The Political Legacy of American Slavery*

Avidit Acharya†, Matthew Blackwell‡, and Maya Sen§

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Abstract

We show that contemporary differences in political attitudes across counties in the American South in part trace their origins to slavery's prevalence more than 150 years ago. Whites who currently live in Southern counties that had high shares of slaves in 1860 are more likely to identify as a Republican, oppose affirmative action, and express racial resentment and colder feelings toward blacks. These results cannot be explained by existing theories, including the theory of contemporary racial threat. To explain these results, we offer evidence for a new theory involving the historical persistence of racial attitudes. We argue that, following the Civil War, Southern whites faced political and economic incentives to reinforce existing racist norms and institutions to maintain control over the newly free African-American population. This amplified local differences in racially conservative political attitudes, which in turn have been passed down locally across generations. Our results challenge the interpretation of a vast literature on racial attitudes in the American South.

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†Assistant Professor, Stanford University. email: avidit@stanford.edu, web: http://stanford.edu/~avidit

‡Assistant Professor, Harvard University. email: matt_blackwell@harvard.edu, web: http://www.mattblackwell.org

§Assistant Professor, Harvard University. email: maya_sen@hks.harvard.edu, web: http://scholar.harvard.edu/msen

1 Introduction

For the first 250 years of American history, white landowners, predominantly from the South, enslaved millions of individuals of African descent. This "peculiar institution," as it was sometimes called, defined the social, economic, and political landscape of the American South throughout this period. Slavery was so crucial to the South that one Georgia newspaper editor wrote, "negro slavery is the South, and the South is negro slavery" (cited in Faust, 1988). Yet, despite slavery's prominence in shaping American history, and despite volumes written by historians on its consequences, political scientists have largely overlooked how American slavery and the events following its abolition could continue to influence its *contemporary* politics. Given recent findings on the long-term consequences of past events and institutions (Dell, 2010; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Acemoglu, García-Jimeno, and Robinson, 2012; Voigtländer and Voth, 2012; Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn, 2013), it would be surprising if such a fundamental aspect of American history had no persistent impact on American politics.

In this paper, we show that the local prevalence of slavery—an institution that was abolished 150 years ago—has an effect on present-day political attitudes in the American South. Drawing on a sample of more than 36,000 Southern whites and historical census records, we show that whites who currently live in counties that had high concentrations of slaves in 1860 are on average more conservative and express colder feelings toward African-Americans than whites who live elsewhere in the South. That is, the larger the number of slaves per capita in his or her county of residence in 1860, the greater the probability that a white Southerner today will identify as a Republican, oppose affirmative action, and express positions that indicate of some level of "racial resentment." We show that these differences are robust to accounting for a variety of factors, including geography and mid-19th century economic conditions and politics. These results also strengthen when we instrument for the prevalence of slavery using geographic variation in cotton growing conditions.

To explain our results, we present a new theory of how coercive institutions and their removal can produce shifts in attitudes that persist for generations. We argue that emancipation was a cataclysmic event that undermined Southern whites' political and economic power. As suggested by Key (1949) and Du Bois (1935), the sudden enfranchisement of blacks was politically threatening to whites, who for centuries had enjoyed exclusive political power. In addition, emancipation undermined whites' economic power by abruptly increasing black wages, raising labor costs, and threatening

the viability of the Southern economy (Du Bois, 1935; Alston and Ferrie, 1993). Taken in tandem with massive preexisting racial hostility throughout the South, these political and economic changes gave Southern white elites an incentive to further promote existing anti-black sentiment in their local communities by encouraging violence towards blacks and racist attitudes and policies (Roithmayr, 2010). This amplified the differences in white racial hostility between former slaveholding areas and nonslaveholding areas, and intensified racially conservative political attitudes that have been passed down locally, one generation to the next. We provide empirical support for this theory by showing that areas of the South that were the earliest to eliminate the political and economic incentives for anti-black violence—for example, by adopting new technologies such as tractors that reduced the demand for black farm labor—are also the areas in which slavery's long term effects have most attenuated. Furthermore, as evidence for cultural transmission being an important pathway for the intergenerational transfer of attitudes, we show that slavery's effects attenuate significantly for immigrants and children of immigrants, who have recently settled in the American South. Our theory therefore emphasizes the importance of particular events following the abolition of slavery and occurring throughout the 20th century in transmitting the impact of slavery across time.

We also consider several alternative explanations for our results and find each to be inconsistent with the empirical evidence. For example, given the correlation between slavery in 1860 and contemporary shares of the black population, we consider the possibility that white racial attitudes vary with contemporaneous black populations—the central finding of the literature on racial threat (Key, 1949; Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958). However, when we estimate the direct effect of slavery on contemporary attitudes, we find that contemporary shares of the black population explain little of slavery's effects. In addition, we also test various other explanations, including the possibility that slavery's effects are driven exclusively by post-Civil War population shifts or persistent inequality between African-Americans and whites. We find no evidence that these, and other factors considered in the Supplemental Information, can fully account for our results.

The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we motivate our hypothesis that the historical prevalence of slavery continues to affect white contemporary political attitudes. We discuss our data in Section 3 and present our core results linking the prevalence of slavery in 1860 and contemporary attitudes in Section 4, with additional robustness checks presented in the Supplemental Information. In Section 5, we provide evidence in favor of our theory of historical persistence, paying close attention to postbellum po-



Figure 1: Estimated proportion slave in 1860 by county.

litical and economic incentives. In Section 6, we consider and provide evidence against several competing theories. Section 7 concludes by discussing the broader implications of our research for scholarship in American political behavior.

2 How Slavery May Affect Attitudes Today

We orient our analysis toward the Southern "Black Belt" (or the "Cotton Belt"), the hook-shaped swath of land that was the primary locus of antebellum slavery (Figure 1). Scholars have noted that the whites of the Black Belt were particularly prominent in Southern politics and are more conservative than whites elsewhere in the South. As V.O. Key wrote, it is "the whites of the black belts who have the deepest and most immediate concern about the maintenance of white supremacy," and "if the politics of the South revolves around any single theme, it is that of the role of the black belts" (Key, 1949). Furthermore, these parts of the South have had an enormous influence on national politics. Members of Congress from these areas held influential positions, effectively exercising veto power during the development of the welfare state in the 1920s and 30s (Katznelson, Geiger, and Kryder, 1993). Given these facts, our motivating question is: Why are whites who currently live in the Black Belt more conservatives than whites living elsewhere in the South? We consider three broad classes of explanations: (1) historical persistence of attitudes due to slavery, (2) demographic persistence, and (3) population mobility. These possible explanations drive our analyses in later sections.

2.1 Historical Persistence of Political Attitudes Due to Slavery

Our first hypothesis is that slavery and its aftermath caused a divergence in local white attitudes in the past, and that these beliefs were then passed down over time, through both institutional and cultural factors. Such a narrative requires explaining both (1) when and how slavery changed attitudes historically and (2) how these attitudes were passed down. We consider various mechanisms that speak to these questions.

When and how would these differences have emerged? Though it is difficult to date the beginning of the divergence using empirical data, we show in several of our analyses in Section 5.1 that there is strong evidence that the political and racial attitudes of the Black Belt began to diverge from other parts of the South around the time of emancipation and thereafter. There is no question that anti-black attitudes were rampant throughout the South before the Civil War (and many of these attitudes were even held by Northern abolitionists). However, even for counties that were politically similar and had similar treatment of local slave populations, the data show that differences became more pronounced in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and that these differences have persisted.

However, why would attitudes in the Black Belt persist after the Civil War, even as other regions of the country slowly changed their views on race? Our explanation of these postbellum differences lies in the fact that, after emancipation, Southern white elites faced two interrelated threats. The first was political. The abrupt enfranchisement of blacks threatened white control over local politics (Du Bois, 1935; Key, 1949; Kousser, 1974). This gave whites in former slaveholding counties an incentive to promote an environment of violence and intimidation against the new freedmen, with the purpose of disenfranchising them (Du Bois, 1935; Kousser, 1974). The second threat to white elites was economic. The emancipation of slaves after the Civil War was a major shock to the Southern economy: blacks now had to be paid (closer to) market wages (Higgs, 1977). Furthermore, emancipation brought blacks some freedom over the amount of labor they supplied, and ex-slaves, especially women and children, quite understandably chose to work for themselves rather than for the white ruling class (Ransom and Sutch, 2001). This both reduced the labor supply and increased labor costs sharply, threatening the Southern economy (Du Bois, 1935; Alston and Ferrie, 1993).[1] Whites therefore had an incentive to establish not just new forms of labor

[1] Some of these concerns were mitigated by the sharecropping system that became pervasive in the post-bellum period. Under this system, white landowners divided up large plantations into smaller farm units and rented these farms out to families for a fixed share of the crop. This aligned the incentives of the

coercion that could replace slavery but also new political restrictions that would help protect white hegemony. Since black populations were greatest in former slaveholding counties, it was in these counties that Southern elites exerted greater efforts toward repression (Kousser, 1974).

These repressive techniques are well documented in the economics and history literatures (Alston and Ferrie, 1993; Blackmon, 2008; Lichtenstein, 1996; Wiener, 1978). For example, Wiener (1978, p. 62) describes how "planters used [Ku Klux] Klan terror to keep blacks from leaving the plantation regions, to get them to work, and keep them at work, in the cotton field." Also well documented is the fact that poor whites were complicit with the landowning elite and would engage in and support violent acts towards blacks, even though such violence could presumably also lower white wages (Du Bois, 1935; Blackmon, 2008; Roithmayr, 2010). Such repression both required and supported social norms that put blacks in an inferior position to whites (Logan, 1954; Du Bois, 1935). This suppression and violence intensified racially hostile attitudes, which expanded across local white communities in a manner consistent with existing theories of the diffusion of political opinions from elites to the public (Zaller, 1992).[2] As evidence of this, we show in Section 5.2 that localized slavery predicts more lynchings and a weaker economic situation for blacks in the postbellum period.

How did these attitudes persist until today? We argue that they were passed down from one generation to the next through both cultural and institutional channels, for example via institutions such as Jim Crow or socially enforced segregation and racially motivated violence. The intergenerational transfer of such preferences and attitudes is consistent with theories of intergenerational socialization both in economics and cultural anthropology (Boyd and Richerson, 1988; Bisin and Verdier, 2000) and political science (Campbell et al., 1980; Jennings and Niemi, 1968).[3] We expect that such transmission would be imperfect so that there would be some decay in these geographically-based relationships over time. This leads to two empirical predictions: (1) the effect

planters and the laborers to some extent (Ransom and Sutch, 2001, p.88-89), but these arrangements did not reduce the incentives of planters to further bolster their position in the labor market.

[2] The political and economic incentives for racial violence and oppression is likely to have produced racially hostile attitudes among whites through psychological and other channels. For example, whites might have developed racially hostile attitudes to minimize the "cognitive dissonance" associated with racially-targeted violence towards blacks. Theories in social psychology, beginning with the work of Festinger (1962), would suggest that engaging in violence could produce hostile attitudes among members of the perpetrating group towards the victim group, if individuals from the perpetrating group seek to minimize such dissonance.

[3] In our theory, it is socio-political *attitudes*, rather than *partisanship*, that are passed down from parent to children. This makes our theory consistent with the partisan realignment that took place in the 1960s, given the assumption that partisanship depends at least in some part on attitudes.

should be seriously attenuated or non-existent for individuals whose ancestry is not local to their current residence, and (2) the effects of slavery should be weaker (that is, should have decayed more) in areas where the incentives for anti-black attitudes faded earlier. Below, we provide evidence for both predictions.

