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LEADERSHIP DURING CRISIS AT DARTMOUTH AND BEYOND

*The Role of Students in Building Community Resilience at
Institutions of Higher Education*

Presented to Dartmouth College

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

For hundreds of years the assumption that both small- and large-scale communities would fall into chaos should a wide-scale pandemic or natural disaster hit has permeated public consciousness and manifested itself in local and national emergency preparedness plans. Burgeoning research in community resilience debunks this myth and suggests that the public is not only capable of coping with disaster effectively, but that a community can even experience positive growth in the post-crisis period.

Institutions of Higher Education (IHEs) are particularly vulnerable to emergency due to their size, their complexity of operations, the close living proximity of students, and the frequency of international travel across the student body in the international study population, for study abroad, and for faculty positions. The very factors that make them vulnerable also make them uniquely prepared to foster a more resilient community. By examining Dartmouth's current model of preparedness, interviewing key stakeholders, and researching best practices at other colleges this paper proposes a number of ways Dartmouth can better engage its students and build a more resilient community. By utilizing student social capital, leaders can foster more resilient communities and strengthen citizenship among student populations. Furthermore, in engaging students more thoroughly in emergency preparedness and response planning, IHEs have a unique opportunity to advance their educational missions—to cultivate leadership and civic engagement in a student body.

1. BACKGROUND

“A culture of integrity, self-reliance, and collegiality and...a sense of responsibility for each other and for the broader world.” – Dartmouth College Mission Statement

Dartmouth describes the College's mission as that of “educat[ing] the most promising students and prepar[ing] them for a lifetime of learning and of responsible leadership, through a faculty dedicated to teaching and the creation of knowledge.” Additionally, in describing one of its core values Dartmouth says, “Dartmouth fosters lasting bonds among faculty, staff, and students, which encourage *a culture of integrity, self-reliance, and collegiality and instill a sense of responsibility for each other and for the broader world.*” The culture the College's mission statement and the core value cited above describe is certainly an outgrowth or characteristic of a resilient community, that is, a community capable of responding quickly and effectively to a crisis and even experiencing positive growth as a result of one. In this regard, the educational mission of the College has many implications for disaster preparedness and response based on a model of community resilience.¹



Educating students on how to prepare for and react to a disaster asks students to role model civic engagement, which by extension cultivates a culture of self-reliance, integrity, collegiality, and responsibility. Currently, however, Dartmouth's Emergency Preparedness Plans do not incorporate student feedback, leadership, or engagement in the way the College's Mission Statement suggests they should. This paper uses burgeoning research in community resilience to propose that the College can further its mission by engaging its students more thoroughly in its emergency preparedness and response plans and that in doing so the College will first, advance its mission in cultivating leadership and civic engagement in its student body and second, benefit from the resource of students' social capital. In this way, by engaging students the College will build a more resilient community and better prepare itself and the community at large for a disaster. Finally, in examining Dartmouth's current model of preparedness, in interviewing key stakeholders, and in researching best practices at other colleges this paper proposes a number of ways Dartmouth can better engage its students and build a more resilient community.

2. LEADERSHIP AND COMMUNITY RESILIENCE

2.1 The Myth of Chaos

The assumption that communities of all sizes would be unable to withstand a wide-scale pandemic or natural disaster has permeated public consciousness and manifested itself in local and national emergency preparedness plans. A growing body of research, which took off in the months after 9/11, seeks to debunk this myth and offer an alternative hypothesis on how communities can and do react in crisis. Experts in the field of emergency preparedness like Dr. Monica Schoch-Spana have made contributions to a burgeoning body of literature that explores the notion of community resilience.² This literature is quickly making its way into public policy circles, civil society, and even the private disaster management industry in an "effort to reduce disaster related losses."³

In her article, "The People's Role in U.S. National Health Security: Past, Present, and Future," Dr. Schoch-Spana writes, "The notion that citizens have a positive and consequential role to play in managing public health and other disasters seems obvious today, but this was not always so. Neither was the idea that people could be resilient—that is, capable of coping with, rebounding from, and even experiencing positive growth as a result of a disaster."⁴ Dr. Schoch-Spana has identified three areas of potential in which the public can become key players: disaster response, recovery, and positive growth post crisis. This paper will suggest that the crucial role strong leadership plays in emergency preparedness is often overlooked in the field of emergency preparedness, particularly as it related to community resilience. Strong leadership has the capacity to help build resilient communities from the top down and this area of potentiality has not yet been fully recognized on college campuses. Indeed, Dr. Schoch-Spana writes:



Yet, enough dedicated people—with leadership’s support—are still needed to develop engagement strategy, cultivate relationships with community- and faith-based groups, conduct broad public outreach and communication, mobilize volunteers, and involve the public in preparedness policymaking.⁵

Leadership during a crisis (as opposed to simple management, which deals with the process of *controlling* things or people, which is almost—by definition—impossible during a crisis) is composed of three key parts. First, leaders must themselves react and make decisions that will maintain the safety and welfare of their constituents. Second, they must also enable (and not disable) active leadership on the part of their constituents. And third, they must help promote a culture that can experience “positive growth” from a disaster and that will capitalize on educational, policy-making, and network-building opportunities created post crisis. This need for crisis leadership is particularly salient at IHEs because of the particular risks and vulnerabilities inherent to the populations at such institutions.

2.2 *The Complex Operational Structure of IHEs*

As of 2006 there were over 4,000 two- and four-year public and private IHEs in the United States with a total of over 15 million students and several million staff, faculty, and visitors.⁶ The number of IHEs and the size of each of their populations alone necessitate the paying of special attention to their preparedness practices, but it is the “distinctive structure and environment” of IHEs that present so many challenges in emergency planning and preparedness procedure that are not present at other organizations and institutions.⁷

The large geographic areas that college and university campuses—which often resemble small towns—cover, the “extent of the services in their vicinity” (i.e., medical centers, sports complexes, art centers, and other businesses that cater to student, staff, and faculty populations), all present unique challenges. The fast changing populations—from day to night and year to year (when classes of students graduate)—in addition to the complex enterprises IHEs operate on top of their academic programs like research and development facilities, agricultural centers, food services, and transportation systems, further contribute to a “unique set of circumstances that must be considered when designing emergency preparedness plans.”⁸ The fact that so many IHEs are integrated into their surrounding communities and often operate building and dining facilities around the clock is also challenging for effective emergency planning. Dartmouth shares many, if not all, of these characteristics.

