measures are potentially most helpful within the first 30 to 90 days of resettlement, as this would improve overall data on refugees across the state soon after their arrival.⁹¹

5. POLICY OPTIONS: METHODS TO IMPROVE REFUGEE TRACKING

The analysis of the literature on refugee integration and practices by various states across the country provides a framework for steps that can be taken to develop more effective tracking programs. While there is no “one-size-fits-all” tracking system that is best for all states, synthesis of these different methodologies can help policymakers determine the optimal program for their individual states.

5.1 What Measures Are Deemed Successful

The literature on refugee integration suggests what components are needed for effective tracking techniques. Scholars indicate that the most important component of successful integration is finding consistent employment. Therefore, most resources and services should be tailored to maximize employment outcomes for refugees, and tracking

mechanisms should focus on factors that are correlated with gaining employment. These factors are often qualitative, making them more difficult to determine and track. Some of the factors that are deemed most important and should be tracked most heavily include: English language skills, wages at employment, job retention, self-sufficiency, familial and marital status, post-traumatic stress disorders, and mental and physical health. Mental health is a particularly important issue for refugees, as many have suffered from traumatizing experiences yet receive inadequate assistance once in the United States. Factors such as participation in job fairs, career services workshops, and employment-training programs would also be helpful to track over time, but most offices lack the coordination and infrastructure to follow such measures longitudinally.

The federal government sponsors innovative programs that seek to improve refugee tracking and integration over time at the state level. These include the Wilson-Fish Alternative Programs, discretionary grants, cash-assistance programs, and mental health assistance funding. Unfortunately, funding for these programs is very limited, so only a few states receive assistance for each program. Expansion of these programs, or funding of similar initiatives on the state and local level, could dramatically improve refugee tracking and integration techniques.

5.2 Various Effective Practices

From our 50 State Analysis and in-depth case studies, there are several practices that stand out as effective and applicable to New Hampshire. A common theme is shared data and communication. Alaska also has a small population, and their resettlement program takes advantage of that by using one agency to oversee all refugee tracking. This allows the state to easily coordinate with the agency, and for data to be complete and in one place. Also, having a single agency track refugees eliminates many administrative costs and overlaps. If New Hampshire did not want to use only a single agency to provide tracking, another option is to develop an inter-agency database so if refugees move cities, the state is still able to continue to track their outcomes. The use of an electronic database is much more effective in tracking refugees than a paper system.

Many states rely on strong community groups and agencies to do the actual tracking of refugees. Community groups often have the resources to better maintain contact with refugees, and have a deeper understanding of the specific cultural needs of the refugee. Because of this, refugees voluntarily stay in contact with community groups longer than with the official refugee office. In Illinois, the state has formalized this practice through the use of Refugee Mutual Assistance Associations, which reports directly to the state while helping refugees assimilate.

5.3 Other Federal Programs' Tracking Mechanisms

There are other federal programs implemented at the state level that track outcomes as well, with methods that can be applied to state refugee tracking. The Children's Bureau under the Department of Health and Human Services works with state and local agencies to develop programs that prevent child abuse.⁹² The Children's Bureau has review consultants whom conduct multiple visits onsite to ensure best practices of the local and

state agencies. It also administers Federal and State reporting systems that provide data to monitor and improve child welfare outcomes.

The State reporting systems have the capacity to share data across states, something that could be useful in refugee tracking. One of the biggest problems states have encountered in refugee tracking is when refugees move to another state. Most of the time, the initial state loses connection with the refugee, and has no way to transfer information to the other state. If New Hampshire were able to coordinate its refugee tracking with surrounding states through the integration of electronic databases or increased communication, all the states would benefit.

In maintaining accountability in administering Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), the state and regional administrators use a participation report to check in regularly with TANF recipients, and flag down individuals who don't meet participation requirements.⁹³ To meet the statewide participation goal of 50 percent, Utah has implemented a performance plan for each case manager, in which they are rewarded for achieving their goal. New York City used monthly tracking data to create competition among regional teams to meet tracking goals. Applying these strategies has been very useful in Utah and New York City, and could be applied to refugee tracking as well if the New Hampshire state agency were able to implement programs that encourage community agencies to be more accountable for refugee tracking.