It is important to note that our argument is not that slaveholding communities were completely insulated, and that their beliefs were not passed down without modification. Rather, our argument is that we can still detect some part of the divergence that took place in the years around the Civil War and in the postbellum period, despite the multitude of other social and economic changes that occurred in the South. By emphasizing postbellum events, we are also not arguing that racial hostility did not exist before the Civil War. Instead, we argue that incentives that surfaced at the time of emancipation exacerbated the political differences between former slaveholding and non-slaveholding areas. Racially hostile attitudes, in other words, may have dissipated more quickly in areas that were non-slaveholding. Moreover, while it is not possible to definitively rule out the continuing influence of antebellum attitudes, we find tremendous evidence that postbellum events work exactly as our theory of political and labor suppression predicts—evidence that cannot be explained exclusively by antebellum racism.

We also note that this sort of historical persistence of attitudes is consistent with a growing literature demonstrating attitudinal persistence in other contexts (see Nunn, 2012, for an overview). For example, Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) show that Africans whose ancestors were historically targeted by the slave trade have higher levels of mistrust today than other Africans. Voigtländer and Voth (2012) find that anti-Semitic pogroms during the Black Death predict anti-Semitism and support for the Nazi party in the 20th century. Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013) show that areas of the world that adopted the plow in their agriculture in the distant past are areas in which attitudes towards women are less favorable today. The argument is also consistent with research demonstrating the persistent effects of similar institutions of labor coercion, such as Peru's *mita* system (Dell, 2010) and slavery in Colombian gold mines (Acemoglu, García-Jimeno, and Robinson, 2012).

2.2 Demographic and Economic Persistence

There are other explanations for the whites of the Black Belts being more conservative that are rooted in demographic and economic factors, rather than the historical persistence of attitudes. As Key (1949) suggested, one possibility is that the preva-

lence of slavery led to high concentrations of African-Americans still living in these parts of the South. These high concentrations of African-Americans today could in turn threaten white dominance in a contemporary context, resulting in whites contemporaneously adopting more conservative political beliefs. The literature supporting this idea of "racial threat" is voluminous.[4] For example, Glaser (1994) finds evidence linking high concentrations of blacks and negative white attitudes toward civil rights or African-American politicians. Giles and Buckner (1993) find a strong relationship between black concentrations and whites' support for racially conservative candidates such as David Duke (these findings are, however, challenged by Voss, 1996). However, this literature has not considered that slavery could be an *independent* predictor of contemporary attitudes and thus an omitted variable in studies of racial threat in the South.

Other aspects of the local contemporary context might also affect white attitudes. For example, a substantial literature addresses the fact that whites' attitudes are driven by education, income gaps between blacks and whites, urban-rural differences, and other contextual factors, and not simply high concentrations of minorities (e.g., Oliver and Mendelberg, 2000; Hopkins, 2010). Some work has even highlighted the connection between slavery and these contemporary factors. For example, O'Connell (2012) demonstrates that areas of the South that had high numbers of slaves have greater economic inequality between blacks and whites today. Similarly, Nunn (2008) finds a negative relationship between the prevalence of slavery and contemporary income in the South, and Mitchener and McLean (2003) find a negative relationship between slavery and modern-day labor productivity. While these papers suggest that slavery might affect contemporary attitudes indirectly through contemporary factors such as economic inequality and prosperity, we find in Section 6 that slavery has a *direct* effect on contemporary attitudes that does not work through these and other channels.

2.3 Mobility and Other Hypotheses

A final category of explanations behind how slavery might be related to current-day white attitudes centers on white mobility since the Civil War. For example, it could be that more racially conservative whites have migrated into former slaveholding areas, while racial liberals have left.

[4] Early studies showed, for example, that modern black concentrations predict white support for segregationist candidates such as George Wallace (e.g., Wright Jr., 1977; Black and Black, 1973), racially hostile white attitudes (Giles, 1977; Blalock, 1967), negative attitudes on school desegregation (Ogburn and Grigg, 1956), and higher incidence of lynchings (Reed, 1972).

We also consider the possibility that the link between slavery and contemporary white attitudes could be driven by the fact that former slaveholding areas are more rural today, or that former slaveholding areas were more likely to have incurred greater costs associated with the Civil War, making them more anti-federal government. We find very limited empirical support for these alternative hypotheses. Therefore, although much of the literature focuses on contemporary or individual-level factors in explaining political beliefs, our evidence is in favor of the cultural and institutional persistence of historical, rather than contemporary, forces.

Finally, it is worth noting that our primary goal in this paper is to establish the effect of slavery in 1860 on attitudes today. The existence of events, patterns, or interventions occurring between 1860 and today that might have amplified or attenuated this effect does not necessarily invalidate or contradict an effect of slavery. In addition, as we point out below, "controlling for" post-treatment (post-slavery in this case) variables and showing a weakened effect of slavery induces potentially severe bias in an overall effect estimate (Rosenbaum, 1984). It may be the case that certain historical events and trends (urbanization, the Great Migration, the Civil Rights Movement) mediate the effect of slavery in various ways, and we discuss several of these intervening factors in our discussion of mechanisms. However, these intervening events do not confound or undermine the effect of slavery, and indeed several of them may be consequences of slavery themselves.[5]

3 Data

Our main explanatory variable and proxy for slavery's prevalence is the proportion of each county's 1860 population that was enslaved, as measured by the 1860 U.S. Census. Although counts of enslaved people were taken before 1860, we use measures from 1860 because they represent the last record before chattel slavery was abolished in 1865. In addition, white planters were very mobile in the antebellum period, during which slaves, which were mobile, were their main source of wealth; after emancipation, mobility decreased rapidly as white elites became increasingly oriented toward landowning (Wright, 1986, p. 34). If any local legacy exists, we would expect to see it in data from 1860. Overall, we have in our data approximately four million enslaved people, constituting 32% of the Southern population. Since county boundaries have shifted

[5] An interesting and fruitful research agenda, beyond the scope of this paper, would be to investigate how these patterns might affect the transmission of beliefs over time.

since 1860, we rely on the work of O'Connell (2012), who has mapped the 1860 Census boundaries onto modern-day boundaries and provides slave proportion by modern county. Figure 1 depicts the data.[6]

3.1 Outcome Variables

We analyze three county-level outcome measures, all of which come from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), a large survey of American adults (Ansolabehere, 2010). We pool CCES data from the 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011 surveys to create a combined data set of over 157,000 respondents. We subset these data to the former Confederate States[7] and to self-identified whites, leaving us with more than 36,000 respondents across 1,224 of the 1,324 Southern counties. In addition, we also investigate one individual-level outcome from waves of the American National Election Survey (ANES) from 1984 until 1998, a time period where the ANES both used a consistent sampling frame and included county-level identifiers for respondents. After again restricting the sample to Southern whites, we have an ANES sample of 2,895 individuals across 56 counties in the South. This makes the ANES more restricted in its geographic coverage, but it contains valuable direct questions on the subjective evaluation of racial groups.

The four outcome measures are as follows.

Partisanship. This is the proportion of whites in each county who identified as Democrats. Such partisan identification could reflect not only explicit racial attitudes, but may also reflect race-related beliefs on a variety of policy issues, including redistribution, education, crime, etc. We construct this measure from a standard seven-point party identification question on the CCES. We operationalize the party variable as whether an individual identified at all with the Democratic Party (1 if Democrat; 0 otherwise).[8]

[6] Admittedly, our measure takes slave institutions as homogeneous when they were hardly so. Slaves in the Black Belt mostly worked on cotton farms, while coastal plantations focused on tobacco, rice, indigo and other crops.

[7] This includes AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, TX, VA, and WV. Kentucky was officially neutral during the Civil War, but contained significant pro-Confederacy factions and was claimed by the Confederacy.

[8] We use survey data as opposed to voter registration data because primaries in many Southern states are open. Coupled with the dramatic changes in partisanship in the South over the last 40 years, this means voter registration data are unreliable measures of current partisan leanings. Finally, survey data allows us to focus on the partisanship of whites voters only.



Figure 2: Bivariate relationships between proportion slave in 1860 and the four outcome measures with a linear fit in red. All four relationships are significant at $p < 0.05$ significance levels. Size of the points are in proportion to their within-county sample size (weighted by sampling weights).

Support for affirmative action. This is the proportion of whites who say that they support affirmative action, a policy seen by many as helping minorities, possibly at the expense of whites. All of the CCES surveys ask respondents whether they support or oppose affirmative action policies, which are described as "programs [that] give preference to racial minorities and to women in employment and college admissions in order to correct for discrimination" (2008 CCES). Although the question wording differs across years, we have no reason to believe that these wording variations affect our analysis. We construct the outcome variable by using the four-point scale, from "strongly support" to "strongly oppose." The final variable is an indicator representing whether the respondent demonstrated any level of support for affirmative action (1 for support; 0 otherwise).

Racial resentment. This is the proportion of whites who express "racial resentment" (or symbolic racism). As explained by Kinder and Sears (1981), racial resentment "represents a form of resistance to change in the racial status quo based on moral feelings that blacks violate such traditional American values as individualism and self-reliance, the work ethic, obedience, and discipline." We construct a measure of racial resentment using the two CCES questions on racial resentment. The first question, asked in the 2010 and 2011 CCES surveys, asks respondents on a five-point scale whether they agree with the following statement: "The Irish, Italian, Jews and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same." The second question, asked in 2010, asks respondents, also on a five-point scale, whether they agree

that "Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class." For the 2010 CCES, when both questions were asked, we rescaled both questions and averaged them to create one measure.

White-black thermometer difference. In many years, the ANES contains "feeling thermometer" questions, which ask respondents to evaluate their feelings about various candidates, politicians, and groups on a scale from 0 to 100. For most years, the ANES asked respondents to rate racial groups, such as whites and blacks. As a measure of relative racial hostility, we take the difference between white respondents' feeling thermometer ratings toward whites and their feeling thermometer ratings towards blacks. Thus, a positive difference would indicate that respondents have warmer feelings towards whites as opposed to blacks. Only using black thermometer scores yields similar results, but we use the difference in case slavery has an overall effect on racial group thermometer ratings.

Appendix Tables A.3 and A.4 report summary statistics for these and other data. Figure 2 depicts the bivariate relationships between proportion slave in 1860 and the four outcome measures from the CCES and ANES. It shows negative, statistically significant relationships between slave prevalence and proportion Democrat and support for affirmative action and positive, statistically significant relationships with racial resentment and thermometer score differences. These relationships are correlations; we now turn to estimating the causal effects of slave prevalence on these outcome measures.

4 Slavery's Effects on Contemporary Outcomes

In Table 1, we report the baseline estimates of slavery's effect on the three CCES outcomes conditional on various controls. Since we measure slavery at the county-level, we use within-county averages of our outcome measures, weighted by the CCES sampling weights. All regressions moving forward are weighted least squares (WLS) with the within-county sample size (appropriately weighted by the sampling weights) as weights, unless otherwise indicated.

In all but our first model, we include state-level fixed effects to address the possibility that states adopted different policies that could have influenced slave shares in 1860 and could affect our outcome variables in ways unrelated to slavery. In addition,

Table 1: Effects of slavery on white political attitudes.