The distinguishing factor of IHEs with which this paper is most concerned is the distinct set of implications that result from the age and legal status student population and that the “Action Guide for Emergency Management at Institutions of Higher Education,” produced by the U.S. Department of Education, cites. The authors of the guide write:

The population served by IHEs is distinct, as well. Most students are over 18



years of age—the age of majority in most states—and therefore are considered adults capable of making decisions on their own. This can present challenges and opportunities. It creates the need for a different set of roles and responsibilities for students during an emergency event (especially compared to the K–12 population of mostly minors).⁹

Though post secondary-educational institutions have been absolved of the legal obligations of *in loco parentis* doctrine, the doctrine and its implications persist in public and parental consciousness.¹⁰ Furthermore, issues of business continuity and tuition refund have become hot issues today, so much so that managing and consulting firms have been employed by IHEs to develop Business Continuity Risk Management Plans.¹¹ Indeed, given an educational climate in which lawsuits disputing tuition bills are frequently brought against IHEs—especially in so large a scale as the class action lawsuits brought by graduates of Thomas S. Cooley Law School and New York Law School for the schools’ alleged distortion of their post-graduate employment rates¹²—the contingency plans in place regarding disaster must, from a university’s prospective, consider the legal ramifications of cancelling classes versus sheltering in place. Indeed, as Mike Wooten, Director of Residential Education at Dartmouth, pointed out in an interview, after a University of Michigan Law School student sued for a loss of tuition when classes were cancelled and won, the school’s unofficial policy was to avoid ever cancelling classes officially. Instead, it now emails professors and urges them to make a decision that is in “their and their students’ best interests.”¹³

2.3 IHEs’ Vulnerabilities to Disaster

Outlined above are many characteristics that make emergency planning at colleges and universities challenging. IHEs are also particularly vulnerable to disaster. Beyond the elevated risks of certain natural hazards associated with the specific geographical locations of some IHEs, some of the qualities inherent to a student, faculty, and administration population—such as the vast amount of international travel associated with faculty and administrative positions, as well as, the study abroad experience widely undertaken by college level students and the close proximity of many residential living situations—put IHEs at particular risk of pandemic flu outbreaks.

In 2005 the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) began a serious campaign to alert the world’s countries of the possibility that a flu outbreak on a scale similar to that of the Spanish Flu (a pandemic that took over an estimated 50 million lives) of 1918 would occur.¹⁴ In a brief John McLaughlin of the Arthur J. Gallagher Risk Management Company wrote, that was excerpted and revised with permission of the WHO and entitled the “WHO checklist for influenza pandemic,” McLaughlin wrote that IHEs will “be among the industries most severely impacted because of risks resulting from international travel by students, faculty, and staff” and the fact that their campuses are open and accessible to the local community at-large.¹⁵ McLaughlin wrote further:



The impact on college or university operations may include unprecedented demands on student health services, relocation of students in residence halls, the establishment of quarantine sites, debilitating sickness among staff and faculty causing severe reductions in the work force, essential services hampered and perhaps unavailable, and significant loss of tuition revenues from closure of the institution, and non-returning students.¹⁶

For these reasons it becomes important to study how leading researchers in the field have identified the role of leadership in crisis response and preparedness, particularly regarding emergency preparedness as can be applied to IHEs.

It is important to note that interviews conducted with the Dean of the College, Charlotte Johnson;¹⁷ Assistant Dean of the College for Campus Life, Katherine Burke;¹⁸ as well as Mike Wooten,¹⁹ confirmed that the issues McLaughlin outlines are ones with which Dartmouth wrestles in its Emergency Planning Group. Further, in an interview with President Susan Scrimshaw of the Sage Colleges, which has a large proportion of students who commute to school, Scrimshaw said that the choice of whether or not to send students home is perhaps the most important and difficult ones to make. President Scrimshaw, whose leadership in the field of disaster response is highly respected and whose former positions include Associate Dean of Public Health and Professor of Public Health and Anthropology at the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA), highlighted Dartmouth and other IHEs' international student populations as another source of concern. Different cultural backgrounds cause students to react differently—psychologically and emotionally—in a crisis and can also, of course, make it more difficult to get students home.²⁰

Acknowledging the complexity of preparedness planning, as evidenced by the above discussion of characteristics that make planning challenging at IHEs, The Harvard Kennedy School has recognized the need for leadership and created *The Program on Crisis Leadership* (PCL), which has the goal of helping “society improve its capacity to avert, mitigate, and respond to disaster and to develop resilience in recovery.”²¹ The program works with current and future leaders of “emergency agencies, community organizations, and generalist public officials who must prepare themselves and their stakeholders for the possibility and consequences of extreme events” (Program on Crisis Leadership). Research that has emerged from the program shows a startling connection between crisis leadership and community resilience. In “Working Together in Crisis,” one of the publications that has come out of the program, Herman B. Leonard and Arnold M. Howitt write:

In the early stages of a crisis in particular, many people will rise to the occasion in surprising and inspiring ways – showing creativity, ingenuity, optimism, a willingness to work hard, to make difficult choices and accept sacrifices, setting personal and narrow institutional interests aside in favor of the interests of the organization as a whole, and the capacity to lead and inspire. Crisis leaders need



to seek, identify, support and rely upon these individuals. Others will find the stress and uncertainty debilitating.²²

Leonard and Howitt stress the importance of community resilience and make the connection between a resilient public and the need for leaders to capitalize on individual leadership potential identified within a community. Their research speaks to the potential of crisis leaders to *enable* a resilient community. Efforts such as these are only effective if leadership—the College’s administration—is prepared to harness community goodwill. Grassroots efforts must work in concert with top down governance to be truly effective. We saw the bottom up process with the over 300 non-profits that arose after 9/11, but the government squandered the opportunity presented demonstrating poor leadership.²³