6. CONCLUSION

This overview of refugee tracking programs serves as a guide for states looking to improve the effectiveness of their integration programs. Most states currently utilize limited tracking programs that lack the depth and longitudinal mechanisms needed to track refugee integration over time. The best practices drawn from the scholarship on refugee studies and the analysis of nationwide methodologies show the various opportunities and techniques available for tracking refugees. Together, these components provide an effective framework for creating new refugee tracking programs, and this synthesis of literature and existing practices is crucial to developing effective systems suited to individual states.

It is also important to acknowledge that states vary in the quality of refugee services provided by community groups and the quantity of refugees received each year, so this analysis can only provide a snapshot of these programs. However, integration of statewide agencies and local community groups presents an even greater opportunity for effective integration and longitudinal tracking of that process. The policy options and analysis offered can provide innovative solutions to the difficult issue of tracking refugee integration over time.

APPENDICES

Appendix A. Current Refugee Tracking Methods Across the 50 States

Category Zero

<i>State</i>	<i>Refugees</i>	<i>Length of Tracking</i>	<i>Notes</i>
Montana	N/A	N/A	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No state refugee office.
Wyoming	N/A	N/A	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No state refugee office.

Category One

<i>State</i>	<i>Refugees</i>	<i>Length of Tracking</i>	<i>Notes</i>
Arkansas	3	8 months	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Very small refugee program, accepting fewer than five refugees per year
California	4,975	8 months	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minimal tracking
Connecticut	447	8 months	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minimal tracking
Delaware	16	8 months	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not developed a specific tracking methodology for refugees. Mostly working with secondary migrants.
Indiana	1,197	8 months	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minimal tracking.
Iowa	331	8 months	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minimal tracking
Kansas	327	8 months	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minimal tracking.
Kentucky	1,363	8 months	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minimal tracking.
Louisiana	272	8 months	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minimal tracking.
Maine	197	8 months	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minimal tracking.
Michigan	2,587	8 months	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minimal tracking.
Mississippi	2	8 months	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minimal tracking.
Nebraska	738	8 months	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minimal tracking.
Nevada	329	8 months	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minimal tracking.

New Hampshire	517	8 months	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minimal tracking.
New Mexico	155	8 months	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minimal tracking.
North Dakota	368	8 months	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minimal tracking.
Oklahoma	271	8 months	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minimal tracking.
Rhode Island	157	8 months	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minimal tracking.
South Carolina	142	8 months	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minimal tracking.
Tennessee	1,236	8 months	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minimal tracking.
Texas	5,623	8 months	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minimal tracking.
West Virginia	9	8 months	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minimal tracking.

Category Two

<i>State</i>	<i>Refugees</i>	<i>Length of Tracking</i>	<i>Notes</i>
Alabama	89	1 year	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No comprehensive database system Wilson-Fish Program provides some services up to five years but not to all
Hawaii		1 year	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Track economic and state services data.
Idaho	732	1-2 years	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monthly phone, mail or email contacts with clients for the 1-2 years they are with our program.
Maryland	1,278	1 year	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MORA state database tracks ESL and Vocational training services for a maximum of five years and collects data as long as they are enrolled in services. Data is collected through forms electronically from service providers that have contract with our office.
Massachusetts	1,548	1 year	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Participates in Wilson/Fish and Refugee School Impact Grants. Department of Public Health tracks health outcomes and outreach practices.
New Jersey	383	1 year	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Track up to 1 year when refugees become self-sufficient. Most grants end after 6 months.

New York	3,531	1 year	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Office of Refugee and Immigrant Services, Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance is single state agency responsible for implementing services to refugees. Mayor's Office of Immigrant Affairs tracks refugees within New York City.
North Carolina	2,128	1 year	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Database used for capturing services provided by refugee providers under contract with the State Refugee Office. Providers record the amount of service provided (units of service) and to whom it is provided.
Ohio	1,690	1 year	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Case managers work with refugees to register for Cash Assistance and Medical Assistance.
Oregon	762	1 year	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mostly tracking employment statistics.
Pennsylvania	2,974	1 year	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Service providers submit monthly reports on clients and services provided. Some contractors offer education and citizenship services up to 5 years, but that is not tracked. Monthly reports are cumulative so that at the end of the year we have a snapshot of all individuals served during the year and the services they were provided.
South Dakota	490	1 year	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lutheran Social Services maintains open files up to 5 years, but refugee data is only tracked for 1 year.
Utah	842	1 year	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Currently has ORR Formula Targeted Assistance Grant (TAG) System in place to track up to 2 years, but usually only track up to 1 year.
Vermont	361	1 year	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Tracks through social programs, but employment data is incomplete.
Wisconsin	759	1+ years	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Follows for 2 years or until refugee becomes a citizen. Less formal tracking after 8 months.