	Prop. Democrat		Affirm. Action	Racial Resent.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Prop. Slave, 1860	-0.187^{**}	-0.131^{**}	-0.137^{**}	0.526^{**}
	(0.024)	(0.046)	(0.039)	(0.154)
State Fixed Effects		✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates		✓	✓	✓
N	1,214	769	769	694
R^2	0.046	0.178	0.125	0.138

Notes: $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$. All models are WLS, with within-county sample size as weights. Standard errors in parentheses.

we control for factors that may have been predictive of proportion slave in 1860. These "1860 covariates," unless otherwise noted, come from the 1860 U.S. Census, and address possible differences between slaveholding and non-slaveholding counties. First, because wealthier or more populous counties may have had more or fewer slaves, we control for economic and demographic indicators from 1860. These include (i) the log of the total county population, (ii) the percent of farms in the county smaller than 50 acres, (iii) the inequality of farmland holdings as measured by the Gini coefficient for landownership (Nunn, 2008), and (iv) the log of total farm value per capita in the county. Second, because counties may have had different norms about slavery, we include controls for (v) the proportion of total population in 1860 that is free black. We also include a proxy for pro-slavery sentiment just before 1860, which is (vi) the proportion of the county voting Democrat in the 1856 election.[9] We also control for characteristics related to trade and commerce, including separate indicators for whether the county had access to (vii) rails and (viii) waterways. Finally, to account for any remaining spatial variation, we control for (ix) the log of the county acreage, (x) the ruggedness of the county terrain (Hornbeck and Naidu, 2014), and (xi) the latitude and longitude of the county, as well as their squared terms (to flexibly control for spatial variation in the outcome).

Column (1) of Table 1 presents the simple WLS relationship between slavery and white partisan identification. Columns (2) - (4) further include state-level fixed effects as well as the 1860 covariates described above. The conditional effects of slavery are

[9] The Democratic Party was the pro-slavery party during this time period. Replacing the 1856 election with other antebellum elections does not change the results.

Table 2: Instrumental variables estimates of the effect of slavery.

	Prop Slavery	Prop Democrat	Affirm. Action	Racial Resentment
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Cotton Suitability	0.314**			
	(0.044)			
Prop. Slave, 1860		−0.472**	−0.230†	0.892†
		(0.162)	(0.126)	(0.524)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Florida Excluded	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	884	884	884	793
F Statistic	48.150**			
	(df = 20; 863)			
Model	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
	First Stage	Second Stage	Second Stage	Second Stage

Notes: †p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01. The instrument, cotton suitability, derived for intermediate input level and rain-fed water system. Column (1) is the first stage.

meaningful and significant for all three CCES outcome variables. A 20 percentage-point increase in the slave proportion (roughly a one standard-deviation change) is associated with a 2.6 percentage-point decrease in the share of whites who currently identify as Democrats (and so roughly a 5.2 percentage-point shift toward the Republicans), a 2.7 percentage-point decrease among those who currently support affirmative action, and a 0.11 point increase on the racial resentment scale. Each of these represent approximately a 0.16 standard deviation change in the outcomes.[10] Importantly, since we control for both the share of small farms in the county and the inequality in land holdings, it is unlikely that this is simply a "plantation" effect—that is, this is not simply due to areas with more slaves also having larger farms.

4.1 Instrumenting for Slavery with Cotton Suitability

There are two potential concerns with the above analysis. First, the 1860 slave data are historical and may be measured with error. Second, we may have inadequately controlled for all of the pre-treatment covariates that simultaneously affect slave proportion in 1860 and political attitudes today, which would result in omitted variable bias.

[10] Appendix Table A.5 presents respondent-level analyses with additional respondent-level controls and standard errors clustered at the county level point to the same conclusions. While these results may be contaminated by post-treatment bias, they are consistent with the county-level analyses.



Figure 3: Cotton suitability as evaluated by the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

To allay these and other concerns, we conduct a number of robustness checks, matching comparisons, and counterfactual analyses comparing the North and South. Many of these are reported in the Supplemental Information. Here, we present alternative specification that instruments for slave proportion in 1860 with county-level measures of the environmental suitability for growing cotton. We constructed these measures using data from the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).[11] Table 2 presents our instrumental variable (IV) estimates of the effects of proportion slave on the three outcome measures using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) model with state-fixed effects, log of the county size, ruggedness of the terrain, water access, latitude and longitude, and their squared terms included as controls in both stages. Column (1) presents the strong first-stage relationship between cotton suitability and proportion slave. Columns (2) - (4) present the second stage estimates of the effect of proportion slave on the outcome measures. The results show second-stage estimates that are stronger than our baseline estimates, reported in Table 1.[12]

For our IV approach to serve as a plausible identification strategy, cotton suitability must have an effect on contemporary attitudes exclusively through slavery, a strong assumption. Cotton suitability could, for example, determine how rural a county is

[11] These measures represent the maximum potential cotton yield based on soil, climate, and growing conditions. The estimates are based on climate averages from 1961 to 1990 and a "intermediate" level of inputs, which refers to the effort required to extract the resource. We omit suitability for other crops, such as tobacco, because they have no relationship with slavery conditional on cotton suitability.

[12] To strengthen the internal validity of our design and minimize the potential for confounding, we omit counties with zero cotton suitability from the analyses. We also exclude DE, MO, and MD from the non-South since these states had some slavery in 1860.

Table 3: Reduced form relationships between cotton suitability and white attitudes in South and Non-South.

	Prop. Democrat		Affirm. Action		Racial Resentment	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	South	Non-South	South	Non-South	South	Non-South
FAO Cotton Suitability	−0.135*	0.001	−0.066†	0.067†	0.248†	−0.067
	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.140)	(0.128)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	884	367	884	367	793	336
R^2	0.159	0.344	0.084	0.144	0.088	0.295

Note: †p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01. Included in the Non-South are the following states with some positive cotton suitability: AZ, CA, IA, IL, IN, KS, NE, NJ, NM, NY, OH, PA, UT.

today, which in turn could affect political attitudes. While the exclusion restriction is an untestable assumption, we assess its plausibility using a falsification test motivated by Nunn and Wantchekon (2011). We first estimate the reduced-form relationship between cotton suitability and contemporary beliefs both within and outside of the South—that is, mostly in the North. The legal absence of slavery in the North in this time period means that cotton suitability cannot affect political attitudes through slave prevalence. Any relationship between cotton suitability and political attitudes in the North would be a direct effect of cotton suitability on political attitudes. Figure 3 presents the suitability of growing cotton in various areas of the country; this map shows that several non-slave areas of the country were suitable for cotton, including parts of the midwest (IL, IN, IA, and NE) and southwest (CA, NM, AZ, and OK).

We present the results of this falsification test in Table 3. Columns (1), (3), and (5) present the reduced-form relationship between cotton suitability and the three outcome measures in the South, showing that the estimated effects are significant. On the other hand, columns (2), (4), and (6) show that there is no consistent relationship between cotton suitability and political attitudes outside the South. The relationship is only significant for affirmative action, but in this case the result in the opposite direction: higher cotton suitability leads to higher levels of support. If anything, such a positive relationship would bias our results in the conservative direction. As an additional test, we applied the same falsification test to a more historically complete source of data: presidential election returns (which we discuss in additional detail in Section 5.1). Drawing on county-level returns (Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale, 2006), we



Figure 4: Reduced-form coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for the effect of cotton suitability on the county Democratic vote-share in presidential elections in the South (red) and the non-South (black).

estimated the reduced-form relationships between cotton suitability and the percentage voting for the Democratic presidential candidate for both the South and the non-South in each presidential election from 1872 until 1972, separately. Figure 4 plots the coefficient and 95% confidence intervals for each of these reduced-form models and shows that there is a strong reduced-form relationship over time in the South (explored further below), but a fairly precisely estimated non-effect in the non-South for the time period between the end of the Civil War and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Thus, both historically and today, there is little evidence that cotton suitability has any effect on attitudes in the absence of the institution of slavery, making the exclusion restriction appear reasonable in this case and lending credibility to our causal estimates.

4.2 Difference in Thermometer Ratings for Whites versus Blacks

We also investigate the effect of slavery on the fourth outcome variable, the difference in ANES thermometer scores. These scores represent a more direct measure of views on racial groups, although the geographic coverage of this measure is, as we noted above, poor. Recall that this measure is the difference between an whites respondent's 0 to 100 "thermometer" rating of whites as a group and the same respondent's 0 to 100 "thermometer" rating of blacks as a group. Thus, a more racially hostile viewpoint would

Table 4: Effect of slavery on feeling thermometer scores.

	White Thermometer - Black Thermometer (-100 to 100)			
		OLS		IV
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Prop. Slave, 1860	27.194**	15.520**	30.157**	50.218**
	(9.143)	(5.968)	(11.166)	(18.055)
Clustered SEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
State/Year Fixed Effects		✓	✓	✓
Geographic Controls			✓	✓
1860 Covariates			✓	
N	1,658	1,658	1,117	1,240
R^2	0.032	0.136	0.176	0.138
First-stage t-statistic				33.96**

$^{\dagger}p < .1$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$. All analyses are at the individual level with standard errors clustered at the county level, weighted by ANES survey weights. Data from the ANES 1984-1998.

be a larger difference between these two responses. We apply the same models from the CCES outcomes for this outcome, except here at the individual-level with clustered standard errors at the county level.

Table 4 presents the results of this analysis and shows that, across all specifications (including IV), there is a significant and positive relationship between proportion slave and anti-black attitudes as measured by the difference in thermometer scores. A difference of 0.2 in proportion slave is associated with an increase of 6 points in the relative difference in how whites view whites versus how they view blacks on the feeling thermometer scale (roughly 0.26 standard deviations of the dependent variable). (The Supplemental Information replicates these analyses looking at thermometer scores for whites and blacks separately.) While this is a very small sample and the geographic coverage is limited, we arrive at qualitatively similar conclusions regarding the long-term impact of slavery on direct racial attitudes. Furthermore, these results may underestimate the true effects in light of possible social desirability bias.

5 An Explanation Rooted in Political and Economic Incentives

What explains the finding that slavery appears to have a long-lasting impact on contemporary attitudes? Our theory is that, although racism was prevalent in the prewar

period, slave and non-slave areas began to more seriously diverge *politically* around the time of the Civil War and, for the reasons we discuss below, in the key periods of Reconstruction and Redemption. The prevalence of slavery, coupled with the shock of its removal, created strong incentives for Southern whites to try to preserve both their political and economic power by promoting racially targeted violence, anti-black norms, and, to the extent legally possible, racist institutions.[13] This intensified racially hostile political attitudes, and these attitudes were passed on by elites to other members of the community, and then from parents to children, leading to a *historical persistence* of political attitudes.

In this section, we provide evidence for this theory by presenting evidence on (1) the burgeoning political importance of race in the postbellum period, (2) postbellum racial violence (including lynchings) and economic oppression, (3) the weakening of economic incentives for racial hostile attitudes that took place as a result of the movement toward agricultural mechanization in the 1930s, and (4) evidence for parent-to-child transmission of racial attitudes. We consider, and eliminate, several alternate explanations in Section 6, include the theory of racial threat.