2.4 Crisis management versus leadership

In “Adapting to Novelty: Recognizing the Need for Innovation and Leadership,” Joseph Pfeifer outlines the differences between crisis management and crisis leadership citing the ability to adapt and connect people across sectors and interests as one of the main components that distinguishes the two. He also elaborates on leadership’s ability to “connect” and “collaborate” across groups as necessary for quick recovery and resilience. Finally, he suggests:

As a novel incident increases in scale and complexity, it is important for Incident Commanders²⁴ to separate management and leadership functions. Unfortunately, many Incident Commanders are seduced into the action of only managing. The same phenomenon also occurs in business with Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), who would rather run operations than take the role of leadership. Management deals with command and control issues by executing or customizing standard plans. Leadership is about stepping back and detaching from the management of the incident to analyze what is taking place and project future actions; then leaders reconnect to guide management in adapting to novelty. Here, leaders look to connect, collaborate and coordinate with others to discover innovative ways to solve unusual problems.²⁵

It is true that leadership theory has changed greatly over the last century. What began as a study of the qualities that seemed to make great leaders “great” evolved into an exploration of models of leadership that looks at the relationship between followership and leadership, leadership within a cross-cultural context, and leadership within a global context.²⁶ This paper will focus on transformational leadership, which defined by Bruce Avolio et al. in “Leadership: Current Theories, Research, and Future Directions” (discussed by Pfeifer above), encompasses “leader behaviors that transform and inspire followers to perform beyond expectations while transcending self-interest for the good of the organization.”²⁷ In his article “From Passive Recipients to Active Coproducers: Followers’ Roles in the Leadership Process,” Boas Shamir has suggested that the effectiveness of leadership is as much a product of good followers as it is of good leadership.²⁸ Shamir’s definition of leadership, which certainly applies to the theory of



transformational leadership, has broad implications for community resilience within the contexts of emergency preparedness and response and higher education.

This paper will now examine how Dartmouth College addresses the task of emergency preparedness planning and response taking into account the role transformational leadership plays in building community resilience and the ways in which a college can take advantage of the leadership potential in administrators, faculty, and, most importantly, students that could help build community resilience on this campus.

3. DARTMOUTH'S CURRENT MODEL

It is important to acknowledge that Dartmouth's commitment to ensuring the safety and security of its students, staff, faculty, and administrators cannot reasonably be called into question. Indeed, Dartmouth does as much if not more than its peer institutions to ensure it is prepared for any eventuality, yet it still misses the crucial role its students can play in preparing for and responding to emergencies.

While Dartmouth has procedures in place for a vast array of emergencies ranging from hurricanes (which we witnessed most recently in Irene and Sandy) and active shooters on campus to building fires and the death of a student,²⁹ paper will focus on Dartmouth's preparedness plan regarding public health emergencies, for clarity's sake. Dartmouth's emergency preparedness efforts are concentrated on the College's Emergency Planning Group (EPG), which includes representatives from every major constituency of the college: the Office of the President, the Office of the Dean of the College, Public Affairs, the Libraries, all the professional schools, IT, Outdoor Programs, Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center, College Legal Counsel, Residential Education, Safety and Security among other offices. Further, Harry Kinne, the Director of Safety and Security meets weekly with Hanover Chief of Police during which time Kinne keeps him updated.

The Emergency Planning Group has several iterations including the Emergency Response Group and the Emergency Operations Group; they are largely composed of the same key players. The Emergency Planning Group drafted a document outlining initial protocol for emergencies on campus. The College's "Protocol for Emergencies" is divided into nine categories: Severe Weather, Building Fires, Hostile Intruder/Threat of Imminent Campus Violence, Public Health Emergencies, Student Death or Serious Injury, Employee Death or Serious Injury, Campus Power Outage, Campus Network Outage, and Campus Water Outage.

Dartmouth's emergency plans are largely modeled after the Incident Command System (ICS). The ICS, designed by the Federal Emergency Management System (FEMA), aims to provide a standardized incident management approach for all varieties of hazards. The ICS also establishes a basic outline and cohesive set of processes and guidelines for planning and for the management of resources in the event of or in preparation for a crisis. FEMA considers ICS to be a highly adaptable system that allows for the



integration of all the personnel, equipment, resources and particular procedural precedent in each organizational structure.³⁰ For the most part Dartmouth has appropriated this system to its advantage, but this system leaves little room for faculty/student leadership or faculty/student contribution to crisis response and preparedness planning.

Let us now more specifically consider Dartmouth's model for infectious agents, which provides the preparedness model for pandemic flu. Many records of Dartmouth Protocol date back to 2010. We will consider these records bearing in mind that Dartmouth Emergency Protocol is in the process of being updated. That said, each of Dartmouth's emergency plans follows a general model: notification of key persons, identification of the Incident Commander,³¹ the development of an Incident Action Plan,³² and the establishment of an Emergencies Operations Center (EOC). At Dartmouth there are three pre-determined EOCs in separate quadrants of the campus so that one will be available in almost every emergency. Each of these centers is fully equipped to function during periods in which power and water outages may be occurring.

In line with the first area of potential Dr. Schoch-Spana identified for building community resilience, Dartmouth has contributed significant time and effort to the development of a comprehensive response plan. Thus in its protocol Dartmouth further identifies three initial contacts, the Director of Health Services (or his/her designee), the Director of Environmental Health and Safety, and third, a Dean on Call from an affected individual, as well as a time line that demarcates steps to be taken within the first half hour, hour, and appropriate subsequent period of time (to be determined by nature of infectious agent). The Incident Commander (whoever is on scene and most highly trained) will then set in motion an "information gathering" effort, which begins with making contact with the person reporting the event, the number of cases, the location of individuals, and the diagnosis or prognosis of the case, and then moves on to an assessment of the potential for greater contagion in the community. A series of "contacts" are then outlined that will open the Emergency Operating Center, at which point plans for public communication/notification and "support for the community" are put in place.