Category Three

<i>State</i>	<i>Refugees</i>	<i>Length of Tracking</i>	<i>Notes</i>
Alaska	86	2-5 years	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All services provided by one agency in Anchorage • Track refugees as long as they require services, usually two years for cash assistance programs • Refugees ranked on self-sufficiency measures (See Appendix)
Arizona	2,173	1+ years	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use two tracking systems: one for up to one year and one for over one year • Contract with seven VOLAGS to provide case management and employment services for refugees up to five years. • Track case management caseload, employment caseload, benefits, employment, and health • Funding source is 100% federal
Colorado	1,564	Up to 5 years	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Track refugee data 1 and 5 years in US in various report such as trimester cash assistance, annual goal plan and many ad hoc reports. • Refugee Health Program performs initial health screening for 90 days.
Florida	2,903	1+ years	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provides services, including employment, adult education, legal services and youth services to refugees in 7 distinct areas of the state, with separate contracts with local providers for each area and service • Data for contract performance is entered into a centralized data system, so we can identify subgroup performance of clients who received services
Georgia	2,635	1+ years	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Uses Agency Database and State Refugee Database to communicate between agencies and organizations. • Georgia Coalition of Refugee Stakeholders maintains a blog for communicating with refugees.

Illinois	1,941	1+ years	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sponsors the Refugee and Immigrant Citizenship Initiative (RICI), the first state-funded program of its kind. • Database includes refugees receiving services past one year, but that number is much lower than those up to one year.
Minnesota	1,840	5 years	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Outcome achievements are reported on real-time through a web-based management system. • Refugees progress are tracked along 6 outcome domains – housing, income and employment, immigration adjustment, use of public programs, safe environment and family functioning.
Missouri	941	1 year	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Uses Penelope case management system to track refugees between agencies. • Only track clients on assistance, not outcomes or longitudinally.
Virginia	1,339	Up to 5 years	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Track where they live, work with them for 5 years. • After 1 year, each refugee is assigned an education or employment caseworker.
Washington	2,135	Up to 5 years	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Runs LEP Pathway Program. • Program outcomes are identified through the invoices service providers submit for payment.

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- ⁶³ *Ibid.*, 9.
- ⁶⁴ http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/programs/match_grant_prg.htm
- ⁶⁵ <http://www.nh.gov/oep/programs/refugee/agencies.htm>
- ⁶⁶ <http://www.nh.gov/oep/programs/refugee/facts.htm>
- ⁶⁷ <http://www.nh.gov/oep/programs/refugee/facts.htm>
- ⁶⁸ http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/data/ORR_Annual_Report_FY_2008.pdf
- ⁶⁹ <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11369.pdf>
- ⁷⁰ <http://www.isedsolutions.org/projects/wilson-fish>
- ⁷¹ Table copied directly from: <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11369.pdf>
- ⁷² Map copied directly from: <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11369.pdf>
- ⁷³ Table copied directly from: <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11369.pdf>
- ⁷⁴ Black, 68.
- ⁷⁵ <http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/data/fy2011RA.htm>
- ⁷⁶ <http://www.cssalaska.org/html/programs/refugee-assistance.php>
- ⁷⁷ Phone interview with Dr. Karen Ferguson
- ⁷⁸ <http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/data/fy2011RA.htm>
- ⁷⁹ DHS Refugee Services Tracking System & Blog: 2010 – 2011 Service Analysis
- ⁸⁰ <http://garefugees.wordpress.com/>
- ⁸¹ "Fiscal Year 2011 Refugee Arrivals." *Office Of Refugee Resettlement*. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2011. Web. 30 May 2012. <<http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/data/fy2011RA.htm>>.
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⁸⁸ "Fiscal Year 2011 Refugee Arrivals." *Office Of Refugee Resettlement*. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2011. Web. 30 May 2012. <<http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/data/fy2011RA.htm>>.

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