5.1 Timing of Divergence and Importance of the Reconstruction Period

We suspect, based on our analyses, that emancipation and the demise of slavery intensified the political differences between former slaveholding and non-slaveholding counties. In results presented above, for example, our effects are robust to controlling for the antebellum presence of freed blacks in the county, which may be possible indicator of antebellum racial attitudes. They are also robust to the inclusion of a host of antebellum factors capturing economic and political differences. This raises a puzzle: when did differences between former slaveholding and non-slaveholding counties become politically salient?[14]

To further shed light on this question, we therefore examine the relationship between proportion slave in 1860 and a long-standing historical measure of political attitudes, presidential vote share. Until realignment in the middle of the 20th century, the

[13] The more general idea behind our theory is that when an entrenched social and economic institution like slavery is abruptly and forcibly abolished, previously powerful groups (ex-slave-owning white elite) seek to establish other local and informal institutions that serve a similar purpose to that of the previous, forcibly abolished formal institution (slavery) (Acemoglu, Cantoni, et al., 2011, e.g.,).

[14] Here, we note an excellent and extensive socio-historical literature (e.g., Foner, 2011; Jordan, 1968) concerning the development of American racism and the radicalized hierarchy. We do not engage the nuances of this longstanding scholarly discussion; rather, our purpose is to explore the emergence of *political differences* between former slave-holding and nonslaveholding counties.



Figure 5: Effect of proportion slave on vote for Democratic presidential candidate in the South over time. Each point is the effect of a 25 percentage-point increase in proportion slave from separate IV models of county-level Democratic share of the presidential vote on proportion slave. Results for Obama in 2008 are from White respondents in the CCES.

Democratic Party was the racially conservative party, while the Republican Party was the racially progressive party (Black and Black, 1987). Thus, if we see a difference from before the war period, this would suggest that a narrative rooted in antebellum differences would be persuasive; if we see differences emerge after, this would suggest that postbellum forces were critical in shaping political divergences in the South. Neither eliminates the fact that antebellum racism was prevalent (as noted by Du Bois, 1935, and many others), but the analysis does shed light on when political cleavages began to develop—that is, the timing of when racial attitudes and political attitudes became linked.

Accordingly, we examine the effect of slavery on county-level Democratic share of the presidential vote between 1844 and 1968, using the instrumental variables approach.[15] To analyze the time trend, we calculate the effect of a 25 percentage-point

[15] Since election outcomes are not disaggregated by voter race, these data also include black voters. Blacks voted in large numbers following emancipation but were systematically disenfranchised between

increase in 1860 slavery on the presidential vote in each year. Thus, each point in Figure 5 represents a (scaled) point estimate from a regression of county-level Democratic vote share on county proportion slave in 1860, using the same IV design as Table 2. As the figure shows, there is little *political* difference between slave and non-slave areas before the Civil War, with the exception of 1856 where, if anything, high slave areas are more likely to vote for the more moderate candidate on slavery, Millard Fillmore (compared to the relatively more pro-slavery Democratic Party). Thus, at least in terms of national party politics,[16] differences in white views appear to emerge primarily after the Civil War. This provides evidence against our findings being exclusively attributable to pre-existing antebellum differences.

Second, the differences that emerged after the end of Reconstruction are obvious. As the white elite begins to restrict the vote of African-Americans in the late 19th century, the effect of slavery becomes massive, reaching its peak around the time that most of the states have enacted poll taxes and literacy tests to almost fully disenfranchise blacks (Kousser, 1974). As the 20th century moved toward its midpoint, the effect of slavery weakens likely due in part to some small additions of African-Americans to the registered voter pool,[17] and also to the move of national Democratic candidates toward a platform of civil rights. Interestingly, the effect is more stable once we focus on candidates that represent the Southern political agenda, for example Strom Thurmond (1948) and George Wallace (1968).[18] And these two effects are roughly similar in magnitude, but in the opposite direction, to the effect of slavery on the Obama white vote in 2008, estimated from the CCES white respondents. Throughout, the difference in voting behavior between formerly large slaveholding counties and other counties is large and statistically significant. These findings also hold if we condition on 1860s covariates through WLS. Substantively, this means *that large and significant differences emerge in the postbellum period even among counties that were politically and economically similar in the antebellum period*. This points to emancipation, Reconstruction, and Redemption as being critically important.

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in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Large scale re-enfranchisement did not occur until the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which is why we stop the analysis of such vote shares at that time.

[16] We obtain similar results for congressional elections and using the WLS specification.

[17] The percentage of the Black Voting-Age Population expanded from 3% to 18% in Georgia, and from 0.8% to 13% in South Carolina (Mickey, 2015).

[18] Due to the enfranchisement of African-Americans after the passage of the Voting Rights Act, we use the total white voting-eligible population based on the 1960 U.S. Census as the denominator when calculating the George Wallace vote share.

Table 5: The effect of slavery and antebellum attitudes.

	Prop Democrat		Affirm. Action		Racial Resentment	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prop. Slave, 1860	-0.163^{*}	-0.131^{**}	$-0.104^{\dagger}$	-0.144^{**}	0.650^{**}	0.523^{**}
	(0.067)	(0.046)	(0.060)	(0.040)	(0.210)	(0.158)
Prop Slave 1830	0.041		-0.083		-0.010	
	(0.059)		(0.053)		(0.183)	
Avg. Residents per Slave Dwelling		-0.015^{**}		$-0.005^{\dagger}$		0.049^{**}
		(0.004)		(0.003)		(0.012)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	456	717	456	717	398	616
R^2	0.236	0.210	0.159	0.121	0.191	0.134

Note: $^{\dagger}p < .1$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$. All models are WLS with within-county sample size as weights. Average Residents per Slave Dwelling were calculated by diving the number of slaves on a farm, divided by the number of slave dwellings, and then average across farms in the same county.

We conduct two further analyses regarding the timing of these differences, both designed to assess whether the differences we find are due exclusively to antebellum differences. First, to test whether antebellum slavery has an effect on our outcome variables, we include proportion slave in 1830 as a control. The logic is as follows. If negative racial attitudes led whites to acquire slaves, then proportion slave in 1830 serves as a good proxy for areas where negative racial attitudes were most intense. That is, counties with more slaves in 1830 would have been those counties that had more racially hostile whites. Under the assumption that racial attitudes only affect slavery in 1860 through their effects on previous levels of slavery, this analysis effectively controls for differences in antebellum racism. These results, reported in in columns (1), (3), and (5) of Table 5, are largely consistent with our baseline models, albeit with greater uncertainty. The larger standard errors are consistent with the fact that the proportions of slaves in 1830 and in 1860 are highly correlated. The estimated effects for proportion Democrat and racial resentment increase, while the effect size for affirmative action decreases. By and large, though, these results are similar to the baseline results.

The second is to explore the local treatment of slaves as a proxy for attitudes about race. Comprehensive data on racial views are not available in the antebellum period, so we instead look for measures that might be consequences of such attitudes. In particular we use samples from the slave schedules of the 1860 U.S. Census to calculate the average occupant size of slave quarters on farms in a county (Menard et al., 2004). Across the South, the average slave quarters housed around five individuals, though

this number varied considerably across counties. Variation in the occupancy of such quarters may come from both variation in the size of slave families and also the propensity of farm owners to place multiple families in the same dwelling. Attitudes about race might affect both of these sources. First, there is some evidence that planters engaged in so-called "slave breeding," which entailed various ways of promoting and forcing high fertility rates among enslaved women (Sutch, 1975), though the extent of this practice is contested (Fogel and Engerman, 1995). Second, those planters with more extreme negative racial attitudes might provide less housing for their slaves, which would be measured as a higher occupancy in the average slave dwelling. Obviously there are other factors that affect this measure, but it may pick up some degree of planter cruelty or racial animus that is not captured by the density of slavery alone.

We add the the average number of occupants of slave quarters to our baseline specification in columns (2), (4), and (6) in Table 5. Here we see that both the economic institution of slavery, as measured by proportion slave, and the relative treatment of slaves, as measured by the dwelling size, have independent and significant effects on the attitudes of whites today. Despite the potential significant effect of slave dwelling size on the outcome variables, however, we still see a strong effect of proportion slave on attitudes as well, indicating that the localized prevalence of slavery continues to matter once we account for aspects of how slaves were treated. This analysis is consistent with separate analyses of white slave*holders*, included in the Supplemental Information.

To sum, even counties that were similar on those antebellum measures that we do have (e.g., share of the population freed slave, slave dwellings, the share of white slaveholders, economic and geographical indicators) differ in the postbellum period. Presidential vote shares also differ significantly in the postbellum period, again even among counties that were similar in the antebellum period. These facts taken together suggest some strong role in postbellum incentives driving some portion of the difference between former slaveholding and non-slaveholding areas. We therefore focus our argument to develop why the time around emancipation and Reconstruction was so important. However, we do note that the continuing influence of antebellum attitudes cannot definitively ruled out, and that racial hostility certainly did not emerge after emancipation. Our data suggests that emancipation may have been something like an exogenous shock that was felt more deeply in high slave areas, perhaps exacerbating existing differences and leading to attenuation in some areas but not others. In order to further explain our findings, however, we now turn to explaining how the political economy of the postbellum South could have reinforced political and attitudinal differences between high and low slave areas.

Table 6: Effect of slavery on postbellum violence and effect modification by mechanization.

	Lynchings	Prop Democrat	Affirm. Action	Racial Resentment
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Prop. Slave, 1860	21.058**	−0.203**	−0.221**	0.699**
	(6.651)	(0.056)	(0.048)	(0.187)
Tractors Change, 1930-1940		−0.433	−0.554*	1.599†
		(0.290)	(0.248)	(0.964)
Tractors, 1930		−0.133	−0.206	−0.132
		(0.189)	(0.162)	(0.631)
Prop Slave × Tractors Change		2.253*	2.200**	−6.399*
		(0.959)	(0.822)	(3.235)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	610	769	769	694
R^2	0.326	0.185	0.136	0.143
Specification	WLS-county area	WLS-sample size	WLS-sample size	WLS-sample size

Note: $^{\dagger}p < .1$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$. The first column is WLS with the total county area as weights (and where county area is omitted from the 1860 covariates, though this has no effect on our analysis). The remaining columns are WLS with within-county sample size as weights. Lynchings are black lynchings between 1882 and 1930 per 100,000 1920 residents (similar results hold using average population size between these dates). Tractors change is the change in tractors per 100,000 acres of land between 1930 and 1940. Tractors in 1930 is the number of tractors per 100,000 acres of land in 1930.

5.2 Lynchings and Other Forms of Suppression

We now turn to exploring the links between the immediate postbellum environment and the political environment today. A key component of our incentives-based explanation is that violence was used not only to disenfranchise blacks, but also to suppress their mobility and wages—a particularly strong incentive in the postwar, post-empancipation landscape. Given this explanation, we would expect to see greater racist violence in former slaveholding counties in this time period. While we do not have measures of all forms of violent racism in the post-Reconstruction era, we do have county-level measures of one extreme form of racial violence: lynchings (Beck and Tolnay, 2004).[19]

In column (1) of Table 6, we confirm the hypothesis that the number of black lynchings between 1882 and 1930 per 100,000 1920 residents is greater in counties that had high slave proportions in 1860, conditional on state-level fixed effects and our 1860 covariates. The relationship between slavery in 1860 and lynchings is strong and significant: a 10 percentage-point increase in slave proportion is associated with a 1.36

[19] These data include all states in our analysis except Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.

increase in lynchings per 100,000 residents.[20] This result is in line with our incentive-based theory: there is more racial violence in areas previously more reliant on slave labor. Furthermore, under our theory, black farmers should be worse off in former slave areas due to this greater local violence. Appendix Table A.15, drawing on data from the the 1925 Agricultural Census (Haines, 2010), shows that, in comparison to white farmers, black farmers in former high-slave areas were worse off than those in other areas of the South—more likely to be under tenancy agreements and less likely to own their own farm.