What is salient in its absence is an articulated line of reasoning that would prepare Dartmouth College Administration to make perhaps the most crucial decision in a pandemic situation at an IHE: if and when to send students home. It is important to note that each interview conducted for the purposes of this paper with key players in the EPG and those who work in collaboration with it resulted in the same conclusion. Dartmouth has not identified the conditions under which the college will either shelter in place/quarantine its students versus send them all home.

Dartmouth does, however, address Dr. Schoch-Spana's second area of potential for community resilience, that of recovery post crisis, in its follow-up plan. Dartmouth has plans for "follow-up" which includes disseminating the necessary information across all involved and/or necessary parties to facilitate the development of a response/recovery program and that builds the ability of the senior officers in charge of each sector i.e.



Health Services, Student Life, Safety and Security etc. to begin the process of short- and long-term response planning. As described thus far, Dartmouth's emergency preparedness model does seem to illustrate an understanding of the ripple effect of crisis across community sectors, as well as the need for follow-up after a crisis to better absorb disaster impacts and aid in the health and sociopolitical and emotional recovery of a community. In addition, Dartmouth's post crisis plan leaves room opportunities for educational and awareness raising events and programs, but does not indicate a commitment to capitalizing on these opportunities thus ignoring Dr. Schoch-Spana's third area of potential in positive growth post crisis. Former Dartmouth College President Jim Yong Kim was frequently known to say that the colleges with the best alcohol prevention programs are those that have very recently suffered the death of a student from alcohol related causes. Dartmouth's model as it stands now shows no signs of attempting to set up a means by which post crisis growth can be inspired pre-crisis in so far as it focuses entirely on actions to be taken once a crisis is identified.

Another crucial piece of Dartmouth's emergency plan in the event of a public health crisis involves an agreement made between Dartmouth College at large and the Upper Valley region. In a document entitled, "Memorandum of Understanding Between Upper Valley Public Health Region and Dartmouth College"³³ dated December 15, 2010, Dartmouth agrees that "in the event of a public health emergency, Leverone Field House will be made available by Dartmouth College to the Upper Valley Public Health Network for the implementation of an Acute Care Center (ACC) and or Point of distribution site (POD)." This document clearly underscores the relationship between Dartmouth and the Upper Valley community at large as important. The memorandum, in and of itself, however, does not suggest a model of preparedness that fosters community resilience. The memorandum cites one instance in which a Dartmouth facility will be made available to the larger community, but it does not acknowledge the resource that the College and the town have in each other for supplies or any other kind of assistance in a crisis. That said, in an interview with Julia Griffin, Hanover's Town Manager, Griffin repeatedly emphasized that one of the strengths of the town's emergency preparedness plan is its partnership with the College at large. She stated that her relationship with Harry Kinne, Dartmouth's Director of Safety and Security, is a strong one. They meet almost weekly and frequently Hanover is included either by proxy or in open conversations between herself and key players of the EPG.³⁴

In sum total, however, Dartmouth's emergency preparedness plans do not support a transformational leadership model in so far as none of the procedures or protocols in place create or leave opportunities for the population at large to serve as a resource. Indeed, in interviews with Harry Kinne, Nicole Buck, Dartmouth's Emergency Management Coordinator, and Charlotte Johnson, it was clear that the college had not yet budgeted opportunities for the administration and the student/faculty/staff populations to work in tandem.^{35,36,37} Administrative primary concern seemed to be with what and when to communicate with students and parents in an emergency. In none of the emergency protocol documents does Dartmouth incorporate student leadership or aid, furthermore,



any/all mentions of the role students will play in a crisis are limited to implied contact with Dartmouth's Office of Public Affairs, that is, the Justin Anderson, the Assistant Vice President for Media Relations. And, in fact, this is one aspect of the preparedness model that could also be improved. The interviews mentioned above, including one with Katherine Burke, indicate that the college is fairly well prepared to communicate with students during crisis, but not prepared for any form of long-term communication regarding preparedness for crisis.

Indeed, the vast majority of information disseminated to students comes in the form of information purveyed on Dartmouth's "Emergency Preparedness Website"³⁸ where the information and resources are limited. The College provides a general mission statement committing the College "to ensuring that its students, faculty, staff and administration live, learn and work in a secure environment." The website further says, "The College continually reviews its emergency management procedures. This involves refining processes designed to deal with various types of emergencies, and monitoring developing events and issues in a rapidly changing environment." It is significant to note that the very language of the college's emergency preparedness statement at this point suggests that students are not counted as an asset during a crisis, but instead a responsibility.

To wit, the webpage then describes the DartAlert system, Dartmouth Daily Updates (D2U), the Outdoor Mass Notification System, and "this website" as how Dartmouth intends to communicate with "you," i.e., the student. DartAlert is described as being part of a "campus-wide communications plan." The website further states that "The College has selected the services of an outside company which has the capacity to deliver time-sensitive emergency notifications through a variety of communications devices to the entire Dartmouth student, faculty and staff population in the event of an emergency," at which point DartAlert will send notifications with details and instructions to all registered cell phones, Dartmouth-administered telephones and email accounts. Similar in function and operation, Dartmouth Daily Updates is a campus-wide email notification system that will reach out to all faculty, students, and staff with details regarding the emergency in the event of one on campus.

The website's section entitled, "What you can do," lays out what Dartmouth expects its student and faculty population to do to prepare for and react to a crisis:

- Review information regarding common hazards for Hanover and Dartmouth.
- Review the Department of Safety and Security safety tips.
- Remain calm and go about your normal activities.
- Be alert to suspicious activity.
- Be alert for news and instructions.
- Pay special attention to physical security (do not prop doors open; lock doors that have access to sensitive areas such as residence halls, laboratories, computer equipment, etc.).
- Make it a practice to communicate with friends and family about your



daily schedule and plans.

- Review suggestions from other organizations listed to the right.³⁹

These recommendations suggest that there is opportunity to strengthen preparedness at Dartmouth at the bottom-up level. To make a judgment on its top level preparedness is far more difficult given the limited amount of public information, that said, the interviews referenced earlier and others with key players at Dartmouth suggest that whatever readiness each individual owns is due to experience gained on the ground or experience at another university. In particular, Dean Johnson and Assistant Dean Burke owned that they felt prepared for a crisis, but that their preparedness was the result of years of experience not training received at Dartmouth. They further indicated that from an administrative perspective student leadership roles in a crisis were yet unclear and had not garnered much thought.^{40,41}

Finally, Dartmouth has a hyperlink on this website to a document, described as a resource, entitled “Dartmouth College Emergency Procedures,” prepared by Environmental Health and Safety. This document is divided into eight sections: medical emergencies, bomb threats, Shelter in Place/Safe Shelter, Suspicious Packages/Objects, Fire and Evacuation, Building Evacuation, Hostile Intruder/Active Shooter (which is the longest and most comprehensive section understandably so in an era post Columbine, Virginia Tech, and now Sandy Hook massacres), and Utility Failures and Natural Disasters. “Medical Emergencies” is the shortest section of the manual, even though as earlier research in this paper illustrated, IHEs are particularly vulnerable to pandemic flu and every year IHEs are to some degree at risk of one.

4. BEST PRACTICES AND POSSIBILITIES FOR DARTMOUTH’S FUTURE

4.1 Social Capital and Leadership During Crisis

As this paper has established, Dartmouth has a gap between the College’s Mission Statement and how it operates in an emergency. By failing to incorporate students in emergency planning, response, and recovery efforts Dartmouth loses a great opportunity to build community resilience and experience post growth post-crisis. In particular, this paper will further suggest that students are vital to the process on account of the “social capital” they possess.

Some writers and thinkers believe the concept of social capital dates as far back as Alexis de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill and there is still much debate currently on the idea’s conception and utility. The concept’s malleable definition has seemed to inspire its proliferation across disciplines, particularly among public policy debates.⁴² In an article, which surveys recent debates and research trends regarding the topic, Frane Adam and Borut Rončević argue that “one may approach practically any social entity or situation through the conceptual framework of social capital.”⁴³ James Coleman and Robert Putnam are, however, widely recognized as the two fathers of the second and third



traditions or iterations of the concept. For the purposes of this paper appropriate both Coleman and Putnam's definitions to discuss student roles in a crisis. Coleman wrote:

[Social] capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity, but a variety of different entities having two characteristics in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors – whether persons or corporate actions within the structure.⁴⁴

Coleman further elaborates to say social capital is an asset by which the individual or organization that is in possession of it can achieve “certain ends” that would not be “attainable in its absence.”⁴⁵ In their article Adam and Rončević connect the Putnam and Coleman definitions together and write, “drawing on Coleman’s account of the productive and achievement-enhancing nature of social capital, Putnam offers the following definition of social capital: ‘Social capital here refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions.’^{46,47}

In their students IHEs have a great source of social capital on account of students' influence over peers, knowledge of social networks not necessarily sanctioned by the college, and their simple ability to cooperate, which could and should be leveraged to build more resilient communities. Furthermore, the very act of utilizing student social capital by involving students in emergency planning and response may engender more civic engagement in a community and civic engagement in students thus building more resilient communities at institutions of higher education. Indeed, Putnam's research confirms a correlation between civic engagement and governmental effectiveness, which for the sake of this paper's argument can be substituted with the effectiveness of the governing body of administrators at IHEs.

Putnam examined the relationship between four variables and institutional performance during the 1980s in Italy: civic involvement during the 1900s, socio-economic development during the 1900s, civic involvement during the 1970s, and socio-economic development during the 1970s. He found that the “intensity of initiative and participation on the part of citizens at the beginning of the 20th century (civic involvement in the 1900s) to a great extent determine[d] the political effectiveness of regional governments during the 1980s.”⁴⁸ If Dartmouth (and other institutions of higher education) were to cultivate civic engagement in its students and faculty and thus increase social capital among its main constituents, the College's Administration and Emergency Response and Recovery Groups would be capable of achieving ends that would otherwise be impossible, in this case, a level of community resilience yet unseen at Dartmouth college.

4.2 Examples of Best Practices at Other Colleges and Universities:

How Dartmouth Can Utilize Student Social Capital for Emergency Preparedness



In recent years a number of other schools have developed institutionalized disaster education and research opportunities. Most notably, the University of New Orleans and The University of Colorado at Boulder have two very comprehensive programs. In 2001 at the University of New Orleans a conglomeration of faculty, staff, and graduate research assistants representing a wide spectrum of disciplines and interests founded the Center for Hazards Assessment, Response and Technology (UNO-CHART) now directed by Dr. Monica Teets Farris. At the present time, UNO-CHART engages in research that addresses “repetitive flooding, disaster mitigation planning, community resilience assessments, community continuity, resilience curriculum development etc.”⁴⁹ Hurricane Katrina, which was perhaps the worst natural disaster this nation has seen, gave birth to a wide study and interest in disaster preparedness, response, and mitigation, interest that in turn manifested itself in the establishment of UNO-CHART. Dr. Susan E. Krantz, Dean of the College of Liberal Arts at The University of Colorado at Boulder speaks about the center and says:

Education isn’t just linked to disaster preparedness and recovery. It’s the key element in it. Every person in every community needs to have a basic literacy on disaster from a personal plan to a large-scale regional recovery project. Institutions of higher education like the University of New Orleans are responsible for the research and problem-solving needed to create safe and resilient communities. At UNO[-CHART] we meet that responsibility by offering our students a curriculum in disaster resilience and by introducing them to applied research through [the center].⁵⁰

Dr. Krantz goes further to describe how the center collaborates with local communities to work towards disaster resilience and how it is this collaboration with diverse stakeholders that allows the center to create projects that address diverse issues. She particularly emphasized that the students are considered professionals once they receive their appointments at UNO-CHART and how they assist in developing best practices for reducing risks and help implement these practices to achieve “comprehensive community sustainability.”⁵¹

The two-pronged approach of the Center becomes particularly significant when one considers the importance of Dartmouth and Hanover i.e. the community at large’s partnership in preparation for and in moments of crisis. The second focus of UNO-CHART is a commitment to looking at the reverse, that is, the impacts of community—social, political, and economic—activity on the ecosystems of the surrounding community. Affiliates of the program, Shirly Laska, Robert Kates, and Craig Colten in their paper, “Three Years after Katrina: Lessons for Community Resilience,” write, “What sets resilience in human communities apart from biotic communities is the capacity to learn from past experiences and employ strategies to contend with future events.”⁵² UNO-CHART attempts and succeeds to model this educational approach to community and community resilience.