5.3 Mechanization of Southern Agriculture

Our explanation for the divergence in attitudes between different parts of the South relies on the fact that cotton was a labor-intensive crop, and that landowners used various tactics to gain an advantage in the labor market after the emancipation of slaves. Some of these tactics, including the convict leasing system and the racial violence to suppress black mobility, helped to fortify racial attitudes against any progress in race relations in the broader United States. A clear implication of this theory is that once the demand for farm labor drops due to exogenous technological development, the incentives for whites to interfere in the labor market lessen and thus the effects of slavery on attitudes should also diminish.

We test this hypothesis by showing that counties that mechanized earlier are those where the effects of slavery wane quicker. Following Hornbeck and Naidu (2014), we use the number of farming tractors as a proxy for mechanization.[21] We interact the proportion of slaves in 1860 with the change in the number of tractors per 100,000 acres of agricultural land in the county between 1930 and 1940, which we collect from the 1930 and 1940 Agricultural Censuses (Haines, 2010). We then estimate the effect of this interaction on our three outcome measures. To help identify the effects of this interaction, we additionally control for tractors in 1930 (See Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen, 2013, for the formal model that motivates this test.). As Table 6 shows, the effects of slavery are weaker for counties where mechanization grew between 1930

[20] In Appendix Table A.17, we show that there is suggestive evidence that there are more hate crimes against African-Americans more recently. These data are marred by the fact that reporting standards for hate crimes vary considerably and might be correlated with views on race.

[21] Tractors were an early form of mechanization for the cotton industry, intended to replace mule-drawn plows (Wiener, 1978). Full-blown mechanization of cotton production via the cotton picker would not become widespread until after 1940.

and 1940. Though we cannot read the direct effect of slavery off the regression coefficients in Table 6 due to post-treatment bias, we can use the sequential g-estimator described below in the context of racial threat to estimate the effect of slavery at various levels of mechanization. For example, where mechanization did not grow between 1930 and 1940, a 10 percentage-point increase in proportion slave leads to a 1.9 percentage-point drop in the percent of whites who identify as Democrat today (95% confidence interval: $[-2.8, -1.0]$). Where mechanization grew rapidly, with 0.07 more tractors per 100,000 acres (95th percentile), the same change in proportion slave leads to only a 0.34 percentage-point decrease in the percent Democrat (95% confidence interval: $[-1.2, 0.06]$).

We note two potential concerns with this test. First, the results could be consistent with a racial threat explanation—early mechanization led to decreases in the black population in these areas (as shown by Hornbeck and Naidu, 2014), thus diminishing racial threat. In Appendix Table A.14, however, we replicate the analysis using the declines in proportion black from 1920 to 1940 and 1970 and find that areas with larger declines have, if anything, larger effects associated with slavery. Thus, it seems unlikely that racial threat is driving the attenuating effects we see above. Second, it could be that more racially tolerant counties chose to mechanize early in order to rid themselves of the incentives for racial exploitation. However, as Table 6 shows, the number tractors is itself never independently predictive of political or racial attitudes and the change in mechanization has an insignificant effect for most values of proportion slave. Furthermore, as shown in Appendix Table A.16, there is no relationship between growth in tractors and either racial violence or inequality in wages between blacks and whites. This casts doubt that tractors are an indicator of racial attitudes. Moreover, as Hornbeck and Naidu (2014) argue, many of the counties that mechanized early were those affected by an exogenous shock, that of the Mississippi floods of 1927, and are thus *ex ante* similar to counties that mechanized later.

5.4 Intergenerational Transmission of Beliefs

Our last empirical analysis concerns how racial attitudes have been passed down over time. One possibility is that racial attitudes are shaped contemporaneously by local institutions, for example schools and churches, which have themselves persisted. Another possibility is that racial attitudes have been passed down from parents to children, independent of external institutions such as schools and churches. These mechanisms have different implications. For example, if intergenerational socialization (parent-to-

Table 7: Effects of slavery for those born after the Voting Rights Act and for immigrants.

	Democrat		Supports Affirm. Action		Racial Resentment	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Full Sample	Born After VRA	Full Sample	Born After VRA	Full Sample	Born After VRA
Prop. Slave, 1860	-0.688^{**}	-1.083^{**}	-0.856^{**}	-0.821^{*}	0.547^{**}	0.726^{*}
	(0.250)	(0.370)	(0.244)	(0.377)	(0.184)	(0.299)
1st/2nd Generation Immigrant	-0.057		0.024		0.201	
	(0.141)		(0.172)		(0.150)	
Prop. Slave × 1st/2nd Gen. Imm.	1.002^{*}		$1.035^{\dagger}$		-1.249^{*}	
	(0.479)		(0.554)		(0.547)	
State/Survey Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cluster-Robust SEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	24,477	6,938	24,435	6,922	10,200	2,450
Model	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	WLS	WLS
R^2					0.039	0.037

Note: $^{\dagger}p < .1$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$. All models at the individual-level with standard errors clustered on county and weighted by CCES survey weights.

child transmission) is in effect, then newcomers to the South should not meaningfully differ in their political attitudes across former slaveholding and non-slaveholding counties. The reason is because their ancestors did not live there and so could not transmit racially hostile attitudes across generations. On the other hand, if local institutions like schools and churches shape racial attitudes continuously through time, then we should expect those moving to former slaveholding counties to adopt similar attitudes as families living there for generations, because even the newcomers are exposed to many of the same institutions and environment as older families.

To adjudicate between these explanations, it would be ideal to compare the direction and magnitude of our effects for those whose families have been in the South for generations and those that have come more recently to the South. Unfortunately, the CCES provides very little data on the family histories of the respondents. We can, however, exploit one proxy for Southern lineage: immigration status. Those respondents whose families (or they themselves) come from outside the U.S. have shallower ties to the South. Thus, if our parent-to-child transmission mechanism is at work, we should expect to see the effect of slavery be much weaker among these respondents than among respondents whose families have been in the U.S. for generations. In Table 7, we interact our baseline results (at the individual level) with a binary variable for whether

the respondent (also white) is an immigrant themselves (first generation) or has immigrant parents (second generation). Across each of our outcomes, we find that the effect of slavery is far lower for these groups than for the general sample of white respondents.

One concern is that our findings regarding contemporary attitudes may be driven not by intergenerational transmission, but by the direct experiences and attitudes of older individuals in our CCES sample. That is, an effect only among older whites would suggest no or limited intergenerational transfer of attitudes but an exposure to the tail end of Jim Crow or segregation. To test this, we estimate the effect among a subgroup who were more likely to receive such attitudes only from their parents: whites born after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. To be sure, segregation and race-related oppression extended well past this time; however, both pieces of legislation have been acknowledged as influential in strongly reducing segregation in the South and increasing black enfranchisement (Rosenberg, 2008). In Table 7, we show the effect of slavery on these younger whites is just as strong and statistically significant as it is for older whites. In addition, in Appendix Table A.18, we provide additional evidence for intergenerational socialization by showing that the effect of slavery is stronger for those who have lived in their current city since they were younger than 18. Taken in tandem with our results on racial threat and income-based discrimination (in Section 6), which rule out that these results are driven exclusively by contemporary factors, these findings provide some evidence that the parent-to-child transmission mechanism is an important component of how slavery affects attitudes. As such, this evidence provides some support that political *culture*, rather than exclusively institutions, plays an important role in explaining the persistent effects of American slavery.

6 Alternative Explanations for Slavery's Effect

We now examine several alternative theories that could explain our findings. We consider three possible explanations: racial threat, geographic sorting, and contemporary income inequality between blacks and whites, which could lead to statistical discrimination. We examine two other explanations—Civil War destruction and rural/urban differences—in the Supplemental Information. We find limited support for these factors. Furthermore, these theories are generally incompatible with some of the evidence we present in Section 5 for what we believe is the more likely explanation concerning the long-term historical persistence of attitudes.

Table 8: Effects of slavery on white attitudes net the effect of the contemporary proportions of African-Americans

	Prop. Democrat		Affirm. Action		Racial Resentment	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prop. Slave, Direct Effect	-0.141^{**}	-0.135^{*}	-0.139^{**}	-0.131^{**}	0.535^{**}	0.518^{*}
	(0.045)	(0.061)	(0.039)	(0.048)	(0.154)	(0.219)
Prop. Black, 2000	0.197^{**}		0.043		-0.240	
	(0.050)		(0.044)		(0.169)	
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bootstrapped SEs		✓		✓		✓
N	769	769	769	769	663	663
R^2	0.194	0.177	0.126	0.106	0.117	0.111
Model	WLS	Seq. g-est.	WLS	Seq. g-est.	WLS	Seq. g-est.

Note: $^{\dagger}p < .1$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$. Columns (1), (3), and (5) simply include proportion black in the year 2000 as an additional control to the baseline specification from Table 1. Columns (2), (4), and (6) use sequential g-estimation of Vansteelandt (2009).

6.1 Racial Threat (Contemporary Black Concentrations)

A plausible explanation for our results is that slave prevalence affects contemporary political attitudes through its effect on contemporary black concentrations. The local prevalence of slavery has produced high concentrations of blacks in the modern-day Black Belt, which, according to the theory of racial threat, would cause whites' views to become more racially hostile. This is an observation that was made by Key (1949) and then developed by the expansive literature on racial threat. At first glance, the racial threat mechanism does provide a possible competing explanation: the correlation of percent slave in 1860 with percent black in 2000 is 0.77.

To address this issue, we check how much of our baseline results can be explained by contemporary black concentrations. We do so in two ways. First, we include the mediator (here, proportion black in 2000 as measured by the 2000 U.S. Census) as a covariate in the baseline specification, along with the treatment of interest (percent slave in 1860). This analysis is shown in Table 8, columns (1), (3), and (5). The coefficient on proportion slave in 1860 remains significant and actually strengthens, suggesting that its direct effect does not operate through proportion black in 2000.

These estimates, however, could suffer from post-treatment bias (Rosenbaum, 1984); after all, the modern geographic distribution of blacks is a direct consequence of the prevalence of slavery (Key, 1949). Including a mediator in a model can bias direct effect

estimates unless strong assumptions are satisfied that are unlikely to hold with respect to proportion slave (Petersen, Sinisi, and Laan, 2006). We address these concerns by using a method developed in biostatistics by Vansteelandt (2009). This method enables us to calculate the controlled direct effect of slavery, which is the effect of slavery on our outcomes if we were to fix the modern-day concentration of African-Americans at a particular level. To implement the method, we use a two-stage estimator, called the sequential g-estimator, that estimates controlled direct effects when we have a set of covariates that satisfy selection on the observables (or no unmeasured confounders) for the intermediate variable (Vansteelandt, 2009).[22] The exact procedure is as follows. We first estimate the effect of contemporary black concentration on white views today, controlling for all of our covariates including the additional covariates in footnote 22. We then transform the dependent variable by subtracting this effect. Finally, we estimate the effect of proportion slave on this transformed variable, which gives us the controlled direct effect of proportion slave in 1860. Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen (2015) gives an introduction to this approach geared toward political scientists and discusses how it relates to causal mechanisms.