Dartmouth's geographic or rural isolation has always been a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it fosters a tight-knit community nearly impossible to replicate elsewhere and it in part supports the development of close and meaningful relationships between faculty and students. On the other hand, unlike a school like Stanford University with its proximity to Silicon Valley, entrepreneurial opportunities at Dartmouth fewer and harder to come by. A center engaging faculty, staff and community members on the issue of emergency preparedness and community resilience might cultivate or provide an outlet for entrepreneurial, think-tank like engagement at Dartmouth.

Another university with a noteworthy commitment to fostering community resilience and emergency awareness is the University of Colorado at Boulder. The university has hosted an "Annual Natural Hazards Research and Applications Workshop" since 1975 for 400 federal, state, and local emergency officials; representatives of nonprofit and humanitarian organizations; hazards researchers; disaster consultants; and "others dedicated to alleviating the impacts of disasters."⁵³ The university also includes student registration for those interested. At Dartmouth the development of a more comprehensive research program would be extremely beneficial, as would a summit hosting interested faculty, students, and staff members from the around the Ivy League and such a workshop would engage students on the topic of civic responsibility. Furthermore, this is an opportunity to enrich student faculty engagement.

Julia Griffin, Hanover's Town Manager, mentioned earlier in this paper, has been working in emergency preparedness and crisis leadership for over 17 years. She posits that there are generally two schools of thought regarding disaster preparedness. There is a constituency that believes that the best emergency preparedness plans are those that attempt to anticipate every detail and possible facet of a crisis. There is another constituency that believes that one cannot prepare for every crisis so the best approach to disaster preparedness is to prepare for the unexpected.

Griffin believes that a framework of a plan, articulated in a document, should serve as the backbone of an emergency preparedness and response plan, but that the relationships between and among key players are the component of preparedness that makes communities resilient. She cited the longstanding partnership between Hanover and Dartmouth College as a source of strength for our community. Hanover may not be able to anticipate every eventuality—though it does have a very strong emergency preparedness plan⁵⁴—but it can maintain the strong collaborative ties it has to this community.⁵⁵

Nicole Buck, also mentioned earlier in this paper, spoke to the difficulty in recent years in maintaining a continuity of knowledge with respect to emergency planning and response at upper administrative levels. The administrative turnover that occurred first when President Jim Yong Kim came and then when President Kim left disrupted the short-term response capabilities of the EPG.⁵⁶ Griffin's argument resonates. Her approach building an emergency preparedness plan on strong relationships can be extended to



maintaining a tradition or precedent of strong relationships. If there are bridges already build between networks of people, every new staff member and administrator only need step into the shoes that were left behind. Though administrative changeover has challenged such at model at Dartmouth, interviews with Buck suggest that her principles are indeed upheld at Dartmouth.

Griffin also highlighted Dartmouth's student body as one of Hanover's greatest assets and shared a proposal for DARTCORE, a group of student volunteers that would sign themselves up to be called upon in emergencies to assist the town of Hanover and the surrounding community.⁵⁷ Griffin cited "The United Way Day of Caring," a statewide event that United Way organizes, as an example of the spirit of volunteerism that she has witnessed on the Dartmouth campus. United Way, a non-profit committed to improving income, health, and education disparities in communities enlists local service agencies once a year for a Day of Caring. The agencies then prepare projects for the volunteers. The projects can be as simple as helping elderly residents in the area make repairs on their homes or gather firewood to stock a warehouse.⁵⁸

Each year Griffin said she sees upwards of 75 Dartmouth student volunteers, a number which accounts for half the number of volunteers total. This is an example of the sort of engagement Dartmouth can easily ask or require of its students. It's "amazing how generous Dartmouth students are with their time when they put their mind and body to it" Griffin said, frequently emphasizing the value of the simple "sweat equity" of the students.⁵⁹

Griffin explained that she envisioned DARTCORE as a core group of students that would sign up at the beginning of their Dartmouth careers or indeed at any point during their time at the College who identified themselves as individuals ready and wiling to be called on in the event of an emergency. Their tasks might include volunteering at a shelter-in-place unit, delivering food, or simply donating items and helping gather those necessary items for distribution. An emergency preparedness and response core structured in this way would eliminate the need for training. Volunteers would need neither any particular skill set nor knowledge prior to enlisting because with a team like DARTCORE student volunteers' spirit, able-bodied-ness, and agility of mind would become an asset.

Many high schools and certain colleges have established Community Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) in the past few decades. These teams, while initially developed to fill a need in communities that struggled to recover from major disasters or that suffered from a scarcity of first responders, now take on far more substantial and quotidian role in communities. CERT teams have been known to assist in everything from evacuations and traffic control to the promotion of community awareness of potential hazards and preparedness measures (Community Emergency Response Teams). While the college and university population is subject to fast turnover the implications and potential benefits in investing in such a team at Dartmouth could be far reaching. The feasibility of such a team is less clear than the feasibility of DARTCORE. That said,



Dartmouth's Emergency Medical Services⁶⁰ team (EMS) has enjoyed incredible success at Dartmouth, as has the entirely student run Ski Patrol group, which monitors Dartmouth's Skiway.

Dartmouth's current student director of EMS, Nicolas Valentini, spoke in an interview of the incredible willingness and excitement of Dartmouth students to receive and utilize emergency service training.⁶¹ There is nothing to suggest among the current student population that CERT training would be any less well received or impactful. Furthermore, engaging a small subset of the student body in such training would open many doors for the kinds of educational programming and awareness raising campaigns the college could conduct on the topic of disaster preparedness, community resilience, and indeed, as mentioned earlier, leadership and civic engagement. The group also lends itself as a programming resource throughout the year, during Freshman orientation most certainly, and around flu season and other periods during which risk to biological and natural hazards—like snow storms—is particularly high.

To date, Dartmouth College Health Promotion maintains a healthy number of student-run peer advisory groups⁶² namely, Drug and Alcohol Peer Advisors (DAPA), Eating Disorder Peer Advisors (EDPA), Sexual Abuse Peer Advisors (SAPA), and Sexperts (Sexual Health Peer Programming), which enjoy considerable success at Dartmouth and are extremely well versed in conducting programming and fund- and awareness-raising around their respective issues. If Dartmouth were to pilot Griffin's programs it would build a community that is strong in its relationships not its documented plans. DARTCORE or a CERT team would help further relationships among Hanover community members and members of Dartmouth College. These groups would also foster the spirit of civic engagement that is very much in line with the College's mission and, perhaps most importantly, teams like these could become crucial components of a strong emergency preparedness plan at Dartmouth.

Finally, the college has a vast population of untapped leaders at Dartmouth, most particularly, in its Undergraduate Advisors (UGAs), Student Council Representatives, Class Presidents, Student Body President and Vice President, as well as, the leaders of many other well-respected organizations on campus. In his interview Mike Wooten emphatically agreed that UGAs and Community Directors (CDs) are an underutilized resource at Dartmouth and should be given a larger role in Dartmouth preparedness planning.⁶³ While it is also true that the leadership of undergraduate organizations and the individuals holding positions change every four years, if not yearly, establishing a system of unified response procedures for student leaders—not unlike the one found in hospitals that lays out different protocol for different levels of emergency—would not be difficult.

The student head of Dartmouth EMS sits on the EPG, but it might also be worthwhile to consider having Dartmouth's Student Body President and Vice President sit on the group. While it is true that the EPG discusses highly sensitive information, so too does the Presidential Search Committee, and Dartmouth's Student Body President was



incorporated into that committee and was able to provide vital student interest input. Transformational leadership allows followers to become leaders themselves. We see extraordinary leadership in Dartmouth's Student Body daily from the cutting edge research being conducted by students, to students' internships in government, non-profits, and other sectors. It would be a natural step forward for Dartmouth to harness this potential for leadership at an even greater scale by including students in its emergency preparedness planning process.

The value of incorporating students in the emergency planning, education and awareness-raising processes, as well as the response protocol extends even further. As mentioned earlier, student involvement increases civic engagement and cultivates community resilience in the event of a crisis, but it also helps cultivate leadership qualities in students and capitalizes on their leadership potential and their social capital. Peers often have more influence with peers and indeed the value of peer-to-peer communication is being reified by an abundance of literature in the field of social media and communications.

In her paper on "Integrating Social Media into Emergency Management Planning" Kim Stephens discusses peer-to-peer communications and suggests by quoting Nathan Huebner of the CDC who says, "Social Media is obviously about more than how we reach out to the public and educate the public...It's about the public talking to us. It's also about the public talking to the public," that engaging the public facilitates public engagement as a whole.⁶⁴ The positive result of such a dialogue can be seen in the words of a Fox News Anchor that Stephens quotes. The anchor described reporting during a disaster and says, "When a storm hit the region, instead of staff making phone calls to sheriffs' offices in remote counties, the station received instant feedback about storm damage via Twitter from its viewers region-wide."⁶⁵

In this instance we see that engaging the public, particularly by using social media, can create a highly beneficial dialogic relationship.⁶⁶ Further, lest one leverage a concern regarding the spread of misinformation through social media and its potentially harmful effects, Jeannette Sutton, a sociologist at the University of Colorado at Boulder, has found that not only does social media have a self-corrective mechanism by which misinformants are identified, but it also brings together resources that create more resilient communities.^{67,68} Thus increased communication with a student body and among students themselves pre, during, and post crisis is certainly positive and if Administrations at IHEs were to place trust in their students such that they engaged with their students through social media as well as the many ways outlined above, IHEs would, as a result, have a curriculum of study and a student life culture that would further cultivate leadership qualities in students.

5. FURTHER IMPLICATIONS

Disaster response and recovery have several different layers. There are environmental impacts, health impacts, issues concerning public policy, and issues of social justice and



community. Dartmouth has struggled in recent years, as many other institutions have, with binge drinking, sexual violence, and hazing. Indeed, by many standards the campus is experiencing a health crisis currently. That said, perhaps the most profound implication of engaging Dartmouth's student body in emergency preparedness planning and response is the potential for the sense of citizenship resulting from such work to help change the culture at Dartmouth that seems to promote violence and unhealthy, irresponsible drinking behavior.

Adjusting emergency preparedness planning at Dartmouth and other Institutions of Higher Education (IHEs) to more comprehensively incorporate students has implications beyond community resilience. Research has shown that violence prevention interventions on college campuses that focus purely on individual actions⁶⁹ and the often—statistically—male role in assault remain stagnant in their level of effectiveness.^{70,71,72} In “Bystander Education: Bringing A Broader Community Perspective to Sexual Violence Prevention” Victoria Banyard, Elizabeth Plante, and Mary Moynihan review the existing literature on community change and suggest that the problem of sexual violence stems from problematic cultural norms embedded within communities. They therefore suggest that the issue of violence calls for community-focused solutions. They write, “The history of the rape crisis center movement and studies of its effectiveness underscore the importance of social change through community education at a primary prevention level as well as work at the secondary and tertiary ones to expand safety nets for victims.”⁷³ The trio cites two researchers, Koss and Harvey, who examining the effectiveness of rape crisis centers, wrote, “whatever qualities may distinguish these programs from one another, none is ‘separatist’ in its orientation to social and community change. Instead, each is a leader and a participant in community affairs, able to catalyze change in other settings.”⁷⁴

Violence prevention and awareness-raising work is not dissimilar from disaster preparedness and response work. Both attempt to prepare for the unexpected and cultivate a sense of imperativeness around an issue that is made problematic by community norms of complacency. In modeling its emergency and disaster preparedness plans in accordance with its mission statement and in a way that will build on and up a resilient community, Dartmouth would also encourage its students to learn active citizenship and responsibility, which might in turn change some of the behaviors prevalent on the Dartmouth campus that advance dangerous drinking, sexual behavior, and problematic interpersonal relationships between those of different racial, religious, ethnic and socio-economic backgrounds.