Estimates from this analysis are reported in columns (2), (4), and (6) of Table 8.[23] Compared to the baseline estimates of Table 1 and the potentially biased estimates in columns (1), (3), and (5), these results demonstrate that contemporary percent black has little influence on slavery's effect on any of the outcomes. Indeed, the direct effects of slave proportion are similar to those in Table 1 and are still highly significant. Moreover, once we account for slavery in 1860, contemporary black concentrations appear to have the opposite effect that racial threat theory would predict for Southern white attitudes. Finally, with the full controls from the first stage of the sequential g-estimator, the effect of proportion black today is no longer significant (Appendix Table A.8). Thus, we see no evidence that slavery's effects operate via contemporary black concentrations.

6.2 Geographic Sorting

The next possibility is that population sorting explains our results. For example, racially hostile whites from other parts of the South (or elsewhere) may have migrated to former

[22] Drawing on the usual controls in the racial threat literature (see, for instance Giles and Buckner, 1993), the additional variables we include to satisfy the selection on observables assumption are log population in 2000, unemployment in 2000, percent of individuals with high school degrees in 1990, and log median income in 2000. These results assume no interaction between proportion slave and contemporary proportion black, but weakening this assumption does not change the findings.

[23] To account for the added uncertainty of the two-step nature of sequential g-estimation, we report bootstrapped standard errors.

slave counties during the last 150 years. Analogously, whites who hold more racially tolerant beliefs may have continually left former slaveholding areas. We address this sorting hypothesis in several ways.

Historical Migration Analysis. If geographic sorting is an important determinant of why and where people move, our interpretation of the results as reflecting the importance of the historical events following the Civil War might be overstated. To investigate this possibility, we look into patterns of migration in a five-year snapshot from 1935-1940, drawing on the public use micro-sample (PUMS) of the 1940 U.S. Census (Ruggles et al., 2010). This year of the census is unique in that it provides the county in which a person resided in 1935 and in 1939. Thus, we can identify migrants and their patterns of migration at the individual level. These data allow us to investigate if white migrants into or out of former slave areas were somehow distinct from other white migrants. If sorting plays an important role in our results, we would expect to see differences between migrants to/from high-slave areas versus low-slave areas. To test for differences among *out-migrants*, we adopted the following strategy: we ran a regression of various individual characteristics on out-migration status for white respondents, the proportion of slaves in the respondent's 1935 county of residence, and the interaction between the two. We also included the 1860 covariates and state fixed effects for the 1935 counties. The interaction in this regression measures the degree to which differences between out-migrants and those who didn't migrate varies as a function of proportion slave. For *in-migration*, we take a similar approach but replace the characteristics of the 1935 county of residence with the characteristics of the 1939 county of residence.

Figure 6 depicts the results from this analysis, and shows the differences between white migrants and non-migrants across a number of characteristics.[24] The figure depicts how these effects vary by proportion slave. For continuous outcomes, the effects are in terms of standard deviations; for binary outcomes, they are in terms of differences in proportions. With age, for example, this figure shows that both out-migrants and in-migrants are significantly younger compared to those who remained in their counties. However, the key point is that this pattern is the *same* for low and high-slave counties. Thus, migrants into or out of high-slave counties are not any younger than migrants from or to other counties.

[24] See the IPUMS documentation at `https://usa.ipums.org/` for a complete description of these census measures.



Figure 6: Characteristics of white out-migrants and in-migrants compared to white non-migrants for high-slave and low-slave counties, where migration took place between 1935 and 1940. In the left panel, each point is the estimated difference between non-migrants and out-migrants from high-slave areas (black dots) and between non-migrants and out-migrants from low-slave areas (red triangles), conditional on 1860 covariates of the individual's 1935 county of residence. The right panel is the same for in-migration, conditional on 1860 covariates of the individual's 1940 county of residence.

This pattern holds more generally: migrants in the 1935-1940 period are distinct from non-migrants, but those differences are fairly constant across proportion slave in the county. Migrants are younger, more likely to be male, more highly educated, earn higher wages, and more likely to have both of their parents born in the U.S. Again, our key point is that these differences are largely the same for high-slave and low-slave counties. Even where there are statistically significant differences (e.g., out-migrant wages, out-migrant nativity, and out-migrant sex), the differences between high and low slave counties are miniscule. Furthermore, in the case of wages, the results indicate that wealthier people were leaving high-slave areas, but these migrants are the most likely to be conservative; and, conservatives leaving high-slave areas actually cuts against our observed patterns. These results are obviously tied to a specific five-year period in American history in which migration may have been distinct. These data, however, do provide suggestive evidence that the differences we are seeing are not due to geographic sorting alone.

Taken together, the evidence above suggests that geographic sorting is unlikely to be the exclusive explanation behind our results. Given this evidence, we conjecture that the movement of Americans has been for reasons mostly orthogonal to slavery in 1860, which would actually make our estimates of slavery's effect on contemporary attitudes conservative.

6.3 Inequality and Statistical Discrimination

The final alternative explanation that we consider is that contemporary (or historical) inequality between black residents and white residents, or other features of the local black communities, are the main drivers of contemporary differences in white attitudes. For instance O'Connell (2012) finds that slavery in 1860 predicts black-white income inequality today, using a OLS approach. Her results suggest that our findings could be explained by a simple theory of statistical discrimination (Becker, 2010) if the lower incomes of African-Americans is what shapes white attitudes towards them, more generally. In addition, if poverty correlates with other traits (such as, for example, higher instances of crime) then we might expect this type of statistical discrimination to be even more pronounced.

We address this story of statistical discrimination with three analyses, all of which cast doubt on its explanatory power. First, in Appendix Table A.11, we show that the effect of slavery on black-white income inequality today is not robust to different empirical specifications. For example, we show that, while an OLS approach shows that slavery is positively correlated with inequality, our IV approach shows no such statistically significant relationship. We do not think this is an issue of statistical power because repeating the analysis for black-white inequality in 1940 wages shows that applying the IV strategy actually increases the magnitude of the effect of slavery on inequality. Thus, while there is evidence that slavery increased historical income inequality, there is much weaker evidence that this effect has persisted until today. We also present the effects of median income in the county, which are even more divergent, showing negative effects of slavery under OLS, positive effects under IV. The inconsistency of the results on these economic indicators and the consistency of the results for political attitudes means that it is unlikely that these economic indicators are driving the entirety of our estimated effects.

Second, we show that local income inequality is a weak predictor of our main outcome variables, and, if anything, the effects are in the opposite direction as statistical discrimination theory would predict. In Appendix Table A.12, we show that inequal-

ity has a statistically significant relationship only with proportion Democrat and in this case, the relationship is actually positive. The relationships with support for affirmative action and racial resentment are small and not significant. Furthermore, the table also shows that including contemporary black-white income inequality into our baseline specification does not substantially change our estimates of the effects of slave prevalence.

Finally, we check an observable implication of the inequality account. If income inequality drives these effects, then the marginal effect of slavery on attitudes should vary in the income level of the respondent. For example, higher income respondents might be more responsive to the inequality mechanism, since the discrepancy between their income and that of the local black population is higher. In Appendix Table A.13, we show that there is no interaction between respondent income and proportion slave. Taken together, these three analyses provide evidence that statistical discrimination and inequality are not the main drivers of our findings.

7 Conclusion

In this paper, we have shown that an institution that was formally abolished 150 years ago still has effects on attitudes today. Specifically, we show American slavery and its aftermath has had a direct impact on Southern whites' (1) partisan affiliation, (2) attitudes on affirmative action, (3) levels of racial resentment, and (4) attitudes toward blacks. We further show that our findings are robust to instrumenting for cotton suitability, lending credence to this being a causal relationship. Our findings are also robust to including a wide variety of factors that could plausibly affect both the share of the population that was enslaved and also contemporary political attitudes (although the latter suffer from post-treatment bias). Importantly, our results point to the idea that *localized* prevalence of slavery is what is what drives the findings, as opposed to the idea that state-level patterns (or the simple legality of slavery at the state level) is the driving factor.

In addition, we rule out a variety of alternative mechanisms that could potentially drive our results, some related to slavery and others not. Specifically, we rule out the theory "racial threat," or the idea that contemporary shares of the black (minority) population is what drives white (majority) group racial attitudes. When we take into account the post-treatment contemporary share of the black population using the appropriate methods, our results show that slavery continues to have a separate direct effect.

We also provide strong suggestive evidence that our results are not due exclusively to geographic mobility over the course of the 20th century.

Our results appear to suggest a separate causal channel attributable to the localized institution of slavery and of post-war incentives to maintain whites' superior social standing. Specifically, we have developed a theory that links slavery to emancipation and a post-war landscape, one in which whites coordinated to provide an informal social infrastructure (and to the extent legally permissible an institutional one as well) to maintain the economic and political power previously guaranteed to them under slavery. Providing affirmative evidence of this particular causal channel is challenging; however, we show in this paper that we can trace cultural and repressive features stemming from slavery over time—for example, in consistently more conservative (for many years more Democrat) presidential vote shares, higher rates of lynching and radicalized violence, and decreased wealth concentrated in black farms. As further evidence supporting this theory, we show that those areas of the U.S. South that were quick to mechanize and shift to tractor usage are also those areas in which the effect of slavery and its aftermath is the fastest to decline. In terms of the pathways of persistence, we have offered strong evidence that parent-to-child transmission represents at least one mechanism by which attitudes are passed down over time. However, we do not rule out that Southern institutions may have also played a role in the cultural transmission.

Our research has substantial implications for our understanding and study of politics, not just in the U.S. context. Much work within political science, and public opinion specifically, focuses on contemporary respondent factors, such as income, age, gender, education, etc. However, this style of research overlooks historical and culturally rooted explanations for the formation of public opinion. Our findings here suggest that slavery and its aftermath were of significant consequence in shaping the culture and politics of the U.S. South, and possibly of the country as a whole. In light of this, we encourage future research to explore the relationships between historical institutions and contemporary political behavior. As Key (1949) himself observed, social and historical forces have "an impact on political habit whose influence has not worn away even yet." This might be the case not just for development of political attitudes in the U.S. South, but also in other arenas within American economic and political development and elsewhere in the world.

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A Supplemental Information: Additional analyses

A.1 Matching Adjacent Counties

Although our analyses so far control for a number of historical and geographic covariates it remains possible that our results are driven by differences between slaveholding and non-slaveholding areas not fully captured by these covariates. For instance, it could be that the "upland" regions of northern Alabama and Georgia differed systematically from the Black Belt (as suggested by Kousser, 2010). To test the robustness of our results to these potential confounders, we restrict our sample to the set of neighboring counties that are on either side of a cutoff of 50% slave in 1860 (Figure A.1 of Appendix B). This enables us to compare the effects of slavery across counties that are geographically and perhaps also politically, economically, and culturally similar (as Banerjee and Iyer, 2005, do with Indian districts). It also drops certain former high slave counties that are in regions where all of the neighbors are also high slave areas—for example, the Mississippi Delta (compare Figure A.1 with Figure 1). Columns (1), (3), and (5) of Table A.1 show that the results for all three of our CCES outcomes are robust to restricting our analysis to only these neighboring counties, even though this removes more than half of the counties in our original sample. Thus, even within fairly geographically concentrated areas, there are strong, statistically significant differences between counties with higher and lower past concentrations of slaves.[25]

A.2 Counterfactual Comparisons to the North

If the effects that we estimate are genuinely attributable to the local prevalence of slavery, then we should see no difference in our outcomes between areas of the South that were largely non-slaveholding and areas in other parts of the country that also did not have slaves, such as counties in the North. In addition, if no such differences exist, then that would provide evidence against the alternative theory that it is the institutional *legality* of slaveholding, rather than the *local prevalence* of slavery, that is driving our results. Making these comparisons with the North also enables us to address what we consider to be the appropriate counterfactual, which is what contemporary political attitudes in the South would have been had slavery been as non-prevalent in the South as it was in the North.

We therefore examine differences between Southern counties with very few slaves in 1860 and non-Southern counties with no slaves in 1860. To do this, we restrict the

[25] The results are substantively similar when we use different cutoffs below and above 50% (Appendix Table A.7). The conclusions are also the same when, rather than using the 50% cutoff, we take in our sample only those counties that border a county in which proportion slaves differs by more than 20 percentage points.

Table A.1: Neighbor matching within South and between South and Non-South.

	Prop. Democrat		Affirm. Action		Racial Resentment	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prop. Slave, 1860	−0.197*		−0.200**		0.535†	
	(0.078)		(0.068)		(0.283)	
Slave State		0.048		0.073		−0.376
		(0.086)		(0.090)		(0.270)
State Fixed Effects	✓		✓		✓	
1860 Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
50% Threshold Match	✓		✓		✓	
North-South Match		✓		✓		✓
N	326	100	326	100	289	95
R^2	0.313	0.413	0.201	0.169	0.238	0.113

Note: †p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01. Columns (1), (3) and (5) show results of regressions with state fixed effects and 1860 covariates for those counties that border a county in which proportion slave lies on the other side of the 50% threshold. Columns (2), (4) and (6) show difference between slave-state counties with few slaves (< 3% of 1860 population) and non-Southern counties, matched on geography, farm value per capita, and total population. Coefficients are from a regressions on the matched data, that include a dummy variable for "slave state" as well as the 1860 covariates. All models are WLS with county sample sizes as weights.

data to counties in slave states where fewer than 3% of the county population was enslaved,[26] and then match these counties to similar counties in non-slaves states on geography (latitude/longitude), county size, farm value per capita, mixed-race population, and total county population.[27] We regress each of our three CCES outcome variables on the 1860 covariates as well as on a dummy variable for the county being in a slave state. Columns (2), (4) and (6) of Table A.1 show these results and confirm that there exists no difference between the Southern counties and the non-Southern counties beyond the effect of local slave prevalence. This provides evidence that the local prevalence of slavery, rather than state laws permitting the ownership of slaves, drives our results.

A.3 Rural versus Urban Counties

Another plausible explanation for our findings is that large slaveholding counties tend to be more rural today than counties that have smaller slave proportions, maybe be-

[26] This analysis is fairly robust to the choice of cut-off; for example, choosing only counties in slave states that had up to 5% enslaved resulted in a comparable analysis.

[27] We use coarsened exact matching (CEM) on these variables, employing the default cut-points (Iacus, King, and Porro, 2012; Stefano Iacus and Gary King and Giuseppe Porro, 2009). To avoid biasing our results, we drop Maryland and Missouri from the Northern sample since both had non-trivial slavery in 1860.Replicating this analysis with propensity score matching or genetic matching does not substantively change the results (available upon request).

Table A.2: The effects of slavery after eliminating large urban centers and controlling for Civil War destruction.

	Prop Democrat		Affirm. Action		Racial Resentment	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prop. Slave, 1860	-0.106^{*}	-0.136^{**}	-0.132^{**}	-0.141^{**}	0.349^{*}	0.546^{**}
	(0.051)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.039)	(0.174)	(0.153)
Civil War Destruction		−0.010		−0.007		0.049
		(0.008)		(0.007)		(0.032)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Dense Counties Dropped	✓		✓		✓	
N	689	768	689	768	616	693
R^2	0.150	0.182	0.114	0.128	0.097	0.149

Note: $^{\dagger}p < .1; ^{*}p < .05; ^{**}p < .01$. All models are WLS with within-county sample size as weights. Dense counties are those defined to be in the top ten percentile of population density in 1860.

cause they had plantations and other large farms. Our results might therefore reflect the simple fact that rural counties tend to be more conservative than urban counties.

To examine this possibility, we remove from our dataset the top ten percentile of all Southern counties in terms of 1860 population density. Thus, we remove ten percent of counties that have been historically the most urban. Removing these counties hardly changes the estimated effects of slavery, as indicated in columns (1), (3) and (5) of Table A.2. Our results are therefore unlikely to be attributable to the sparse populations of former slaveholding counties.[28]

A.4 Civil War Destruction

A third possibility is that slaveholding counties were more adversely affected by the Civil War (1861–1865). The damage to infrastructure and the loss of life resulting from the War was extensive and affected the South's agricultural areas disproportionately (Goldin and Lewis, 1975).[29] This could affect our analysis in two ways. First, in light of the federal government's role in the war, whites in war-torn slave counties perhaps became more resentful of the federal government, which in turn they express through

[28] An alternative strategy is to restrict our attention to counties that are rural today as opposed to rural counties in 1860. This approach, however, potentially suffers from post-treatment bias since the prevalence of slavery in 1860 could affect population density today. Mindful of this possibility, we include such an analysis in the Appendix, noting that the results are consistent with those of Table A.2. Similar results are obtained when controlling for modern-day county population as opposed to 1860 county population.

[29] The correlation between proportion slave in 1860 and our measure of the Civil War's impact (described below) is positive at 0.23.

resentment toward blacks. Second, it may be that the Civil War disrupted the social fabric of these communities, aggravating racial strife in the process (Collier et al., 2013).

In either case, we would expect the effects of slavery to diminish once we control for Civil War destruction. Columns (2), (4) and (6) of Table A.2 therefore control for U.S. Census measurements of the percentage drop in the average value of farms in the county between 1860 and 1870, which is a proxy for Civil War destruction.[30] As Table A.2 indicates, slavery's effects on our three outcome measures are hardly affected by the inclusion of this variable.[31] Furthermore, in results not presented here, we find that even when we include an interaction term between proportion slave and Civil War destruction, the interaction is not significant.

B Supplemental Information: Additional Tables and Figures

[30] We assume that ignorability is satisfied here for both slavery and Civil War destruction with the same set of covariates, which would make the effect on the slave variable the controlled direct effect. We believe that this is a more plausible assumption than that made with respect to contemporary black population. The reason is because conditioning on 1860s covariates is likely to result in an accurate estimate of which counties suffered more destruction during the Civil War, but would probably not be sufficient to separately identify the effect of black concentrations in the 20th century.

[31] Since the nature of land value changed dramatically before and after the Civil War due to the emancipation of slaves (Wright, 1986), we use an alternative measure of destruction based on the loss in livestock value in Table A.10. Results using this measure are almost identical to those presented here.

Table A.3: Summary statistics for the county-level variables.

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Outcomes					
Prop. Democrat	1,223	0.310	0.259	0.000	1.000
Support for Affirmative Action	1,223	0.220	0.229	0.000	1.000
Racial Resentment	1,069	4.127	0.700	1.000	5.000
Lynchings per 100,000 1920 Residents, 1882-1930	1,183	9.358	18.032	0.000	178.134
Geographic Variables					
County Area, 2000	1,215	0.151	0.094	0.001	1.497
Ruggedness	1,131	44.882	50.282	2.106	334.972
Latitude, 2000	1,215	34.163	2.947	24.850	40.521
Longitude, 2000	1,215	−86.814	6.763	−106.235	−75.685
Water Acces, 1860	929	0.349	0.477	0	1
Other 1860 Covariates					
Gini Coefficient for Land Holdings, 1860	905	0.486	0.079	0.000	0.789
Prop. Democratic Vote, 1856	781	60.160	15.426	11.500	100.000
Prop. Small Farms (< 50 Acres), 1860	905	0.443	0.213	0.023	1.000
Total Population, 1860	917	10,666.210	9,509.694	42	174,491
Farm Value per Capita, 1860	905	195.513	128.338	0.501	966.004
Prop. Free Black, 1860	917	0.011	0.021	0.000	0.184
Rail Access, 1860	929	0.262	0.440	0	1
Other Variables					
Cotton Suitability	1,212	0.322	0.151	0.000	0.778
Prop. Black, 2000	1,214	0.170	0.173	0.000	0.846
Tractor Growth, 1930-1940	1,182	0.018	0.031	−0.030	0.252

Table A.4: Summary statistics for individual-level data.

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
CCES, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011					
Democratic Identification	36,636	0.334	0.472	0	1
Support for Affirmative Action	36,574	0.229	0.420	0	1
Racial Resentment	15,483	4.017	1.128	1.000	5.000
1st/2nd Gen. Immigrant	36,541	0.071	0.257	0	1
Age	36,636	52.153	15.367	18	96
ANES, 1984-1998					
Black Therm. Score	2,628	62.598	21.616	0	100
White Therm. Score	1,690	74.972	18.782	0	100
White-Black Therm. Difference	1,658	12.935	22.877	−50	100

Note: Restricted to self-identified whites living in the former Confederate states (plus Kentucky).

Table A.5: Effects of slavery on individual white attitudes

	Prop Democrat		Affirm. Action		Racial Resentment	
	logistic		logistic		OLS	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prop. Slave, 1860	−0.639*	−0.589*	−0.802**	−0.729**	0.526**	0.472*
	(0.251)	(0.254)	(0.244)	(0.249)	(0.192)	(0.184)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cluster-Robust SEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Individual Covariates		✓		✓		✓
N	24,541	23,479	24,499	23,437	10,224	10,210
R^2					0.022	0.072
AIC	30,704.210	29,101.100	26,715.460	25,028.100		

Note: $^{\dagger}p < .1$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the county level.

Table A.6: Feeling thermometer score effect disaggregated by race.

	Black Therm. Scores		White Therm. Scores	
	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Prop. Slave, 1860	−24.354**	−18.611*	1.983	22.265
	(6.409)	(7.246)	(9.247)	(15.984)
Clustered SEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
State/Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓		✓	
N	1,795	2,001	1,138	1,264
R^2	0.101	0.090	0.061	0.030

$^{\dagger}p < .1$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$. All analyses are at the individual level with standard errors clustered at the county level. Data from the ANES 1984-1998.

Table A.7: Varying the cutoff for the neighbor matching analysis.

	Proportion Democrat				
	(1) 30%	(2) 40%	(3) 50%	(4) 60%	(5) 70%
Prop. Slave, 1860	-0.122^{*}	-0.214^{***}	-0.197^{**}	-0.219^{*}	-0.296^{*}
	(0.064)	(0.071)	(0.078)	(0.131)	(0.173)
N	390	388	326	212	106
R^2	0.241	0.316	0.313	0.291	0.345
	Support for Affirmative Action				
Prop. Slave, 1860	-0.054	-0.158^{**}	-0.200^{**}	-0.419^{**}	$-0.254^{\dagger}$
	(0.052)	(0.058)	(0.068)	(0.110)	(0.147)
N	390	388	326	212	106
R^2	0.116	0.174	0.201	0.253	0.324
	Racial Resentment				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Prop. Slave, 1860	0.165	0.679^{**}	$0.535^{\dagger}$	1.043^{*}	0.912
	(0.227)	(0.230)	(0.283)	(0.495)	(0.782)
N	357	347	289	183	92
R^2	0.127	0.275	0.238	0.261	0.240
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: $^{\dagger}p < .1$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$.