Finally, the question of ethics seems to continually re-emerge in discussions of emergency preparedness. Mike Wooten is often heard to say that his department is committed to creating a community that is composed of “a network of caregivers” and that is “radically hospitable.”⁷⁵ He also suggests that in a post Sandy Hook, post Columbine era it is necessary that all members of a community be proactive about learning about safety procedures. If Dartmouth were to follow the community resilience



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The Center for Public Policy and the Social Sciences

model outlined in this paper and to acknowledge that every person has the potential to be a leader, not only would such action uphold its Mission Statement, but it would also be proactive on the part of the College itself.



APPENDICES

Appendix A: Additional Sources

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Appendix B: Initial Protocol for Emergencies, January 2010

Initial Protocol for Emergencies

Notification

1. Members of the Emergency Response Group (ERG) and Emergency Operations Group (EOG) will convene based on one of three scenarios:
 - A Dartalert message is received;
 - A phone call is received from the President's office, Senior Officer in Charge or Dean in Charge, asking them to convene; or
 - Catastrophic events occur that would cause a reasonable person to head to the emergency response room (example: the terrorist events of 9/11/01).
2. ERG and EOG members should convene when it is safe to do so (for example, if there is a shelter in place, people should not put themselves in danger). If it is not safe to travel to the Emergency Operations Center (see #4), members should follow the instruction for a conference call. The conference call will be set up by the Dean-in-Charge.
3. Before people join the response group, they should let their staffs know whether to implement their departmental emergency plans.
4. Until further notice, ERG members should convene in [REDACTED] (EOG members should be next door in 304). If [REDACTED] is off-line, then the Dartalert system will notify them to convene in the [REDACTED] Conference Room at [REDACTED] Street.

Steps once in the room


5. The first person in the room is the Incident Commander until one of the designated Incident Commanders arrives (in this order: Sylvia Spears, Interim Dean of the College; Carol Folt, Interim Provost and Dean of the Faculty; and Steve Kadish, Senior Vice-President and Strategic Advisor).
6. The communications staff (David Bucciero or his designee) will have set up the Emergency Operations Center.
7. Communication should be established with the person on-site. For example:
 - In the case of a campus violence incident, the Safety and Security Officer on site.
 - If a student is at the hospital for a life-threatening illness, the doctor or dean at the hospital.
8. Available information should be shared with the group.
9. Updates should be put on the whiteboard so that people who join late can be up to speed immediately.
10. The appropriate situational protocol should be employed. (See following)

January 2010



Appendix C: Dartmouth College Incident Command System Outline

Dartmouth College ICS Organization





Appendix D: Memorandum of Understanding, December 2010

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN UPPER VALLEY
PUBLIC HEALTH REGION AND DARTMOUTH COLLEGE

2010

WHEREAS the Upper Valley Public Health Network consists of the following towns: Canaan, Cornish, Dorchester, Enfield, Hanover, Grafton, Grantham, Lebanon, Lyme, Orange, Orford, Piermont, and Plainfield;

WHEREAS the risk exists for a public health emergency both Natural and Man Made, in the Upper Valley;

WHEREAS it is recognized a public health event affecting a large proportion of the regional population has the capacity to outstrip available health resources and necessitate the activation of the community medical surge system;

WHEREAS it is recognized that under a Commissioner of Public Health declared Public Health Incident or a Governor declared State of Emergency the Acute Care Center (ACC) is designed to be the in-patient facility established to provide medical care, and a Point of Distribution (POD) is designed to be a central location where inoculations or the distribution of medications are accomplished.

THEREFORE it is the policy and resolve of the Upper Valley Public Health Network to plan for the implementation of an ACC and or POD at the Leverone Field House to; provide limited care to patients that would normally require admission to an acute care hospital or provide inoculations or medications to the public.

IT IS AGREED that in the event of a public health emergency, Leverone Field House will be made available by Dartmouth College to the Upper Valley Public Health Network for the implementation of an Acute Care Center (ACC) and or Point of distribution site (POD).

Dartmouth College agrees to allow site visits at the appropriate and mutually agreeable times by members of the Upper Valley Public Health Network, local law enforcement, and State Officials for the development and maintenance of ACC and POD plans for operations.

It is the responsibility of the Upper Valley Public Health Network to establish, maintain, disinfect and dismantle the operations of the ACC and or POD.

The Upper Valley Public Health Network will maintain accurate records of expenditures and personnel hours contributed by Dartmouth College in support of expanded medical capacity and or distribution of inoculations or medications for the region. Although there is no guarantee of reimbursement, in the event that reimbursement is made available as a result of a declared emergency to the region, Dartmouth College is eligible to receive a fair share of reimbursed expenses based on expenditures.

Termination: This Memorandum of Understanding may be terminated by either party with six months written notice to the other party.



**MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN UPPER VALLEY
PUBLIC HEALTH REGION AND DARTMOUTH COLLEGE**

2010

All notices and correspondence, which may be necessary or proper for either party, shall be addressed as follows:

TO: Lebanon Fire Department
12 S. Park St
Lebanon, NH 03766

Attention: Upper Valley Public Health Network
Chris Christopoulos, Jr.
(603) 448-8810


TO FACILITY: Dartmouth College
Hanover, NH 03755

Attention:

Approved on this 10 day of December, 2010.


Michael B. Blayney, Ph.D
Director
Environmental Health and Safety
Dartmouth College
37 Dewey Field Road, Suite 6216
Hanover, N.H. 03755

FOR Dartmouth College:


Signature _____ Printed Name _____

12.15.10
Date _____ Title _____

For Upper Valley All Health Hazard Region


Signature _____ Printed Name _____

12-10-2010
Date _____ Title _____
Fire Chief - POC



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