Table A.8: First stage estimates from the sequential g-estimation model of Table 8.

	Prop Democrat	Affirm. Action	Racial Resentment
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Prop. Slave, 1860	-0.108^{*}	-0.037	0.297
	(0.052)	(0.046)	(0.185)
Log Population, 1860	0.014	0.003	0.0001
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.039)
Prop. Black 2000	-0.007	-0.122^{*}	0.227
	(0.064)	(0.056)	(0.223)
Log Population, 2000	0.015^{*}	0.021^{**}	-0.075^{**}
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.026)
Percent High School Graduates, 1990	0.006^{**}	0.003^{**}	-0.012^{**}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)
Unemployment, 1999	0.006	-0.004	$0.027^{\dagger}$
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.016)
Median Income, 2000	-0.167^{**}	-0.207^{**}	0.620^{**}
	(0.049)	(0.043)	(0.174)
Black-White Income Ratio, 1990	0.061^{**}	0.033^{*}	$-0.115^{\dagger}$
	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.065)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓	✓
N	614	614	558
R^2	0.295	0.204	0.218

Note: $^{\dagger}p < .1$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$. Note that conditional on the past, proportion black today lacks explanatory power. While the estimates of proportion slave are insignificant in these models, their estimates possess large amounts of post-treatment bias due to the contemporary variables. Each model includes weights for the within-county sample size.

Table A.9: Controlling for proportion slaveholder in the county.

	Prop. Democrat	Affirm. Action	Racial Resentment
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Prop. Slave, 1860	-0.175^{**}	-0.150^{**}	0.714^{**}
	(0.052)	(0.045)	(0.175)
Prop Slaveholder, 1860	5.136^{*}	3.578	-14.010
	(2.564)	(2.207)	(8.830)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓	✓
N	769	769	694
R^2	0.181	0.125	0.144

Note: $^{\dagger}p < .1$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$.

Table A.10: Alternative measure of civil war destruction based on livestock value.

	Prop. Democrat	Affirm. Action	Racial Resentment
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Prop. Slave, 1860	-0.135^{**}	-0.143^{**}	0.555^{**}
	(0.046)	(0.040)	(0.154)
Livestock Value Loss, 1860-1870	0.0003	-0.0002	0.005
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.005)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓	✓
N	766	766	691
R^2	0.179	0.124	0.146

Note: $^{\dagger}p < .1$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$. Livestock value loss is the decrease in the value of livestock in a county between 1860 and 1870 as a proportion of 1860 livestock value.

Table A.11: Effect of slavery on measures of inequality and income.

	log White-Black Wage Gap, 1940		log White-Black Income Gap, 1990		log Median Income, 2000	
	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prop. Slave, 1860	0.510^{**}	2.371^{**}	0.320^{**}	0.242	-0.172^{**}	0.566^{**}
	(0.186)	(0.719)	(0.077)	(0.289)	(0.065)	(0.195)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓		✓		✓	
N	648	750	614	704	769	926
R^2	0.202	0.038	0.150	0.119	0.334	0.133

Note: $^{\dagger}p < .1$; $^{**}p < .05$; $^{***}p < .01$. All outcomes from the U.S. Census.

Table A.12: Effect of slavery versus the effect of inequality

	Prop Democrat		Affirm. Action		Racial Resentment	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
log White-Black Income Ratio, 1990	0.050^{*}	0.114^{**}	0.023	0.072^{**}	−0.024	-0.206^{*}
	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.079)	(0.102)
Prop. Slave, 1860		-0.171^{*}		-0.116^{**}		0.580^{**}
		(0.048)		(0.041)		(0.168)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1860 Controls		✓		✓		✓
N	904	614	904	614	806	558
R^2	0.175	0.232	0.079	0.161	0.075	0.160

Note: $^{\dagger}p < .1$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$. Inequality here is measured by the log of the ratio of white to black income in 1990. This county-level data comes from the U.S. Census.

Table A.13: Interaction of slavery with income on individual white attitudes.

	Prop Democrat	Affirm. Action	Racial Resentment
	logistic	logistic	OLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Prop. Slave, 1860	−0.370	−0.717*	0.467*
	(0.283)	(0.287)	(0.197)
Income	−0.047**	−0.058**	0.006
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.005)
Prop. Slave × Income	−0.019	0.025	−0.006
	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.015)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Cluster-Robust SEs	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓	✓
Individual Covariates	✓	✓	✓
N	23,479	23,437	10,210
R^2			0.074
AIC	28,711.970	24,528.590	

Note: $^{\dagger}p < .1$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$.

Table A.14: How the effect of slavery varies by declines in the black population in the 20th century.

	Prop Democrat		Affirm. Action		Racial Resentment	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prop. Slave, 1860	−0.110*	−0.132*	−0.107*	−0.123*	0.295	0.192
	(0.055)	(0.061)	(0.047)	(0.052)	(0.246)	(0.269)
Prop Black Decline, 1940-1920	0.749*		0.681*		−2.196	
	(0.346)		(0.298)		(1.536)	
Prop Black Decline, 1970-1920		0.177		0.280*		−0.263
		(0.150)		(0.129)		(0.656)
Prop Slave × Black Decline, 1940-1920	−1.417†		−1.420*		6.053†	
	(0.732)		(0.629)		(3.200)	
Prop Slave × Black Decline, 1970-1920		−0.269		−0.496*		1.799
		(0.293)		(0.251)		(1.271)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	769	768	769	768	663	662
R^2	0.183	0.179	0.131	0.130	0.121	0.121

Note: †p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01.

Table A.15: Effect of slavery on intermediate outcomes.

	Black-White Tenancy Share Gap, 1925		Black-White Owner Share Gap, 1925	
	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Prop. Slave, 1860	0.154**	1.155**	−0.093†	−0.766**
	(0.051)	(0.306)	(0.049)	(0.252)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographic Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓		✓	
N	791	893	791	927
R^2	0.385	−0.251	0.327	0.026

Note: †p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01. Black-White Tenancy Share Gap is the difference between the proportion of all black farms under tenancy agreements minus the proportion of all white farms under tenancy agreements. Black-White Owner Share Gap is the difference between the proportion of all black farms owned by the (black) operator minus the proportion of all white farms owned by the (white) operator.

Table A.16: Association between tractor growth and racial disparities.

	Lynchings per 100,000 residents	Log Black-White Wage Ratio
	(1)	(2)
Tractor growth, 1930-1940	14.924	−1.051
	(21.886)	(0.857)
Prop. Slave, 1860	11.994*	−0.523**
	(4.660)	(0.186)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓
N	748	637
R^2	0.357	0.211

Note: †p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01.

Table A.17: Effect of slavery on anti-black hate crimes.

	Any Anti-Black Hate Crimes		
	OLS		IV
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Prop. Slave, 1860	0.219**	−0.248†	0.983*
	(0.078)	(0.144)	(0.420)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Geographic Controls	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓	
N	1,214	809	979
R^2	0.169	0.303	0.176

†p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01

Note: †p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01. Dependent variable is the reporting of any hate crime in the county from 1992-2010. Hate crimes data comes United States Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation (2010). Results from a logistic regression instead of OLS for the first two columns are extremely similar.

Table A.18: Effect heterogeneity by whether the respondent lived in the same city as a minor.

	Democrat		Support Affirm. Action		Racial Resentment	
	logistic				OLS	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prop. Slave, 1860	$-0.506^{\dagger}$	$-0.440^{\dagger}$	-1.037^{**}	-0.941^{**}	0.428^{*}	$0.354^{\dagger}$
	(0.297)	(0.268)	(0.308)	(0.314)	(0.203)	(0.191)
Lived Here Since Youth	$0.198^{\dagger}$	0.239^{**}	0.283^{*}	$0.241^{\dagger}$	-0.134^{*}	-0.147^{*}
	(0.108)	(0.090)	(0.120)	(0.124)	(0.065)	(0.065)
Prop. Slave × Since Youth	-0.714^{*}	-0.829^{**}	-0.480	-0.635	0.319	$0.362^{\dagger}$
	(0.319)	(0.252)	(0.429)	(0.446)	(0.210)	(0.211)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cluster-Robust SEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Individual Covariates		✓		✓		✓
N	18,662	17,700	18,662	17,700	10,161	10,147
R^2					0.038	0.089
AIC	22,274.860	21,579.780	18,447.210	17,197.330		

Note: $^{\dagger}p < .1$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$. Youth here defined as 18 or younger.



Figure A.1: Sample of pairs of neighboring counties that fall on different sides of the 50% proportion slave cutoff.

B.1 Additional Evidence on Geographic Sorting

We also present some suggestive evidence using data on between-county migration from 1995 to 2000 from the 2000 U.S. Census (Bureau, 2001). These data help us investigate the extent to which *contemporary*, as opposed to historical migration, explains our findings (see Dell, 2010, for a similar analysis). In order for geographic sorting to explain our results, two conditions must hold. The first is that there must be migration from low-slave areas to high-slave areas (or vice-versa); otherwise, there is no meaningful sorting of any kind. To test this condition, we use county-to-county migration data to calculate dyads of where people move to and from, measuring the absolute difference in the proportion 1860 slave between the departing and receiving county; this enables us to assess how much migration exists between low-slave and high-slave areas. Appendix Figure A.2 shows the relationship between these flows and the difference in proportion slave, and it demonstrates that, as the slavery differential grows, the migrations between counties drops significantly. Thus, the vast majority of contemporary migration is within low-slave areas or within high-slave areas, not between.

The second condition for sorting to explain our findings is that racially conservative

whites are moving into high-slave areas, racially liberal whites are moving out of high-slave areas, or some combination. Even if there is very little migration between low- and high-slave counties (as shown in Appendix Figure A.2), the distribution of political beliefs among these migrants could be so highly skewed so as to produce our results. (For example, perhaps all of the out-migrants from high-slave counties are racially liberal and all of the in-migrants to high-slave counties are racially conservative.) With regard to the first possibility, this seems unlikely to be the primary mechanism as it relies on racially hostile whites moving to areas with extremely large proportions of African-Americans. For example, Farley et al. (1994), show that anti-black attitudes are correlated with stronger preferences for geographic segregation. More plausible is the exodus of racially liberal whites from former slave counties. To check this, again using contemporary data, we examine the relationship between the proportion slave in 1860 and out-migration in 1995-2000 census records. We find that proportion slave actually has a *negative* effect on contemporary out-migration (Appendix Table A.19). Thus, we have no evidence drawn from contemporary data for any of the necessary conditions behind a geographic sorting explanation.

Table A.19: Effect of slavery present-day migration.

	In-migration	Out-migration
	(1)	(2)
Prop. Slave, 1860	-0.044^{*}	-0.058^{**}
	(0.017)	(0.020)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓
1860 Covariates	✓	✓
N	809	809
R^2	0.188	0.154

Note: $^{\dagger}p < .1; ^{*}p < .05; ^{**}p < .01$.

Appendix References

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

Figure A.2: Relationship between county-to-county migration and the similarity of those counties on proportion slave. The darker the hexagon, the more county-dyads in that bin. The x-axis represents the absolute difference between the counties in term of proportion slave in 1860 and the y-axis represents the migration (1995–2000) from the sending county to the receiving county as a proportion of the sending county's 2000 population.

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